
GLIMPSES OF INDIAN POETICES

Satya Dev Choudhary



Glimpses of India Poetics, containing 21 essays, would furnish a valuable material on the subject. The essay 'A Survey of Sanskrit (Indian) Poetics' provides the readers a wide panorama of the history of the subject of about one and half millennium. The definition of Poetry, of course, cannot be presented in well-knit, accurate and precise form. The author agrees with the definition put forth by Jagannatha, though with some modification as 'रमणीयता-प्रतिपादकौ शब्दार्थौ काव्यम्'. The essay 'The Soul (Essence) of Poetry' deals with the topic in much detail and *dhvani* has been designated as the soul of poetry. The readers would appreciate the essays like 'The Nature of Aesthetic Pleasure' and 'Sādhāraṇikaraṇa' ('The Theory of Generalization') expressing a marvellous substance about what the poetic delectation is and how it is achieved by a *sahṛdaya* (compassionate) through generalization.

The essay 'The process of Poetic Creation' traces the psyche of the poet about the very moments when he actually becomes absorbed in composing his literary piece of work. The articles 'Causes of Poetry' and 'Originality and Plagiarism' deal with the creative activity of the poets of different calibre, and the essay 'Acting, Actor and Spectator' denotes how and upto what extent the spectator is influenced by the acting of the actor performing his job on the stage. The other essays, connected with various *alamkaras* and *rasas,* highlight and elucidate the academic issues related with them.

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SAHITYA AKADEMI

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Contents

यानेव शब्दान् वयमालपामः, यानेव चार्थान् वयमुल्लिखामः।
तैरेव विन्यासविशेषभव्यैः सम्मोहयन्ते कवयो जगन्ति॥

(नीलकण्ठदीक्षित)

यदवक्रं वचः शास्त्रे लोके च वच एव तत्।
वक्रं यदर्थवादादौ तस्य काव्यमिति स्मृतिः॥ (भोजराज)

निरन्तररसोद्गारगर्भसन्दर्भनिर्भराः।
गिरः कवीनां जीवन्ति न कथामात्रमाश्रिताः॥ (कुन्तक)

येषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशाद् विशदीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीय-तन्मयीभवयोग्यता ते हृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः। (अभिनवगुप्त)

यस्तुष्टे तुष्टिमायाति शोके शोकमुपैति च।
दैन्ये दीनत्वमभ्येति स नाट्ये प्रेक्षकः स्मृतः॥ (भोजराज)

इतरपापफलानि यथेच्छया वितर, तानि सहे चतुरानन!
अरसिकेषु कवित्वनिवेदनं, शिरसि मा लिख, मा लिख, मा लिख॥

(अज्ञात)

Preface

I am glad to present a book before my benevolent readers on different aspects of Indian Poetics, which is a vast and profound discipline of learning — not found in such a subtle as well as detailed form and developed tradition in any language of the world. This branch of learning attracted me from my student life and it remained my favourite subject till this date which I studied, taught, did my research on it and guided my students to do so for about five decades and authored a number of books on it: अधीतमध्यापितमर्जितं यशः.

This book, containing twenty one essays, I believe, would furnish a valuable material on the subject. The essay 'A survey of Sanskrit (Indian) Poetics', as an introduction of the book, provides the readers a wide panaroma of the history of the subject of about one and half millennium. It depicts the different view points of outstanding *ācāryas* (aestheticians) about the following Schools of Thought—Rasa, Alaṁkāra, Rīti, Dhvani, Vakrokti and Aucitya—evolved and developed from time to time, and the influence of these *ācāryas* on the subsequent writers on the subject.

The Definition of Poetry, of course, cannot be presented in well-knit, accurate and precise form. The Indian *ācāryas* throughout this long period of time — from Bharata to Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha — have tried their best to do so. I agree with the definition put forth by Jagannātha, though with some

modification as 'रमणीयता-प्रतिपादकौ शब्दार्थौ काव्यम्' . The historical survey of this remarkable academic effort, it may be noted, enables us to understand more vividly the nature and character of the technical terms of this discipline like *śabda* and *artha, rasa, alaṁkāra*, *rīti, guna*, *dhvani*, *vakrokti* and *dosa*, and also their relationship with each other

The essay 'The Soul (Essence) of Poetry' deals with the the topic in much detail and I quite agree with the great *ācārya* like Ānandavardhana that *dhvani* is the soul of poetry

The readers would certainly appreciate the essays like 'The Nature of Aesthetic Pleasure' and 'Sadharanikarana' ('The Theory of Generalization') expressing a marvellous substance about what the poetic delectation is and how it is achieved by a *sahṛdaya* (compassionate) through generalization Such type of psychic treatment about the subject, it is believed, might not be available in explicit and point-blank form in any treatise of Poetics accept in Sanskrit

The essay 'The process of Poetic Creation' traces the psyche of the poet about the very moments when he actually becomes absorbed in composing his literary piece of work like poetry, drama, story or novel. Similarly the articles 'Causes of Poetry' and 'Originality and Plagiarism' deal with the creative activity of the poets of different calibre, and the essay 'Acting, Actor and Spectator' denotes how and upto what extent the spectator is influenced by the acting of the actor performing his job on the stage.

The other essays, conneced with various *alamkaras* and *rasas,* highlight and elucidate the academic issues related with them. An article entitled 'Percepthke Experience in Bhāvika Alaṁkāra' written by my friend, the late Dr. R.C Dwivedi has been included in this book with his prior consent. In fact I could not resist the temptation of including it among the essays on *alṁkāras*.

The book has been presented in clear and lucid expression and style as far as possible. It is also studded with authentic quotations and appropriate illustrations wherever they are needed. These would certainly help the readers understand the scholarly issues and subtle points discussed in it. I hope that through this modest attempt of mine some of the readers would cultivate the desire of studying some of the original texts on Poetics written in Sanskrit itself, and if that happens, it would be a great reward for me in offering this book to them.

— Satya Dev Choudhary

The scheme of transliteration

अ	आ	इ	ई	उ	ऊ	ऋ	ऌ
a	ā	i	ī	u	ū	ṛ	ḷ
ए	ऐ	ओ	औ	अं	अः		
e	ai	o	au	ṁ	ḥ		
क्	ख्	ग्	घ्	ङ्			
k	kh	g	gh	ṅ			
च्	छ्	ज्	झ्	ञ्			
c	ch	j	jh	ñ			
ट्	ठ्	ड्	ढ्	ण्			
ṭ	ṭh	ḍ	ḍh	ṇ			
त्	थ्	द्	ध्	न्			
t	th	d	dh	n			
प्	फ्	ब्	भ्	म्			
p	ph	b	bh	ṁ			
य्	र्	ल्	व्				
y	r	l	v				
श्	ष्	स्	ह्				
ś	ṣ	s	h				
क्ष्	त्र्	ज्ञ्					
kṣ	tr	jñ					

Abbreviations

Abhi		Abhijñanaśākuntala
Abhinava	..	Abhinavabharati
A K	.	Alaṁkārakaustubha.
A P	..	Agnipurāṇa
A.S	.	Alaṁkārasarvasva
A V C		Aucityavicaracarca
B B		Balabodhini
Bh.G.		Bhagavadgita
Bh.Pr	.	Bhāvaprakaśa
Bṛ. A U.		Brhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad.
C A.	.	Candraloka
Com	..	Commentary.
D R.	...	Dasarūpaka.
Dh A	. .	Dhvanyaloka
Dh A L	.	Dhvanyalokalocana
Ekā	..	Ekāvali
I.P V V	..	Iśvara pratyabhijña vimarśini vyakhyā
J.V	..	Jayadrathavadha
K.A.(Bh)	..	Kāvyālaṁkara (Bhamaha)
K A (Ru)	.	Kāvyālaṁkara (Rudrata)
K.Anu	..	Kavyanuśasana.
K.A	...	Kāvyadarsa.

K.M	Kāvyamīmāṁsā.
K S	Kumārasambhava
K S S	Kavyālaṁkāra-sāra-saṁgraha
K S Vṛ	Kāvyālaṁkāra-sūtravṛtti.
L V	Lalitavistara
M D	Meghadūta
N D	Nātyadarpana
N S	Nātyaśāstra.
N of R	Number of Rasas.
N S M	Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī
Nyā	Nyāyadarśana
Pra Hr.	Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya
Pra Y Bh	Pratāparudrayaśobhūsana
R G	Rasagaṁgādhara
R.M	Rasamañjarī
R T	Rasataraṁgiṇī.
Raghu.	Raghuvaṁśa
S D.	Sāhityadarpaṇa.
S K A	Sarasvatīkanthābharaṇa
Ś.Sū	Śivasūtra
Śr Pra	Śṛṁgāraprakāśa.
T Bh.	Tarkabhāsā.
T.S	Tarkasaṁgraha
U	Ullasa
U N.M	Ujjvalanīlamaṇi.
U R.C.	Uttararāmacarita.
V.J.	Vakroktijīvita
V R	Vālamīki-ramāyana
Vā A	Vāgbhatalaṁkāra.
Vṛ.	Vṛtti

1

A Survey of Sanskrit (Indian) Poetics

[1]

The Indian Poetics is nothing but Sanskrit Poetics which is an immortal encyclopedia of the theories and doctrines about poetry and drama The first available book of this discipline is *Nāṭyaśāstra* presumed to be authored by Bharata, who is thus accepted to be the first *ācārya* (aesthetician) of the Sanskrit Poetics. The last eminent *ācārya* of this science is Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha, the author of *Rasagaṁgādhara*. Bharata is believed to be belonging to between 2nd c.B.C. to 2nd c.A.D and Jagannātha belonged to 17th c.A.D. The Sanskrit Poetics thus is widespread over a period of one and half or two thousand years. Within this period the development of the doctrines of Poetics had taken place continuously though sometimes at slow and sometimes at fast pace.

The stand, regarding principles of poetry which was prevalent at the time of Bharata, changed during the period of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, the authors of *Kāvyālaṁkara* and *Kāvyādarśa*, belonging to 6th and 7th c.A.D. respectively. Bharata was an exponent of *rasa*, i.e., sentiment, while Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin were of *alaṁkāra*, i.e., embellishment or figurative beauty. According to both these *acāryas*, *rasa* was taken to be a mode of *alaṁkāra*.

In the 9th c.A.D. three *ācāryas* by the name of Vāmana, Udbhaṭa and Ānandavardhana came into existence in this field. They are the authors of *Kāvyālaṁkāra-sūtra-vṛitti*, *Kāvyālaṁkara-sāra-saṁgraha* and *Dhvanyāloka* in respective

order Among these Vāmana, supporting *rīti* (poetic diction or style), had declared it to be the *ātman* (essence or soul) of poetry, while Udbhaṭa, the follower of Bhamaha and Daṇḍin, was an adherent of *alaṁkāra*, but Ānandavardhana accepted *dhvani* (an aesthetic suggestivity) as the soul of poetry. On the basis of this theory he shifted the Sanskrit Poetics into a new direction That is why, Anandavardhana is said to be an epoch-making *ācārya*, and the history of the Sanskrit Poetics can be divided into three periods on the basis of his theory as follows: (i) pre-*dhvani* period, (ii) *dhvani*-period and (iii) post-*dhvni* period

After Ānandavardhana, for about two hundred years, many aestheticians refuted the theory of *dhvani*, e.g.:

(i) Dhanañjaya (10th c A.D.), the author of *Dasarupaka*, included *dhvani* into *tātaparyā-vrtti* (the function of the words called purport),

(ii) Kuntaka (10th-11th c.A.D.), the author of *Vakrotijīvita*, into *vakrokti* (clever speech or artful expression), and

(iii) Mahimabhaṭṭa (11th c.A.D.), the author of *yaktiviveka*, into *Anumana* (an inference).

(iv) Apart from all this, an effort was made to include *dhvani* into *abhidha* (word's power of direct signification) and *lakśaṇa* (the power of indication).

But Mammaṭa (11th c.A.D), the author of *Kavyaprakasa*, through his profound exposition, refuting all the adversaries of *dhvani*, defended and re established the theory of *dhvani* indisputably, and throughout six centuries ahead, the doctrine of *dhvani* was accepted by almost all the *acaryas* Even Jayadeva (13th c.A.D.), who had accepted *alṁkara* to be an inseparable component of poetry, dealt with *dhvani* in his book *Candrāloka*. Viśvanātha (14th c.A.D.) though established *rasa* as an *ātman* (essence or soul) of poetry, yet, while treating the theory of *dhvani* with all its varieties

and sub-varieties in his book *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, accepted *rasa* as an important varity of *dhvani*. The last *ācārya* Jagannātha (17th c.A.D.) advocated this theory with full faith in it.

Mammaṭa's book *Kāvyaprakāśa* is a compact compilation of almost all the principal doctrines about Poetics. Before and after Mammaṭa, a number of *ācāryas* also had done compilation work in this field. Prior to him the names of Rudrata, Rājaśekhara, Bhojarāja and the author of *Agnipurāṇa* are worth-mentioning; and after him the names of Hemcandra, Vāgbhaṭa I, Ruyyaka, Jayadeva, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Vāgbhaṭa II, Viśvanātha, Keśavamiśra and Kavikarṇapūra. All these *ācāryas* collected in their books almost all the components of poetry which had come into existence upto their time.

Apart from the above-said *ācāryas*, two other are specially worthy of mention: Bhānumiśra and Appayadīkṣita. Bhānumiśra has authored two treatises namely *Rasataraṁgiṇi* dealing mainly with *rasa*, and *Rasamaṁjarī* dealing mainly with *Nāyaka-nāyikā-bheda* (the classification of the characters of the epic, drama, etc.). Appayadīkṣita is the author of three books: *Vṛttivārtika* dealing with *śabda-śakti*, i.e., the power of word, *Kuvalayānanda* and *Citra-mīmāṁsā* dealing with *alaṁkāras*.

[2]

Sanskrit *ācāryas*, not only expounded the doctrines about poetic forms, but about the drama also. The vast content of *Nāṭyaśāstra* by Bharata indicates that this work is the result of the tradition of the dramatic art prevalent in this country for the last many centuries prior to him.

After Bharata, it seems, this tradition ceased altogether. The probable reason might be that the various concepts about poetic art were so profound, extensive and progressive that the *ācāryas* became disinclined towards the formation of the

principles connected with dramaturgy Another reason might be that the content of *Nātyaśāstra* is so wide and also related to many aspects — like the various kinds of actors and actresses, their mode of acting at various occasions and situations, the movement of limbs of the body while dancing, the size and shape of the stage, etc , that it was a challenge for the writers to formulate new doctrines about dramaturgy surpassing those stated in *Nātyaśāstra* It was, however, about 13-14 centuries later that the *ācāryas* like Dhananjaya, Sāgaranandī, Rāmacandra Gunacandra, Saradatanaya and Śiṁgabhūpāla wrote their treatises exclusively on dramaturgy and resurrected this part of Poetics. Viśvanatha also, probably influenced by *Daśarūpaka* of Dhananjaya, included one chapter on dramaturgy in his famous work *Sahityadarpaṇa*.

The subject-matter of *Nāyaka nayika bhada* (the classification of heroes and heroines), in our opinion, is more concerned with the Dramatics than the Poetics. That is why, all the above-said authors of the Dramatics have necessarily included this topic in their works. Apart from them, the following authors have dealt exhaustively with this topic in their treatises . Rudraṭa, Rudrabhaṭṭa, Bhojraja, the author of *Agnipurāṇa*, Bhanumiśra, Rupagosvami and Sant Akabarshah.

Another topic of the works on Poetics is *Kavi siksa*, i.e , instructions for the poets as to how to create their works Vāgbhaṭṭa II, Kṣemendra, Keśavamisra, Amaracandra yati, Deveśvara and other *ācāryas* have shed light on Kaviśiksa also along with other topics.

It is important to note that among all the *ācaryas* from Bharata to Jagannātha, the following ones should be designated as the originators, as they have established new dogmas in the field of Poetics: Bharata, Bhamaha, Vamana, Ānandavardhana and Kuntaka, while other *ācaryas* have

compiled the principles and statements which were already prevalent in this area of discipline. The following *ācāryas*, however, have their particular and remarkable place in this respect· Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha.

[3]

Apart from the above-said originators and compilers, the contribution of the commentators is no less significant in any way. Among the older interpreters of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* — the following names are worth-mentioning: Udbhata, Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, Śrīśaṁkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Bhatta tauta and Abhinavagupta (all belonging to between to 820 A.D. to 1000 A.D.). Among these, the commentary of Abhinavagupta by the name of '*Abhinava-bhāratī*' is available. He has mentioned the names of the above-said remaining five commentators.

Udbhaṭa has written a commentary by the name of *Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa* on *Kāvyālaṁkāra* authored by Bhāmaha. The famous commentators of *Kavyādarśa* by Daṇdin are Ratnaśrijñāna and Taruṇavācaspati. Rajānakatilaka and Pratihārendurāja have written the commentary on *Kāvyālaṁkāra-sāra-saṁgraha* by Udbhaṭa. Gopendra-tripurahara-bhūpāla is the commentator of *Kāvyālaṁkāra-sūtra-vṛtti* written by Vāmana.

Among the commentaries of *Dhvanyāloka* by Ānandavardhana, the very famous one is '*Locana*' by Abhinavagupta. Dhanika wrote a commentary on *Daśarūpaka* by Dhanañjaya, and Ruyyaka on *Vyaktiviveka* by Mahima-bhaṭṭa. More than 70 commentaries are said to be written on *Kāvyaprakāśa* by Mammaṭa. Among them the most renowned commentary is *Kāvyapradīpa* by Govind Ṭhakkura.

Rāmacandra Tarkavāgīśa is a famous commentator of *Sāhityadarpaṇa* by Viśvanātha, and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa of *Rasagaṁgādhara* by Jagannātha.

Among a number of commentators in Hindi, the name of Ācārya Viśveśvara is at the top of the list. His expositions on the works of Bharata, Vāmana, Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka, Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra and Mammata are really commendable. Śaligrāma has become famous for writing a commentary on *Sāhityadarpaṇa* by Viśvanātha. In recent years Śivanārāyaṇa Śāstrī wrote a worth-mentioning commentary on *Kāvyādarśa* by Dandin

The scholarly, profound and logical interpretation and annotation by these commentators led to solve many problems regarding the text of the original writers, and also to elucidate various theories and doctrines presented by them Among these commentators, the most remarkable job has been done by Abhinavagupta. He, therefore, is assigned as an *āchārya* and not a mere commentator.

[4]

The whole of the subject-matter of Sanskrit Poetics has conveniently and traditionally been divided into ten *kāvyaṁgas* (constitutents) of poetry -- rather of Poetics.

(1) *Kāvya-svarūpa* (the Nature of Poetry): (a) the causes of poetry, (b) the definition of poetry, (c) various classifications of poetry and (d) the purpose of poetry.

(2) *Śabdaśakti*, i.e., the signification of a word.

(3) *Dhvani-kāvya*, i.e., a piece of poetry containing an aesthetic suggestivity.

(4) *Guṇībhūta-vyaṁgya kāvya*, i.e., a piece of poetry where suggested sense is secondary to the primary sense.

(5) *Rasa* (Sentiment), i.e., the poetic relish.

(6) *Guṇa*, i.e., the excellences in poetic expression.

(7) *Rīti*, i.e., the style of poetry.

(8) *Alaṁkāra*, i.e., figurative beauty of poetry.

(9) *Doṣa,* i.e., blemishes in poetic expression.

(10) Nātya-vidhāna, i.e., Dramaturgy

Apart from these, one more constituent of poetry can be enumerated as *Nāyaka-nāyikā-bheda,* i.e., Classification of the hero and the heroine. It is better to include it in the field of *rasa* rather than to accept is as a separate *aṁga* (constituent) of Poetics

It may be noted that *rasa*, itself, though, has been taken as one of the kinds of *dhvani-kāvya*, yet it has been enumerated as a separate constituent of Poetics, the reason being that the discourses and problems of many sorts are to be discussed under this head, e.g., (i) the nature of *rasa*, (ii) the scholarly explanations by about at least 4 annotators about Bharata's theory of *rasa* as to how the poetic pleasure is relished and by whom, (iii) the number of *rasas*, (iv) *Rasa*: only one, (v) *Śṛṁgāra*: the prominent *rasa*, (vi) the nature of aesthetic pleasure of the *rasas* like *Karuṇa*, *Bhayānaka*, etc. (vii) Moreover, many varieties have been enumarated of almost all the *rasas*, especially of *Sṛṁgāra rasa*.

The aim of the prominent *ācāryas* was to put in words the various principles of Poetics and also to develop them. For this purpose they had selected the examples from literary works: epics, dramas, etc. Though the *ācāryas* like Daṇḍin, Jayadeva, Jagannātha had given the examples of the various *kāvyāṅgas* composed by themselves, but such *ācāryas* are not many.

It may be noted that varieties and sub-varieties of *śabdaśaki, dhvani, rasa, nāyaka* and *nāyikā, alaṁkāra, guṇa, rīti* and *dośa* went on increasing from time to time. It seems to be a positive proof that the *ācāryas* had gone through almost all the *kāvyas* right from *Rāmāyaṇa* onward for the purpose of introducing new elements of poetry whereupon the varieties and sub-varieties of the *kāvyāṅgas* also went on increasing.

But still there is an evidence that there was also a tendancy towards decreasing the varieties of the *kavyamgas*. For example: Kuntaka and Jayadeva decreased the number of varieties of *alṁkāra*; Mammata did not agree to accept the *alaṁkāra-dośas*, Ānandvardhana accepted 3 *guṇas* only instead of 10 put forth by Bharata, Dandin and Vamana. It, however, does not mean that these *acaryas* were of the view that such type of varieties are not found in poetry, but they, in fact, cherished to include them into the other *kavyamgas* accepted by them.

[5]

In this way, the principles and doctrines went on developing through the discussions for and against them among the *ācāryas* from Bharata onward for centuries together till the time of Mammaṭa when they got established, and he presented them into 10 forms in his famous treatise *Kāvyaprakāśa*. The notable result of all this was that the whole of the poetic philosophy was taken into five Schools, namely; Rasa-school, Alaṁkāra-school, Riti school, Dhvani school and Vakrokti-school. Apart from these Aucitya school is also taken as sixth one, though not to be accepted as such.

Among the above-said schools *Rīti* and *Vakroti*, founded by Vāmana and Kuntaka respectively, were not accepted by any other *ācārya* after them. And, if at all, any deliberation was made about them, it was simply to refute and discard them. Yet both these schools, however, related with the external form of poetry, are, in no way, ignorable. Many of the dogmas of Stylistics prevalent in west during the recent years can be compared with those of these two schools.

Out of the remaining three schools, Rasa school founded by Bharata was accepted by the author of *Agnipurāṇa*, Bhojarāja, Viśvanātha and many other *ācaryas*; the Alaṁkara-school introduced by Bhāmaha was accepted by Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa; and the Dhvani-school by the celebrities like Mammaṭa and Jagannātha.

Let us, now, discuss as to which *kāvyāṁga*, out of 5, the above-said, could be assigned *ātman* (the essence) of poetry. According to one of the many definitions of '*ātman*' is that it is another name of consciousness: चैतन्यमात्मा ('*caitanya-mātmā*'), and according to another. *ātman* is an agent of knowledge: ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा (*Jñānādhikaraṇamātmā*). In Poetics the word *ātman* stands for that sort of constituent of poetry which being means is (i) inevitable; (ii) extensive, and also (iii) related with internal form of beauty and not external form of it.

Out of above-noted five *kāvyāṁgas Alaṁkāra*, *Rīti* and *Vakrokti*, according to their founders—Bhāmaha, Vāmana and Kuntaka respectively — are, of course, inevitable and extensive means to make a piece of poetry, yet these are related mostly with external beauty of it and not mainly with its internal beauty. Out of the remaining two, *Rasa* and *Dhvani*, though both are internally related with poetic beauty, yet *rasa* (poetic pleasure) is not a means but an end to be achieved by a *sahṛdaya*[1] (a reader or spectator). **It is *dhvani*, which being a means bears above-noted all the three qualities.**[2] As far *Aucitya* is concerned, it is a polishing factor for any constituent of poetry, and it does not serve as a means for it. It should thus not be taken as an *ātman* of poetry and also not a 'School' like Alaṁkara-school, etc.[3]

[6]

Now let us discuss about the chronological order of these Schools. Rasa-school is taken to be earlier than Alaṁkāra and Rīti schools as the exponent of *rasa*, Bharata, is believed belonging to the period between 2nd c.B.C. to 2nd c.A.D., while the founders of *Alaṁkāra* and *Rīti* Schools—Bhāmaha and Vāmana—belong to 6th and 9th c.A.D. respectively. But astonishingly, Bhāmaha and his follower Daṇḍin have not presented the nature of *rasa* in the same fervour as it is

1. i.e., an aesthet, an appreatiator of poetic beauty.

2,3. For detail see 'The soul of Poetry', p. 41

done by Bharata, nor they have given any importance to it as is done by him. There are two possibilities of this state of affair:

Firstly, both the *āchāryas*, for some reason or other, could not go through the 6th and 7th chapters of *Nātyaśāstra* in which *rasa* and *bhāva* are discussed in much detail. Both the *ācāryas*, of course, were aware of *rasa* and they included it in the realm of *alaṁkāra*, but most probably they knew very little about it neither in its extensiveness, nor scholastic part of it.

And secondly, these two chapters might have been inserted in *Nātyaśāstra* after the time of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. Otherwise there was no possibility for Bhāmaha to put forth Alaṁkāra-school and give an importance to it in comparison to such a superb and outstanding School of Thought like Rasa.

In our opinion, the second possibility seems to be valid that Rasa-school came into existence after the Alamkara school especially when *Nātyaśāstra* is considered to be a compilation of the dogmas and theories of Dramaturgy etablished during many centuries on the basis of theatrical performances and stage-craft put forth from time to time, and thus, this treatise is not a production of a single person belonging to one place and one period of time. Is Bharata, then, not the author of this book? The scholars opine that this book though a production of many authors was attributed to a fictitious author by the name of Bharata, which literally means an actor—rather it might be the title of the best actor at the time when this book was compiled.

Same is the case with Vāmana, an exponent of Rīti school. He also seems to be having little knowledge about the theory of *rasa* discussed in much detail in *Nātyaśāstra*. The chronological order of these Schools of Thought, thus,

should be Alaṁkara - school, Rīti - school, Rasa - school, Dhvani - school and Vakrokti - school.

[7]

The books on Sanskrit Poetics have been written in three forms:

(1) Versified form—Bharata, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa, Rudraṭa, Dhanañjaya, Vāgbhaṭa I, Jayadeva, Appayadīkśita and other *acāryas* have written their books in verse, yet among these *ācāryas* Bharata, at a few places, has adopted prose also.

(2) *Sūtra-vrtti* form—In this form, the principles and doctrines have been written in aphorisms and their explanation in prose. The examples, however, have been given in poetic form. Vāmana and Ruyyaka have adopted this form, while the following *ācāryas* have written their books almost similar to this fashion: Vāgbhaṭṭa II, Bhānumiśra, Jagannātha and Sant Akabarshah.

(3) *Karikā-vṛtti* form — Ānandavardhan, Kuntaka, Mammaṭa. Hemcandra, Viśvanātha and others have presented the domgmas in *kārikās* (memorable verses), and their interpretation in prose, while the examples, however, in poetic form.

× × ×

Thus the tradition of writing the books on Poetics went on for about two thousand years from Bharta to Jagannātha and during this vast period of time, the principles and dogmas about poetry and drama and also about *Kavi-śikṣā* (Instructions to poets) have been formulated, expounded, supported or refuted continuously through the *ācāryas* whether originators or compilers and also through the commentators. And their vast writings gave an encyclopediac touch to Sanskrit Poetics.

[8]

What names were given to Sanskrit Poetics from time to time? Let us, now, have some observation about it at the end of this chapter.

In Vālmīki-*Rāmāyaṇa* the word 'Kriyakalpa' has been used for this type of learning [1] On the basis of it, probably, in *Lalitavistara* (a treatise on Buddha-sect) this word has been used, which — in its commentary by the name of *'Jayamaṁgalā'* — has been interpreted as Kavya karana-vidhi or Kāvyālaṁkāra[2]. This very word has been used by Vātsyāyana also in his famous work *'Kamasutra'* while enumerating the 14 *kalās* (arts): one of the *kalas* is Kavya kriyākalpa.[3] And Daṇḍin also has used the word Kriyavidhi in the sense of Poetics.[4]

Yet, it seems that in the time of Bhamaha, the word *'Alaṁkāra'* was prevalent in wide sense. That is why according to Daṇḍin the definition of *alaṁkara* is that every kind of characteristic which provides any sort of brilliance to a piece of poetry is called *alaṁkara*.[5] On the basis of this notion, the Poetics was termed Alṁkaraśastra, and the books on Poetics were named as *Kavyalaṁkara* (Bhamaha), *Kavyālaṁkāra-sāra-saṁgraha* (Udbhaṭa), *Kavyalaṁkara sūtra-vṛtti* (Vāmana) and *Kavyalaṁkara* (Rudraṭa). This tendency went on even upto later centuries : *Vagbhatalamkara* (Vāgbhaṭa I, 12th c.A.D.), *Alaṁkara-sarvasva* (Ruyyaka, 12th c.A.D.), *Alaṁkāra-śekhara* (Kesavamiśra, 16th c A.D.). Owing to taking the word *'alaṁkara'* in its wide sense,

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1. क्रियाकल्पविदश्च काव्यविदो जनान् । V.R. (Uttarakanda, 93.7)
2. क्रियाकल्प इति काव्यकरणविधिः काव्यालंकार इत्यर्थः । L V , Com
3. Kāmasūtra, 1.3.16
4. वाचां विचित्रमार्गाणां निबबन्धुः क्रियाविधिम् । K A , 1 9
5. काव्यशोभाकरान् धर्मान् अलंकारान् प्रचक्षते । *Ibid*, 2 1

not only the *alaṁkāras* (the figures of speech) like *Anuprāsa* and *Upamā*, but *rasa*, *guṇa*, *rīti*, etc., were also included under its umbrella.[1]

Rājaśekhara (9th-10th c.A.D.) called this *śāstra* as Sāhitya-vidyā[2] and Viśvanātha named his book as *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* and Ruyyaka as *Sāhitya-mīmāṁsā*.[3] Apart from all these names of this *śāstra*, Bhojarāja has called it as 'Kāvyaśāstra'.[4]

Thus this śāstra, from time to time, has been named as Kriyā-kalpa, Kāvya-karana-vidhi, Kāvya-kriyā-kalpa, kryā-vidhi, Alaṁkāraśāstra, Sahitya-vidyā and Kāvya-śastra. In this context, it is noteworthy that —

(1) the words like kriyā-kalpa, kāvya-vidhi, etc., later on, became extinct in the sense of Poetics,

(2) the word 'alaṁkāra', from the time of Ānandavardhana, got to be used in its limited sense as figure of speech like *Anuprāsa, Upamā*, etc., and not in its wide sense,

(3) the word 'Sāhitya' in modern times is used in the sense of all kind of literature (*vāṅmaya*): relating to Grammar, Philosophy, Medical Science, Law and Order, Lexicology, etc. and, of course, it is related with poetry and drama also.

The above-noted words, thus, should, now, not be adopted for Poetics.

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1. यद्यपि रसालंकाराद्यनेकविषयमिदं शास्त्रम्, तथापि छत्रिन्यायेन अलंकार-शास्त्रमुच्यते । P.R.Y.Bh., commentary, P.3
2. पंचमी साहित्यविद्या इति यायावरीयः । K.M., P. 5
3. This book has been mentioned by Jayaratha in his comentary on Alaṁkāra-sarvasva by Ruyyaka. It is not available now
4. काव्यं शास्त्रेतिहासौ च काव्यशास्त्रं तथैव च ।
   काव्येतिहासः शास्त्रेतिहासस्तदपि षड्विधम् ॥ S.K.A., 2.139

The word Kāvyaśāstra seems to be a more befitting term for this science, as the word '*kāvya*' includes the books written in poetic form and also in prose connected with all sorts of creative literature, and this very word has been used as a part of the name of books written by the renowned *acāryas* like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Rudraṭa, Rajaśekhara, Mammaṭa, Hemcandra, Vāgbhaṭa I, and Vāgbhata II. Moreover, the word *śāstra* also is quite significant giving the meaning of science[1] as compared to the words like kriyakalpa, kriyavidhi, etc.

The name 'kāvyaśāstra', hence, seems to be more appropriate and cogent than the other names for this science.

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1. 'शासनात् शास्त्रम्', i.e., a book which commands [the rules] is called *śāstra*.

2

The Causes of Poetry

Having seen or learnt about any person, object or happening arousing attraction, pathos, fear or surprise, very few people in the world would not be affected by these; otherwise most of us become, even though for a shortwhile, excited, agitated or stirred by them. All such scenes or happenings get inscribed in our mind, and, from time to time, and sometimes even after many years, these get awakened, and if needed, we talk about them to other people. Such type of expression is called just a *vārtā*, i.e., a worldly talk. Yet there are persons who relate these events, interwoven with their imagination, so beautifully that their fascinating expression comes in the catagory of poetry: it is not called a mere worldly talk; and the narrator of it is called a poet and not an ordinary person.

Well, most of us enjoy and appreciate a piece of poetry, though they cannot compose a poem. Such people are called *sahṛdayas*, i.e., appreciators of any poetic form.

According to Rājaśekhara, the poet is possessed of *kārayitrī pratibhā*, i.e., creative faculty, while the above - said appreciator is possessed of *bhāvayitrī pratibhā*, i.e., appreciative faculty.[1] Obviously, the poet is possessed of both

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1. कारयित्री भावयित्र्यावितीमे प्रतिभाभिदे । K.M., 4th ch.

the faculties and not only the creative one. The *kavi-pratibhā*, i.e., the creative faculty, what may be called poetic intuition, is the main factor (tool) of poetry, without which no composition of any poetic work is possible. The rhetoricians, apart from it, have enumerated other factors also for presenting an event, etc., in a poetic form.

Various causes of poetry

Among the Sanskrit rhetoricians, who have shed light on the causes of poetry, the following are worth mentioning: Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Rudraṭa, Kuntaka and Mammaṭa.

Daṇḍin has accepted three causes of poetry: *naisargikī pratibhā* (inborn genius), *nirmala-śāstrajñāna* (clear academic understanding) and *amanda abhiyoga* (constant application of above-said genius, i.e., constant composing of poetic works.[1]

Rudraṭa and Kuntaka also have enumerated following three causes of poetry : *śakti* (inborn intuitive intellectual power), *vyutpatti* (an accomplishment in the knowledge of scriptures and literary works) and *abhyasa* (constant practice of composing poetic works).[2]

Vāmana also has accepted three causes of poetry : *loka* (the knowledge of worldly norms and behaviour), *vidya* (knowledge of various disciplines of learning) and *prakīrṇa* (miscellaneous). By *prakīrṇa* he means the following six causes: *lakṣajñatā* (study of scriptures), *abhiyoga* (practice of composing poetic works), *vṛddha sevā* (having instructions

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1. नैसर्गिकी च प्रतिभा श्रुतं च बहु निर्मलम् ।
अमन्दश्चाऽभियोगोऽस्याः कारणं काव्यसम्पदः ॥ K. A., 1.103

2. (a) तस्यासारनिरासात् सारग्रहणाच्च चारुणः करणे ।
त्रितयमिदं व्याप्रियते शक्तिर्व्युत्पत्तिरभ्यासः ॥ K. A. (Ru.), 1.14

(b) V.J.,1. 24 (vr), p.101

from Guru/Gurūs : preceptor/preceptors), *avekṣaṇa* (use of appropriate words and avoidance of improper words), *pratibhāna* (inborn genius of poetic intuition) and *avadhāna* (concentration of mind while learning, studying or composing any literary work).[1]

Mammaṭa, a connoisseur, putting forth the following three causes of poetry, included all the above-said causes into them:

शक्तिर्निपुणता लोक-काव्य-शास्त्राद्यवेक्षणात् ।
काव्यज्ञ-शिक्षयाऽभ्यास इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे ॥ K.P. 1.3, i.e.,

(i) inborn intuitive intellectual power;

(ii) proficiency in worldly conduct and also in the study of scriptures as well as literary works; and

(iii) practice of composing poetic works through the help of some one effecient in this art —

all this is the cause for producing poetry.

Now let us discuss all these three causes one by one.

1. *Śakti* or *Pratibhā* (Intellect or poetic intuition)

Defining *pratibhā*, Rudraṭa, Bhaṭṭa-tauta and Jagannātha have taken into consideration the subject-matter of poetry; while Kuntaka and Mammaṭa as to how it is born:

According to Rudraṭa *śakti* or *pratibhā* is that faculty in a poet through which he presents spontaniously any subject-matter manifested in his concentrated mind — using the appropriate words.[2]

Almost similar is the definition of *pratibhā* put forth by Jagannātha as that by Rudraṭa :

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1. K.S.Vṛ, 1.3.1; 1.3.11.

2. मनसि सदा सुसमाधिनि विस्फुरणमनेकधाऽभिधेयस्य।
अक्लिष्टानि पदानि च विभान्ति यस्यामसौ शक्तिः॥ K.A. (Ru.), 1.15

सा (प्रतिभा) काव्य-घटनानुकूल-शब्दार्थोपस्थिति:

(R.G., 1st ch., P. 9),

i.e., the faculty of presenting any poetic work in quite suitable words and sense is called *pratibhā*

Obviously, Rudraṭa and Jagannātha in their definitions of *pratibhā* have laid stress upon the structure (syntax) of poetry — which is an external form of it, but Bhatta tauta has mentioned its internal form only in the following beautiful words:

नव-नवोन्मेष-शालिनी प्रज्ञा प्रतिभा मता,[1]

i.e., genius is that sort of intellect which creates new and novel bloomings in an art of poetry.

As opposed to above-noted three rhetoricians, the aim of Kuntaka and Mammata is to put emphasis on the very basis of *pratibhā* in its definition:

— प्राक्तनाद्यतन-संस्कार-परिपाक-प्रौढा प्रतिभा काचिदेव कविशक्तिः।

V.J. 1.29 vṛ

(The faculty of creating poetic work is some sort of intellect which becomes mature out of the result of the impressions [of the deeds] done in the previous as well as present birth.)

— शक्तिः कवित्व-बीज-रूपः संस्कार विशेषः। K.P. 1.3, vṛ

(A particular sort of impression serving as a seed for creating poetry is called intellect.)

By both Kuntaka and Mammaṭa such faculty is said to be the good result of the deeds done in both the births especially in present birth, yet such deeds should not be taken as the basis of producing this faculty, but as the stimulating factor to it. In fact this faculty is inborn and cannot be produced by any aid though it can be enhanced.

1. S.D. (P.V. Kane), Notes, p. 5.

Now the question arises which factor out of the three should be taken as an essential one, and in case any one of these is considered to be so, what would be the respective position of the remaining two.

Bhāmaha declaring *pratibhā* as an inevitable factor has applauded it very much: 'Study of any branch of a scripture and the composing of poetry are altogether different phenomena. The former is possible even for a dullard through the instructions of a Guru (preceptor), but for the latter a special type of intellect is required':

गुरूपदेशादध्येतुं शास्त्रं जडधियोऽप्यलम् ।
काव्यं तु जायते जातु कस्यचित् प्रतिभावतः॥

K.A. (Bh.), 1.5

And Vāmana taking *pratibhā* as the seed for creating poetry has showed its importance.

कवित्वबीजं प्रतिभानम् । K.S.vṛ 13.16

According to Daṇḍin *pratibhā*, of course, is an essential factor for the creation of poetry, yet in its absence, Sarasvati (the goddess of learning) bestows her bliss upon a man who absorbs himself in the study of scriptures and poetic works and also does a lot of practice in composing literary pieces:

न विद्यते यद्यपि पूर्ववासना-गुणानुबन्धि प्रतिभानमद्भुतम् ।
श्रुतेन यत्नेन च वागुपासिताऽपि करोत्येव कमप्यनुग्रहम् ॥

K.Ā., 1.104

It seems that Daṇḍin might have given this scope in the case of composing the verses connected with *śabdālaṁkāras* like *Anuprāsa* (allitration), *Yamaka* (a kind of alliteration & pun), *Citra* (pictorial figures of speech), etc. But it is very clear that in the eyes of Daṇḍin both these factors (*śruta* and *yatna*) are less important as compared to *pratibhā*.

Ānandavardhana, on the other hand, says that any fault in poetry owing to lack of intellect becomes noticeable as early as possible, but the fault due to lack of erudition could be covered with the use of poetic intellect·

अव्युत्पत्तिकृतो दोषः शक्त्या संव्रियते कवेः।

यस्त्वशक्तिकृतस्तस्य झगित्येवावभासते ॥ Dh. A., 3.6 vr

Thus he differs with Dandin that a fault occuring in poetry owing to lack of intellect can be removed off with the use of erudition. In other words, he opines that intellect is an inevitable factor while erudition is a desirable one

According to Mammaṭa intellect though serves as a seed for creating poetry: शक्तिः कवित्व-बीजरूपः, but he keeps other two factors also on the same footing along with intellect, and accepts all the three factors combined in one: हेतुर्न तु हेतवः.

After Mammaṭa, a remarkable change took place in this respect: Vāgbhaṭa I accepted intellect as the only factor, while erudition, according to him, is a decorating factor; and practice just a worth-adopting one these both are not essential in any way:

प्रतिभा कारणं तस्य व्युत्पत्तिस्तु विभूषणम् ।

भृशोत्पत्तिकृदभ्यास इत्याद्यकविसंकथा ॥ Va. A., 1.6

Hemcandra, most probably, is the only *acarya*, who indicates in clear terms that intellect is the only factor for creating poetry, while the other two are meant for refining the intellect:

प्रतिभाऽस्य हेतुः व्युत्पत्त्यभ्यासाभ्यां संस्कार्या । K. Anu., P.6

It may be noticed that prior to Hemchandra, Rudraṭa had pointed out two types of *pratibha*: *sahaja* (inborn) and *utpādyā* (produced out of erudition).[1] The view of Hemcandra seems to be clearly influenced by the above said second type

1 प्रतिभेत्यपरैरुदिता सहजोत्पाद्या च सा द्विधा भवति । K. A. (Ru.) 1.16

of *pratibhā*. After Hemcandra, Jayadeva Pīyūsavarṣa tried to clarify this issue with an illustration, though with a little change:

> प्रतिभैव श्रुताभ्याससहिता कवितां प्रति ।
> हेतुर्मृदम्बुसम्बद्धबीजोत्पत्तिर्लतामिव ॥ C. Ā., 1.6

(As the cause of a creeper is seed mixed with earth and water, in the same way, the cause of creating poetry is *pratibhā* assisted by erudition and practice)

Hemcandra accepts *pratibhā* as the only factor of poetry, better if refined with other two factors; while Jayadeva accepts *pratibhā* as the seed for poetry, but it must be associated with the other two. In our opinion the view-point of Hemacandra is quite agreeable. The last and one of the prominant *ācāryas* Jagannātha also holds the view that the erudition and practice are nothing but the stimulating causes for intellect. But in some circumstances, according to him, both these factors do not serve to be such kind of cause for it. In such a situation he accepts *adṛṣṭa* (unforeseen) phenomenon to be the cause of it. By *adṛṣṭa* he means the blessings given by any god or a boon given by any person.[1] But *adṛṣṭa*, in our opinion, cannot be the cause of intellect, as without any *saṁskāra* (mental impression) of one's previous birth[2] or the genes of the parents and forefathers, one's intellect cannot become inborn though how much above-said *adṛṣṭa* may take place.

2. *Vyutpatti* (Erudition)

The word *vyutpatti* here stands for an elaborate study of the various scriptures and literary works and also for the

1. तस्य च कारणं कविगता केवला प्रतिभा च । × × × तस्याश्च हेतुः क्वचिद्देवता - पुरुष - प्रसादादि - जन्यमदृष्टम् । क्वचिच्च विलक्षण - व्युत्पत्ति - काव्यकरणाभ्यासौ । न तु त्रयमेव । (R.G., 1st ch., p. 9)
2. According to those who believe in the cycle of birth and death.

knowledge of the worldly affairs Through it, the *sahajā pratibhā* (inborn intellect) becomes more refined, sharp, miraculous, potent, poignant and capable of understanding the essentials But through it, the deficiency of intellect cannot be fulfilled, otherwise all those--the learners of the scriptures, knowers of the essence of literary works, well-versed in poetics, and also the worldly wise people would have been able to compose poetry.

It may be noted that the dormant intellect, in some cases, does awaken owing to ill happenings like the destruction of one's riches or the demise of one's near and dear all of a sudden, etc., but these are the stimulating causes of the intellect and not its producing causes, otherwise all those traders or gamblers who have sustained loss in business or gambling, the parents bereft of their progeny, the widowers and the widows would have become able to compose poetry. The intellect, in fact, is inborn, and it cannot be produced by any means. The second variety of *pratibha*, i.e., *utpadya pratibhā*, hinted by Rudraṭa should be admitted only when it means supported by *vyutpatti*, and not produced by it. Hemcandra rightly says that through *vyutpatti* the *pratibha* (inborn intellect) -- already existant is made chiselled and polished, and is not produced by it.

3. *Abhyās* (Practice)

According to *ācārya* Maṁgala (quoted by Rajasekhara) *abhyāsa* is the only factor for creating poetry,[1] but it is neither the lone and inevitable cause nor is predominant or essential cause of poetry, as there are many poets in the world whose very first creation has become immortal. The following verse of Vālmīki is worth-quoting in this respect.

मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः शाश्वतीः समाः।
यत्क्रौञ्चमिथुनादेकमवधीः काममोहितम् ॥ V.R.C., [illegible]

1. अभ्यास इति मंगलः । K.M., p. 26

In short, we may say that *pratibhā* is the only and inevitable factor for creating poetry, and both *vyutpatti* and *abhyāsa* are its polishing and magnifying causes.

Let us now shed some light on the aspect whether all the poets possess equal intellect of such type. The obvious reply to this querry is in negative, otherwise all the poetic works of the world would have been similar to each other, and thus no classification of literary works like *Uttama*, *Madhyama* and *Avara* (the best, the middle and the inferior) as enumerated by Mammaṭa.[1] The view-point of Kuntaka in this respect is worth-mentioning. He says that there is oneness between a poet and his intellect.[2] He, therefore, assumes that the intellect of the poets of tender nature, is tender, that those of tough nature, is tough, while that those of varied nature is varied. Hence there is a difference of poetic charm between all the poetic works of the whole world.[3]

Now in the end, let us have some light on another question: What is the difference between *Kāvya-hetu* (the causes of poetry) and *Kāvya-prayojana* (the purpose or fruit of poetry)? In other words it may be asked whether any fruit of poetry like achieving fame, riches, good instructions, poetic pleasure, etc.,[4] can be taken to be the cause for creating poetry. The clear reply for this question is, "No", as '*kāvya-hetu*' is the prior stage of the creation of a poetic piece, while *kāvya-prayojana* is an achievement through the poetic works, hence the latter should not be taken to be as the cause of poetry, though, sometime, of course, it acts as stimulating factor for the faculty of creativity which already is possessed by the poet.

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1. K.P., 1 4, 5.

2,3. शक्ति शक्तिमतोरभेदात्.....। V.J., 1.24 (vr)

4. Consult the article 'The Purpose of Poetry' on page 31

3

The Definition of Poetry

A definition, as is said, should be devoid of the following three defects: non-comprehensiveness, over-comprehensiveness and improbability.[1] It should be brief and concise as far as possible. and also easy and simple, that is, bereft of technical terminology, and may not require any sort of explanation. Moreover, it should not contain any alternative aspect.

In Sanskrit Poetics, from the very inception, an effort was made to give the definition of poetry, yet no clear-cut and ideal definition had been presented let us take them one by one.

According to **Bhāmaha, 'A happy fusion of *śabda* (sound) and *artha* (sense) is called poetry:'** 'शब्दार्थौ सहितौ काव्यम्' (K.A.1.16). Obviously, this definition pertains to all the three sorts of meaningful sentences, viz. worldly statement, scriptural statement and poetic performance, and not to poetry alone. Therefore it is not an ideal definition.

Bhāmaha, however, says in this context that the poetry should necessarily be consisting of the *alaṁkāras* (figures of speech) relating to both sound and sense.[2] Thus according

1. अव्याप्ति, अतिव्याप्ति और असंभव.
2. शब्दाभिधेयालंकारभेदादिष्टं द्वयं तु नः।
   शब्दार्थौ सहितौ काव्यम्...॥ K.A. (Bh.), 1.15

to him, the definition of poetry can be given as '**Poetry is a union of sound and sense which express *alaṁkāras* (figures of speech) relating to them**.' This definition undoubtedly requires an explanation what an *alaṁkāra* is, hence not an ideal one.

Daṇḍin says, **The body of the poetry is a group of sounds which indicates the happy aim intended by the author:** **शरीरं तावदिष्टार्थ-व्यवच्छिन्ना पदावली ।** (K.Ā. 1.10-b)

What does he mean by '*iṣṭārtha*', i.e., 'happy aim'? He is of the view that the *alaṁkāras* are such type of characteristics which render poetry attractive.[1] The 'happy aim' thus, indicates the delectation born out of the use of *alaṁkāras*. The above-said statement by Dandin, it may be observed, indicates the definition of the body of the poetry and not that of poetry itself. Yet if it is accepted to be the definition of poetry, it suffers from a defect that the body of poetry is not a *padāvalī*, i.e., a group of sounds, but an inseparable union of both sound and sense.[2] And secondly, the word '*iṣṭārtha*' requires an explanation. This definition, however, has got an importance of its own. The word '*padāvalī*' in it is the first source of the '*Kāvya-puruṣa-rūpaka*'.[3] Moreover, the definition of poetry put forth by the renowned *ācārya* (aesthetian) like Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha[4] is nothing but a recurrence of this very definition.

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1. काव्यशोभाकरान् धर्मान् अलंकारान् प्रचक्षते। K.A., 2.1
2. In poetic term these are called *vācaka śabdh* (expressive sound) and *vācya artha* (expressed sense).
3. A metaphor which relates poetry to be in the form of a human being. (See page 59, f.n. 8)
4. रमणीयार्थ प्रतिपादकः शब्दः काव्यम्। (See page 29.)

According to a number of sayings presented by **Vāmana**, **'Poetry is that union of sound and sense which is devoid of poetic flaws and is embodied with *guṇas* (excellences) and the *alaṁkāras* (figures of speech)**. The poetic excellence is an essential component of a piece of poetry, while a figure of speech is not.[1] The soul (essence) of poetry is Rīti,[2] which is a structure of sounds comprising of poetic excellences.[3]

Such type of definition containing technical terms is also not an ideal one, yet Manmaṭa is greatly influenced by Vāmana in this respect (see page 27). A number of flaws, which will be shown in the definition put forth by him, apply to that by Vāmana also.

According to **Ānandavardhana**, the definition of poetry can be completed in his two sayings: **'शब्दार्थ-शरीरं तावत् काव्यम्'** and **'ध्वनिरात्मा काव्यस्य'**, that is, **'The body of poetry is the combination of denotative word and sound, while its soul is suggested sense.'** This definition, no doubt, indicates that poetry is nothing but an internal beauty of a meaningful construction of words, and such an idea was never presented by any *ācārya* before him, yet the word '*dhvani*' itself is a technical term of Poetics. This definition, hence, is not an ideal one.

Kuntaka has defined poetry on the basis of the doctrine of *vakrokti* propounded by him:

> शब्दार्थौ सहितौ वक्रकविव्यापारशालिनि ।
> बन्धे व्यवस्थितौ काव्यं तद्विदाह्लादकारिणि ॥ V.J. 1.7

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1. 'काव्यं ग्राह्यमलंकारात्'। 'सौन्दर्यमलंकारः'। 'स च दोषगुणालंकारहानादानाभ्याम्'। 'काव्यशब्दोऽयं गुणालंकारसंस्कृतयोर्शब्दार्थयोर्वर्तते, भक्त्या तु शब्दार्थमात्रवचनोऽत्र गृह्यते' (K.S.Vr. 1.1.1,2,3; 1.1.1, Vr.)। पूर्वे नित्याः (Ibid. 3.1.3)।
2. 'रीतिरात्मा काव्यस्य' (Ibid. 1.2.6)।
3. 'विशिष्टपदरचना रीतिः', 'विशेषो गुणात्मा' Ibid. 1.2.7,8)।

(Poetry is the union of sound and sense, arranged in a composition, which, consisting of oblique sayings of a poet is delightful to its sensible reader or listener.)

But this definition is not acceptable. Firstly, because the doctrine of *Vakroki*, like that of *Alaṁkāra* and *Rīti*, is indicative mostly of the external form of poetry, and, secondly, the word *vakroki*, like *alaṁkāra, rīti* and *dhvani* is a technical term of Poetics.

After Kuntaka, the definition of poetry presented by **Mammaṭa** became very famous because of the objections raised by Viśvanātha against it. It goes like this:

'तददोषौ शब्दार्थौ सगुणावनलंकृती पुनः क्वापि'।

K.P , 1.,4-a

(Poetry is constituted by word and sense which are (i) faultless, (ii) possessed of excellences, and (iii) in which rarely a distinct figure of speech may be absent.)

This definition has been criticised by the later scholars. Viśvanātha and Jagannatha have refuted all the three adjectives of '*śabdārthau*'.

Regarding the adjective '*adośau*' as applied to '*śabdārthau*', the main objection of Viśvanātha is that it is almost impossible to conceive of poetry without any flaw of any sort at all. Accepting such criterion in the definition, the real poetry would become, so to say, unavailable.

The adjective '*saguṇau*' of '*śabdārthau*' is appropriate in case it is meant indirectly that words and senses reveal *rasa* (sentiment), yet a direct adjective like '*sarasau*' should have been used in the definition.

Similarly the adjective '*analaṁkṛtī*' is not tenable, as the figures of speech serve merely to heighten a poem, and thus they are not essential part of poetry, hence have no

place in its definition.

The objection raised by Jayadeva on the adjective '*analaṁkṛtī*' is that **to accept words and senses without figures of speech is nothing but to accept fire without heat.**[2] But, Mammaṭa, himself, explaining this adjective, has said that in case there is no distinct figure of speech in a particular piece of poetry, it doesn't harm the delight of it in any way.[3] Jayadeva, perhaps, has not given any importance to this valuable notion regarding the use of the figures of speech, and has cast sarcastic remark on this adjective getting allured to the use of *Yamaka alaṁkāra.*[4]

According to Jagannātha, the word '*śabdarthau*' ought not have been used. It should be substituted by '*sabda*', as it is the 'word' which stands for poetry as in the sentences like (i) 'We have heard poetry, but could not understand its meaning', (ii) 'He reads poetry loudly', etc. But Nageśa-bhaṭṭa (a commentator of *Rasagaṁgādhara* by Jagannatha), refuting his above argument, says that in the sentences like 'We have heard poetry', if the 'word' represents poetry, then in the sentences like 'We have understood poetry', it is the 'sense' which stands for poetry. Thus the word '*sabdarthau*' as used in the definition given by Mammaṭa is appropriate.[5]

In spite of agreeing with Nageśabhaṭṭa in the above said aspect, the definition given by Mammaṭa does not appear an ideal one: firstly because a number of technical terms like

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1. For detail, see *Sahityardapaṇa* (Ch.I), translated by P.V. Kane
2. अंगीकरोति यः काव्यं शब्दार्थावनलंकृती।
   असौ न मन्यते कस्मादनुष्णमनलं कृती॥ C.A. I 2.
3. क्वचित्तु स्फुटालंकार-विरहेऽपि न काव्यत्वहानिः। K.P., I 4 (vr.)
4. Some sort of alliteration.
5. For detail see *Rasagaṅgādhara* (I), page 6, and its commentary by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, pp. 6 & 7.

doṣa, *guna* and *alaṅkāra* have been used in it and they require lot of explanation, and secondly, there is no scope in a good definition for alternative views like 'अनलंकृती पुन: क्वापि'.

The definition of poetry put forth by **Viśvanātha** is '**वाक्यं रसात्मकं काव्यम्**' (Poetry is a sentence, the soul whereof is *rasa*). By giving prominence to *rasa* in the definition of poetry by its name for the first time, Viśvanātha has done a commendable job, yet the term '*rasa*' requires much of its explanation as given by a number of old aesthetician like Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and others from time to time. Moreover the body of poetry is not a sentence (collection of words), but a happy fusion of word and sense. Hence this definition is not an ideal one.

The definition of poetry presented by **Jagannātha** is '**रमणीयार्थ-प्रतिपादक: शब्द: काव्यम्**' (The poetry is a word promoting delight). Here the word '*ramaṇīyatā*' denotes not only poetic delight pertaining to *rasa*, the main variety of *dhvanikāvya*, but also all the ingrediants of *kāvya* like Vastu-dhvani-*kāvya* & Alaṁkāra-dhvani-kāvya, Guṇībhūta-vyaṁgya-kāvya, Rīti, Guṇa, Alaṁkāra, Vakrokti, etc. This definition, thus, covering all the areas of poetics, has a wider field than *rasa* which is limited to certain critaria. Moreover, the word '*ramaṇīyatā*' is not a technical term of poetics like *alaṁkāra, rīti, guṇa, dhvani, rasa, vakrokti, etc*.

But in fact 'the word' is not [the body of] poetry, but it is 'the happy fusion of word and sound' which stands for it: '**शब्दार्थौ सहितौ काव्यम्**'. Kuntaka has advocated this view very forcefully as follows:

— The word and sense, blended like two friends, creating each other's charm, make the poetry delightful.[1]

1. समसर्वगुणौ सन्तौ सुहृदावेव संगतौ।
परस्परस्य शोभायै शब्दार्थौ भवतो यथा॥ V.J., 1.7, (vṛ.)

— The real word is that which chosen out of a number of synonyms expresses the sense desired by the poet himself And the real sense is that which by its own alluring nature causes pleasure in the mind of a *sahṛdaya* (a man of taste, a magnanimous person).[1]

— The togetherness of word and sense is nothing but a captivating state which creates [in the mind of the reader or viewer] poetic delight which is exactly desired by the poet himself neither less nor more.[2]

The 'word' ('sound') in fact is the body of the music which we, absorbed in listening to the tune, enjoy even without knowing the meaning of a song composed in any native or foreign language. But in the case of poetry, we can not do without knowing the literal meaning (*vācyārtha*) of each and every word (*vācaka śabda*). Hence, modifying the definition given by Jagannātha, we may say:

'रमणीयता-प्रतिपादकौ शब्दार्थौ काव्यम्,'

that is, poetry is the happy fusion of sound and sense which promotes poetic delight [in the mind of a *sahṛdaya*, i.e., a man of taste].

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1. शब्दो विवक्षितार्थैकवाचकोऽन्येषु सत्स्वपि।
अर्थः सहृदयाह्लादकारिस्वस्पन्दसुन्दरः॥ V.J., 1.9

2. साहित्यमनयोः शोभाशालितां प्रति काप्यसौ।
अन्यूनानतिरिक्तत्वमनोहारिण्यवस्थितिः॥ V.J., 1.17

The Aim and Purpose of Poetry

[1]

Many of the ancient Sanskrit writers, according to the old convention, immediately after the *mamgalācaraṇa* (benedictory invocation) mentioned the aim and purpose of their work in the beginning of the book. The *ācāryas* (rhetoricians) too preserved this tradition, viz. Bhāmaha, Rudraṭa, Vāmana, Bhojarāja, Kuntaka, Mammaṭa, Hemacandra and Viśvanātha have dwelt upon the purpose of poetry in the beginning of their works. In the *Nātyaśāstra* and *Agnipurāṇa* also we come across references to the purpose of the drama (or poetry), though they do not occur in the beginning of the book.

According to Bharata drama (poetry) is an instrument of achieving *dharma* (virtue), fame and longevity. It gives benefaction, enriches intellect and imparts instruction:

धर्म्यं यशस्यमायुष्यं हितं बुद्धिविवर्धनम् ।
लोकोपदेशजननं नाट्यमेतद् भविष्यति ॥ N.S.1,115

And in the words of Bhāmaha, a good piece of poetry, besides giving fame and pleasure, makes one master of all arts and facilitates the realization of the four aims of human life: *dharma* (virtue), *artha* (wealth), *kāma* (desire) and *mokṣa* (salvation):

धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।
करोति कीर्ति प्रीतिं च साधुकाव्यनिबन्धनम् ॥ K A (Bh) 1,2

Bhāmaha had probably the ideal of Bharata before him while enumerating these purposes and that is why there is so much similarity, direct or indirect, between the purposes of poetry presented by these two *ācāryas*. The adjectives *dharmya* and *yaśasya* used by Bharata have become *dharma* and *kīrti* respectively in Bhāmaha. The 'बुद्धिविवर्धनम्' (enriching intellect) of Bharata can be accepted as 'कलासु वैचक्षण्यम्' (mastery in arts) of Bhāmaha. *Hita* (benefaction) of Bharata and *artha* (wealth) of Bhāmaha are almost identical, because *artha* is nothing but only a part or means of benefaction. There can be one more resemblance between the two, if we accept cause and effect relationship between *lokopadeśa* (instruction) of Bharata and *mokṣa* (salvation) of Bhāmaha. As regards *prītikāritā* (instrument of pleasure) of Bhāmaha, though Bharata has not clearly mentioned it, yet to a *rasavādin*, as he was, it must have been acceptable to him.

All the succeeding *ācāryas* after Bhāmaha had him as their ideal in this respect. Following him on the one hand Rudraṭa and Kuntaka, besides other aims, included the 'चतुर्वर्ग' (four aims of human life enumerated above) in the purposes of poetry: Vśhvanātha accepted all the four, the author of Agnipurāṇa the trio (त्रिवर्ग) leaving out the *mokṣa*[1] out of the four, and on the other hand Vamana and Bhoja adopted fame and pleasure as the purposes of poetry.[2]

Rudraṭa and Kuntaka, as mentioned above, besides the 'चतुर्वर्ग', accepted other purposes also[3]. Those mentioned by

1. K.A. (Ru.) 12, 1; V.J. 1, 3; S.D. 1, 2; A.P. 338.7.
2. K.S.Vṛ. 1, 1, 5; S.K. 1, 2.
3. K.A. (Ru.) 1, 8, 9; V.J. 1, 3 4.

Rudraṭa are—अनर्थोपशम (elimination of suffering), विपन्निवारण (averting trouble), रोगविमुक्ति (deliverance from disease) and अभिमत वर-प्राप्ति (achievement of the desired boon). And those proposed by Kuntaka are—व्यवहारौचित्य (the knowledge of the code of conduct) हृदयाह्लाद (mental exhilaration) and अन्तश्चमत्कार (spiritual illumination or expansion).

Thus Mammaṭa had before him a list of the purposes of poetry as enunciated from Bharata down to Kuntaka, and he gave the following form to it:

काव्यं यशसेऽर्थकृते व्यवहारविदे शिवेतरक्षतये ।
सद्यः परनिर्वृतये कान्तासम्मिततयोपदेशयुजे ॥ K.P.1,2

(Poetry is for achieving fame, wealth and knowledge of code of conduct, for the removal of the evil, attaining instantaneous highest bliss and imparting instructions as sweetly as does anyone's beloved to him.)

The Sanskrit *ācāryas* like Hemacandra and others, who came after Mammaṭa followed him in this respect.

[2]

Now let us enquire:

1. as to which of these purposes as enumerated by Mammaṭa is the foremost,
2. and which of these are related to the poet and which to the *sahṛdaya*[1] (reader or spectator).

In answer to the first question Mammaṭa has clearly accepted 'सद्यःपरनिर्वृति' (instantaneous attainment of the highest bliss) as the chief purpose:

सकल-प्रयोजन-मौलिभूतं समनन्तरमेव रसास्वादन-समुद्भूतं विगलित-वेद्यान्तरमानन्दम् ।

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1. An appreciator; a man of taste; a man of critical faculty; a connoisseur, an aesthete.

(The pleasure which tops all the purposes, is perceived with the rising of the aesthetic experience, and eclipses all other perceptions).

Kuntaka, the predecessor of Mammata, also has declared अन्तश्चमत्कार (spiritual expansion) as the primary purpose सद्यःपरनिर्वृति or अन्तश्चमत्कार can be the synonym for *priti* (poetic pleasure) of Bhāmaha, and if the word *kama* in the group of the above four aims be interpreted as the fulfilment of human passion, this too may be synonymous with those two. In this way, it can be said that all the Sanskrit *acaryas* by and large have made mention of this purpose implicitly or explicitly. In fact this purpose is the most important, because there will be no poetry in its absence. The composition, devoid of it, will be either a matter of fact narration or a didactic piece. Such a composition may bring in fame, wealth or knowledge of ethics, but will fail the test 'कान्तासम्मित उपदेश', and thus would not be entitled to the name 'poetry'. Such type of instruction should rank second in the list of purposes given by Mammaṭa.

[3]

The second question is which of these motives relate to the poet and which to the *sahṛdaya*. Mammaṭa has left the decision to the students of Poetics. Obviously, of these motives, fame, money and destruction of the evil have direct relation with the poet, while knowledge of ethics and attainment of 'कान्तासम्मित उपदेश' relate to the *sahrdaya* directly. But on the one hand a *sahṛdaya*, through the study and teaching of poetry, may get fame and money, and on the other a poet may be able to get instruction and knowledge of conduct through his own compositions. Thus these two purposes can be associated with the *sahrdaya* and the poet respectively though by implication.

As regards the remaining purpose 'सद्यः परनिर्वृति', i.e., attainment of instantaneous aesthetic pleasure (रसास्वाद), the commentators of *Kāvyaprakāśa* seem to opine that Mammaṭa intends to confine it to the *sahrdaya* alone. If a poet himself enjoys this experience, then he, too, for the nonce, becomes a *sahrdaya*:

यशोऽर्थावनर्थनिवृत्तिश्च कवेरेव । व्यवहारज्ञानोपदेशयोगौ सहृदयस्यैव। परनिर्वृतिरपि सहृदयस्यैव । रसास्वादनकाले कवेरपि सहृदयान्तःपातित्वात् । K.P., 1st. U.(B.B.), p. 10-11

Bhaṭṭa-tauta and Abhinavagupta, the predecessors of Mammaṭa, placing the poet and the *sahṛdaya* on the same footing, accepted both of them, though indirectly, as the recipients of aesthetic pleasure:

(a) कविर्हि सामाजिक तुल्य एव । A.Bh., Pt.1, p. 295

(The poet is on the same footing with the spectator.)

(b) यदुक्तमस्मदुपाध्याय-भट्टतौतेन, 'नायकस्य कवेः श्रोतुः समानोऽनुभवस्ततः ।' Dh. Ā., p. 92

(As our revered teacher Bhaṭṭa-tauta has declared, "The hero, the poet and the listener have the same experience.")

[4]

The fact that the *sahṛdaya* experiences aesthetic pleasure is beyond doubt. The controversy is on the point whether the poet too enjoys it or not from his own work. To solve this problem easily let us take the example of the poet Vālmīki. It was as natural for him as for any other compassionate person to be deeply moved by the sight of the death of one of the heron-pair. Upto this stage, Vālmīki, like any other common person, is experiencing the emotion of worldly grief and not the *karuṇa rasa* (pathetic sentiment). The reason is quite obvious: from academic point of view, the designation *vibhāva, anubhava* and *sañcāribhāva* is given to the *kāraṇa*

(cause), *kārya* (effect) and *sahakarikarana* (accessories) in poetic piece alone and not to the cause, etc. of mundane nature. Similarly aesthetic pleasure accrues from a combination of *vibhava*, etc., and not from the combination of worldly causes, etc.:

नहि लोके विभावानुभावादयः केचन सन्ति । हेतुकार्यावस्था-मात्रत्वाल्लोके तेषाम् ॥[1] A.Bh. Pt. I, p. 6

From this very point, in fact starts, the crux of the problem. We can divide the original problem into two parts. Firstly, whether at the time of the outburst of the above-mentioned grief in the form of the verse 'मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः',[2] i.e., at the time when this verse was being composed, does the poet Valmiki experience the pathetic sentiment? And secondly, immediately after the composition of this verse or years later when the poet himself reads it, does he, like any *sahṛdaya* experience the sentiment of pathos.

For solving this problem it will be necessary to divest Vālmīki of his grandeur of a sage and look upon him as a common poet like Kālidasa and others. Our conviction in answer to both the questions is that Valmiki or any other poet can experience 'रसानुभूति' (aesthetic experience) in both these situations. At the time of composing poetry, the poet has before him the impressions of the experiences of his present and previous life. He, in fact, is penning down the recollections of the impressions of the incidents that occurred in his past and left their imprint on his mind, and which now

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1. 'There are no *vibhava*, *anubhava*, etc., in the world. They figure merely in the nature of cause, effect, etc. in the world.

2. मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमाः शाश्वतीः समाः ।
यत्क्रौञ्चमिथुनादेकमवधीः काममोहितम् ॥ U.R.C., 2.5

(Thou shall not attain rest, O Nisada, for everlasting years; since thou hast killed one of a pair of herons, infatuated with love.)

have assumed an extra-sensory form. The writing-process is no doubt worldly, but behind it, is operating the surging and passionate recollection of the poet. This lifts him above mundane feelings, also eclipses all other sensations and helps him to experience aesthetic bliss. Those, which were cause, effect and accessory in the actual worldly experiences of the poet, are academically designated *vibhāva, anubhāva* and *sañcāribhāva* respectively at the time of empirical impressions or recollections and transform the *sthāyibhāva* (permanent emotion) of the poet into *rasa* (*sentiment*).

This aesthetic experience by the poet should be as acceptable as is the pleasure of a *sahṛdaya* while reading poetry or witnessing a play. The difference is just this, that while the medium of aesthetic experience of the *sahṛdaya* is the diction and phraseology of the book or dramatization of different scenes on the stage, the poet owes this experience to his own empirical impressions. In other words, the medium of the *sahṛdaya* is external or optical while that of the poet is internal or imperceptible. Evidently, the above three media cannot be called aesthetic experience. Just as the arrangement of words in a book or the realized effect of every scene on the stage depicts the *vibhāva,* etc. (i.e., super-worldly cause etc.) before the *sahṛdaya* and helps him to attain aesthetic experience, exactly in the same manner the poet's own recollections born of his empirical impressions present a picture of *vibhāva,* etc., before him and assist him in experiencing poetic pleasure, and its positive proof is that the poet himself becomes 'वेद्यान्तर-स्पर्श-शून्य' (impervious to other sensations) at that moment.

There still remain two points for consideration. Whether the act of writing can impede the poet's aesthetic experience? The answer is quite simple. The act of writing does not cause any hinderance in receiving the aesthetic experience by the poet, just as in the case of a *sahṛdaya,* the act of describing the

events of a poem or a play to his friends (after reading the former or witnessing the latter) does not obstruct his aesthetic experience (poetic delight), as *vibhava* etc remain vividly alive in him.

The reason behind this is that writing and speaking are merely external acts which go side by side with enjoying aesthetic experience. Aesthetic bliss is primarily concerned with the internal emotions of the poet or the *sahrdaya*, and therefore the act of writing or speaking does not hamper the emotions converting into *rasa*. If Abhinavagupta has placed the poet and the *sahrdaya* both on the same footing, it is because he believes that aesthetic experience is common to both, but while the poet is endowed with the divine power of expressing his emotions verbally or in writing, the *sahrdaya* lacks it. Endowed with this faculty any *sahrdaya* can earn the title of a poet.

The second point is that the poet's aesthetic exprience may be seriously affected by his concern to choose proper modes of expression. This point, of course, is not baseless. But this does not apply to the accomplished poets, because they are never wanting in choice expressions, as these are at their finger-ends and come in quick succession

अलंकारान्तराणि हि निरूप्यमाण दुर्घटनान्यपि रससमाहितचेतसः प्रतिभावतः कवेरहम्पूर्विकया परापतन्ति । Dh. A. 2, 16 (vr)

And in the case of other poets, their aesthetic experience is no doubt interrupted for that duration when in their quest of suitable expressions they have to wait for a while But this interruption is just like that of a reader when he does not understand a passage in a poem, or like that of a spectator when he fails to apprehend or appreciate a scene in a drama. Yet it is quite clear that before and after this situation, a poet continues to experience poetic delight as other *sahrdayas* do.

[5]

Let us now deal with the second part of the question. Our view in this regard too is that after having composed his work, a poet experiences aesthetic pleasure, while reading his own poetry or viewing his own play as a *sahṛdaya* does. The poet differes from the reader in the sense that while the former has some personal element reflected in the composition concerned, the latter has none. But while reading even his own composition or viewing it on the stage or screen, it is quite possible for the poet to become oblivious of the personal element, and thus to experience aesthetic pleasure on account of complete absorption into the piece. No doubt such a situation too can arise sometimes, nay many a time, when he cannot forget his own self. Such a situation gives rise to two possibilities. The first is that the worldly pleasure resulting from the success of his good composition all the more increases his super-worldly delight, which he gets from the *kāvya-camatkāra* (poetic brilliance) and immerses him into '*rasa*'. The second is that the above-said pleasure over-shadows his super-worldly delight and completely obstructs his aesthetic experience. In the first case he enjoys supra-mundane pleasure as a poet, and in the second he feels mundane pleasure as a common man. And when a poet goes to a theatre or an assembly-hall with a view to find out the reaction on the audience of the staging of his play or the recital of his poem, he descends to the level of a practical person. Obviously, in such situations he does not enjoy the aesthetic pleasure.

Conclusion

1. While composing poetry a poet experiences aesthetic pleasure as a poet.
2. After that, while reading or witnessing his own composition he feels aesthetic delight as a *sahṛdaya* and not as a poet.

3. But in a situation when he does not feel aesthetic pleasure due to some reason, he is neither a poet nor a reader, but an ordinary man.

4. As regards other aspects discussed here we may conclude that:

   (a) *सद्यः परनिर्वृति* is the foremost purpose of poetry and *कान्तासम्मितोपदेश* stands second in the rank,

   (b) all these purposes are related with both poet and *sahrdaya* (reader or spectator) either directly or indirectly.

5

The Soul (Essence) of Poetry

Meaning of the word '*ātman*' (soul)

The word *ātman* (soul) belongs basically to *Vaiśeṣika*, *Vedānta* and *Nyāya śāstras* and not to Poetics. One of the various definitions[1] of *ātman* as presented by these *śāstras* is '*caitanyamātmā*' ('चैतन्यमात्मा'), i.e., *ātman,* the Supreme Spirit, is considered as the essence of all being and source of all sensations. And another is: '*jñānādhikaraṇamātmā*' ('ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा'), i.e., the soul is the basis of knowledge. Here the word 'knowledge' means consiousness which includes will, jealousy, effort, happiness and grief besides knowledge, or that which inspires all of the above-said feelings. As a matter of fact these feelings have been recognised as the '*liṅgas*' (characteristics) of *ātman*, i.e.,

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1. (a) चैतन्यमात्मा । Ś.Sū., 1.1 (I.P.V.V., Bh. T.), p. 245
   (b) इच्छा-द्वेष-प्रयत्न-सुख-दुःख-ज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गम् । Nyā. D., 1.1.10
   (c) 'प्राण एव आत्मा' इति केचित् श्रुत्यन्तविदः (वेदान्तिनः)।
   (d) 'चैतन्यविशिष्टं शरीरमात्मा' इति चार्वाकाः। Pra. Hṛ.
   (e) आत्मेन्द्रियाद्यधिष्ठाता । N.S.M., 1.47
   (f) आत्मत्वाभिसम्बन्धवान् आत्मा । T.Bh.,15
   (g) ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा । T.S., P.8

the existence of soul can be imagined only through them, Evidently, this form of soul has been presented keeping in view the body of all beings, specially the human being. That which directs the body is soul. To bring the point home, it may be said that in this context the word 'soul' stands for *prāṇa* (breath) or *cetanata* (consciousness) in whose absence body is lifeless and therefore completely useless.

The word *ātman* (soul) has been used in Poetics too in the sense of *prana* or *cetanata*. Of course, here it has been used not in its *vācyartha* (expressed sense), but in its *lakṣārtha* (indicated sense), and therefore the word *'soul'* means the essential, rather inevitable, element of poetry.

The use of the word *'atman'* in Poetics

The word '*ātman*' was used for the first time in Poetics by Vāmana when he said that the soul of poetry is '*riti*'. After him, Ānandvardhan and Viśvanatha used the word *ātman* for defining poetry the former accepted *'dhvani'* and the latter *'rasa'* as the soul of poetry. In between these two was Kuntaka who, accepting *'vakrokti'* as the soul of poetry, used the word *'jīvita'* in place of *atman*. Besides this, the word *ātman* was also used for the first time by Rajasekhara[1] (9th c.A.D.) while quoting the metaphor of *kavya purusa*; and so did Viśvanātha (14th c. A.D.) after him:

काव्यस्य शब्दार्थौ शरीरम्, रसादिश्चात्मा, गुणाः शौर्यादिवत्, दोषाः काणत्वादिवत्, रीतयोऽवयवसंस्थानविशेषवत्, अलंकाराः कटककुण्डलादिवत् इति । S.D., 1st Ch.

As a matter of fact this metaphor is responsible to the greatest extent for raising the question as to which theory be accepted as the *ātman* (soul/essence) of poetry. The word

1. K.M., page 13 14.

ātman, for the very first time was used by Vāmana[1], while prior to him Daṇḍin had referred *padāvalī* (phraseology) as the body of poetry.[2] He had also used the word *prāṇa* (life-breath) in the sense of vital factor.[3] Though Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa, and Vāmana were familiar with *alankāras*, *guṇas*, *doṣas* and *rasa*,[4] yet the metaphor of '*kāvya-puruṣa*' quoted above had not been set in.

In the time of Ānandvardhana and even till the age of Kuntaka, though this metaphor had not been presented, yet on the basis of *dhvani* (suggestion), specially *rasa-dhvani*, the appropriate evaluation of *alaṅkāras*, *guṇas*, *doṣas* and *rīti*[5] had been done and their definitions established. Therefore in the age of Kuntaka—even when the above metaphor had not been thought of—the necessity of answering this question was being felt, i.e., which poetic element should be accepted as the soul of poetry?

In this way, though till the age of Vāmana, the meaning of the word *ātman*, in its particular sense, had not been fixed yet a strong belief had arisen that there does exist some essential element in poetry. According to Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa, this essential element consisted in *alaṁkāra*, and according to Vāmana it comprised of *rīti*. Later on *dhvani*[6], *vakrokti*[7] and *rasa* were considered to be the soul of

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1. रीतिरात्मा काव्यस्य । K.S.Vr, 1.2.36
2. शरीरं तावद् इष्टार्थ-व्यवच्छिन्ना पदावली। K.Ā. 1.10-b
3. इति वैदर्भमार्गस्य प्राणाः दश गुणाः स्मृताः । K.Ā., 1.42-a
4. *Alankara* - Figure of speech or the embellishment of poetry.
   Dosa Defects or flaws in poetry.
   Guṇa Poetic quality or attribute of *rasa*
   Rasa - An aesthetic pleasure; poetic delight.
5. *Riti* -- Poetic diction or style.
6. *Dhvani* An aestheic suggestivity.
7. *Vakrokti* A curved (unusual) statement.

poetry. Thus if we wish to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding the soul of poetry, it is necessary to discuss and have a comparative study of the above five theories or schools of thought.

1. The Alaṁkāra School

Though Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, and Udbhata have nowhere said explicitly that *alaṁkāra* (figure of speech) is the soul of poetry, yet the following utterances of these *acaryas*, specially of Daṇḍin, clearly prove that they regarded *alaṁkara* as an essential element of poetry—

1. Bhāmaha, accepting the *alaṁkara* as a necessary embellishing element for poetry, has said that the *alaṁkāras* like *Rūpaka* (metaphor), etc., presented by various *acāryas* are as necessary for poetry as the ornaments are for beautifying the face of even a charming damsel, without which it does not look pleasing.[1]

2. All these *ācāryas* are in favour of calling all the embellishing factors of poetry as an *alaṁkara*, as says Daṇḍin explicitly:

काव्यशोभाकरान् धर्मान् अलंकारान् प्रचक्षते, (K.A 2.1 a).

It means that not only *Anuprasa* (alliteration), *Upama* (simile), etc., are the *alaṁkāras*, but also *guṇas* (attributes), *rasa* (sentiment), *bhava* (emotion), *rasabhasa* and *bhāvābhāsa* (the semblance of *rasa* and *bhava*) are termed as *alaṁkāras*. Though Vāmana, the advocate of *riti*, also had mentioned this very view as 'सौन्दर्यमलंकार:' (all the charms pertaining to poetry are called *alaṁkaras)*, yet his work, as a whole, does not support the view that he accepted *alaṁkara*, in contrast to *rīti*, as the soul of poetry. The following facts

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1. (क) रूपकादिरलंकारस्तथान्यैर्बहुधोदित:।
न कान्तमापि निर्भूषं विभाति वनितामुखम् ॥ K.A (Bh.), 1.3
(ख) अनेन वागर्थविदामलंकृता ।
विभाति नारीव विदग्धमण्डना ॥ *Ibid* 3.58

may be put forth in support of the advocates of the Alaṁkāra School—Bhamāha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa:

(a) These ācāryas, unlike the later ācāryas like Ānandvardhana and others, have not termed *aṁgībūta* (predominant) rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa, bhavābhāsa and bhāvaśānti by these very names, but have called them Rasvat, preyasvat, Ūrjasvī and Samāhita *alaṁkāras* and Udbhaṭa has accepted the *aṁgabhūta* (subordinate) form of all these as the second variety of Udātta *alaṁkāra*.

(b) The *guṇa* though has not been clearly called as an *alaṁkāra*, yet it appears from a saying of Daṇḍin that he wished to call the ten *guṇas* (Mādhurya, etc.) as the specific *alaṁkāras* of Vaidarbha mārga[1] to differentiate the two main kinds of *kāvya*—Vaidarbha and Gaudīya—from each other.

(c) Though these three *ācāryas* have nowhere clearly termed *dhvani* as *alaṁkāra*, yet the definitions and examples of the *alaṁkāras* like Rūpaka, Utprekṣā, Prativastūpamā, Paryāyokta, Apahnuti, Dīpaka, Arthāntaranyāsa, Samāsokti, Ākṣepa, Tulyayogitā, etc., definitely, indicate that they were not only familiar with the element of *dhvani* (suggestivity) or *vyañjanā* (the revealer form), but also wanted to incorporate it indirectly in the above *alaṁkāras*. One *kārikā*[2] from each of these three *acāryas* will illustrate the point:

समानवस्तुन्यासेन प्रतिवस्तूपमोच्यते ।
यथैवाऽनभिधानेऽपि गुणसाम्यप्रतीतितः ॥ K.A. (Bh.), 2.34

शब्दोपात्ते प्रतीते वा सादृश्ये वस्तुनोर्द्वयोः।
तत्र यद् भेदकथनं व्यतिरेकः स कथ्यते ॥ K Ā , 2.180

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1. K.Ā., 2.3. 2. i.e., a memorable verse.

पर्यायोक्तं यदन्येन प्रकारेणाऽभिधीयते ।
वाच्यवाचकवृत्तिभ्यां शून्येनाऽवगमात्मना ॥ K.S.S. 5.6

That is why the first advocate of *dhvani* Ānandvardhana, in the beginning of his book *Dhvanyāloka,* refuted the views of *alamkaravadins* (the advocates of *alamkara*) along with other two of *ācāryas, bhāktas* and *abhavavadins*.[1] In this very context, presenting the examples of many of the above-mentioned *alamkaras,* Anandvardhana proved that the subject of *dhvani* is much wider than that of these *alamkāras*.[2]

(d) Daṇḍin has termed *prabandha kavya* (an epic poem) as Bhāvika alamkāra (K.A. 2.364-365). The etymological meaning of the word *bhavika* is a piece of poetry in which the purpose of the poet is sustained till the end.

(e) Dandin has also included the terms related to dramatics as *alamkaras*:

यच्च सन्ध्यंग-वृत्त्यंग-लक्षणाद्यागमान्तरे ।
व्यावर्णितमिदं चेष्टमलंकारतयैव नः ॥ K.A. 2.367

In this way the advocates of the Alamkara School, specially Daṇḍin, term the *guṇa, rasa, dhvani, prabandha kāvya* and a few terms of dramaturgy as *alamkara*. Thus, according to them, not only alliteration, simile, etc., are figures, but also **all those elements of poetry which contribute to its brilliance or beauty are named as *alamkaras*.**

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1. तस्याभावं जगदुरपरे भाक्तमाहुस्तमन्ये ।
केचिद् वाचां स्थितिमविषये तत्त्वमूचुस्तदीयम् ॥ Dh. A., 1.1

2. Dh.A., 1.13 (vr.)

2. The Riti School

Vāmana is the innovator of the Rīti School. According to him *'rīti'* consists in the special arrangement or combination of words and the speciality lies in the application of *guṇas:*

विशिष्टपदरचना रीतिः । विशेषो गुणात्मा । K S.vr, 1 2 7,8

On the basis of these aphorisms, *rīti* and *guṇa* are accepted as if identical in meaning The *gunas* are of two kinds: connected with *śabda* and *artha*, i.e , sound and sense respectively. Each is ten in number and their names are similar: Ojas, Prasāda, Ślesa, Samatā, Samādhi, Mādhurya, Udāratā, Arthavyakti and Kānti But there is a great difference between the nature and definition of every *guna* of word and *guṇā* of sense

The rīti containing these *guṇas* has been called the soul of poetry by Vāmana. He speaks of three *rītis* — Vaidarbhī, Gaudīyā and Pañcālī. Out of these the Vaidarbhī is vested with all the *guṇas*, the Gaudīyā with two, namely Ojas and kānti, and the Pāñcālī is characterised by Mādhurya and Saukumārya. Vāmana is silent on the question whether the *guṇas* present in these *rītis* are *guṇas* of word or that of sense, but from his analysis, specially from his silence, it can be assumed that he intended the presence of both the types of *guṇas* in all the *rītis*. To him Vaidarbhī was the best because it was endowed with all the *guṇas*. He has pointed out towards another variety of Vaidarbhī as *śuddha* (pure) Vaidarbhī. It is found but in a composition having all the ten *guṇas*, there is no compound:

साऽपि समासाभावे शुद्धवैदर्भी A K.S. Vṛ., 1.2.19

Let us now consider the issue on what basis does Vāmana declare *rīti* to be the soul of poetry? There can be two grounds for this:

(1) to consider that all the other factors which constitute poetry can be incorporated in what he calls the essense of poetry, and

(2) to consider that they strengthen it.

(1) The advocates of Alaṁkāra School, specially Daṇḍin, had in clear terms accepted the first basis, but Vāmana had not given any hint about it. If *rīti* has been accepted as an independent School of Poetry, its main reason is that several other poetic elements can be incorporated in one way or the other into any of the twenty (10 + 10) varities of *guṇa* which is synonymous with *rīti*.

It may be pointed out that Mammaṭa has refuted these very twenty *guṇas* in many ways. One such way is that some of these *guṇas* have been included under Madhurya, Ojas and Prasāda accepted by him, while the other ones under the various elements of poetry. For example:

(i) the four *guṇas* of word accepted by Vāmana— Śleṣa, Samādhi, Audārya and Prasada can be incorporated in the Ojas accepted by Mammaṭa.

(ii) The *guṇas* of the word named Madhurya and Arthavyakti can be incorporated into Mammata's Mādhurya and Prasāda respectively.

(iii) The *guṇa* of the sense namely Arthavyakti can be included in Svabhāvokti alaṁkara, and

(iv) The *guṇa* of the sense named Kanti may be put under *rasa-dhvani* or *guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya*.

But in our opinion, from the point of view of Vāmana, all the above-said elements of poetry, enumerated by Mammaṭa — like all the 3 guṇas, *rasa*, *dhvani* and *guṇibhūta-vyaṁgya* — can, very easily, be included in 20 *guṇas* of *Rīti School*. Svabhāvokti alaṁkāra, however, has no close relation with Arthvyakti guṇa.

(2) Now let us take the above-said second basis. On this basis also *rīti* can be accepted as the soul of poetry from the

view-point of Vāmana, as all the 10 *guṇas* are nothing but the intregal part of Vaidarbhī Rīti, and similarly, both the two *guṇas* in each case of Gaudiyā and Pāñcālī Rīti.

Thus according to Vāmana, *rīti* is the soul of poetry, as all the beautifying elements of it can be included, somehow or other, in the 20 guṇas accepted by him.

3. The Dhvani School

The founder of the Dhvani School, Ānandvardhana, while announcing explicitly that *dhvani* is the soul of poetry, said that the *ācāryas* prior to him had also accepted this view:

(a) काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति बुधैर्यः समाम्नातपूर्वः ।

(b) योऽर्थः सहृदय-श्लाघ्यः काव्यस्यात्मेति व्यवस्थितः ।[1]

Dh. Ā.,1.1,2

In this context, *dhvani* means suggested sense which is expressed when the sound and the sense of the text pale into insignificance.

यत्रार्थः शब्दो वा तमर्थमुपसर्जनीकृत-स्वार्थौ ।

व्यंक्तः काव्यविशेषः स ध्वनिरिति सूरिभिः कथितः ॥

Dh. A., 1.13

Before Anandavardhana, it was declared that *alaṁkāra* had a prime place in poetry, or *rīti* was its soul. In support of his theory, Anandvardhana refuted both the above theories, and also Lakṣṇā Śabdaśakti (indicated sense).

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1. Similarly :

विमतिविषयो यः आसीन् मनीषिणां सततमविदितसतत्वः।

ध्वनिसंज्ञितः प्रकारः काव्यस्य व्यंजितः सोऽयम्॥ Dh. A.,3.34

(This poetic element was not fully known to the earlier scholars and thus it was not expounded by them).

Let us first take the *alaṁkāra*. The supporters of *alaṁkāravāda*, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa may say that after accepting the *alaṁkāra* there is no need of accepting *dhvani* : 'तस्याभावं जगदुरपरे' (Dh.Ā.1.1); because in the *alaṁkāras*—Prativastupamā presented by Bhāmaha, Vyatireka presented by Daṇḍin and the Paryāyokti presented by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa—there are definite hints of *dhvani* element. In the same way, the *alaṁkāra-vyaṁgya* may be accepted as an *alaṁkāra* instead of *dhvani*.

Rejecting the above statements, Ānandvardhana said that in the examples of the above-said *alaṁkāras*, if the suggested sense is not principally expressed, and the element of *alaṁkāra* is prominent there, they should be designated as *alaṁkaras* and not *dhvani*[1]. But if the suggested sense is prominent in the examples of these *alaṁkāras*, such passages are not to be accepted as the examples of these *alaṁkāras*, but the examples of the various varieties of *dhvani*.[2]

As a matter of fact, according to Ānandavardhana, *dhvani* is dominating while the *alaṁkāra*, *guṇa and vṛtti* are its various parts.[3] In his view, *alaṁkāras* are those, which banking on word and sense, embellish both of them - just as the bracelet and the ear-rings embellish the body.[4] They are concerned with the exterior form of the poetry. Therefore *dhvani* which is essentially an internal element cannot be incorporated into them.

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1. अलंकारान्तरस्यापि प्रतीतौ यत्र भासते ।
   तत्परत्वं न वाच्यस्य नाऽसौ मार्गो ध्वनेर्मतः॥
   (यत्र वाच्यस्य व्यंग्य-प्रतिपादनौन्मुख्येन चारुत्वं न प्रकाशते, नासौ ध्वनेर्मार्गः । Dh. Ā., 2.27 (vṛ.)
2. यत्र तु व्यंग्य-परत्वेनैव वाच्यस्य व्यवस्थानं तत्र व्यंग्य मुखेनैव व्यपदेशो युक्तः । *Ibid*, Ā., 2.27 - (vṛ.)
3. काव्यविशेषोऽङ्गी ध्वनिरिति कथितः। तस्य पुनरङ्गानि अलंकाराः गुणाः वृत्तयश्च । *Ibid*, P.74
4. अंगाश्रितास्त्वलंकाराः मन्तव्याः कटकादिवत् ।
   (वाच्य-वाचक लक्षणानि अंगानि...) *Ibid*, 2.6

Ānandavardhana has refuted *rīti* also. In this context, first of all, his following statement is worth-quoting that the *rītis* were introduced by those who were unable to expound *vyañjanā* or *dhvani*. But when this phenomenon (*dhvani*), which remained indistinct, has been made clear, there is no need for *rīti* or such other *kavyāṁgas* to be designated as the soul or essence of poetry.[1]

Giving to *rīti* another name as *sṁghaṭanā*, he said that, banking upon the *gunas*, it exalts *rasa*. It means that in the view of Ānandvardhana the success of rīti lies in its assistance to the exaltation of *rasa*, and that too not directly, but depending on the *guṇas*. And the *rasa*, itself, depends upon *dhvani*, and is also a variety of it.[2] To Ānandvardhan *rīti* is only a *saṁghaṭnā*, i.e., composition, an external form of poetry.

In this way, Ānandvardhana refuted both the schools expounded prior to *dhvani*: taking *alaṁkara* to be the means of embellishment of the body of poetry; i.e., the combination of word and sense, and *rīti* to be a form of composition.

But in our opinion, he did not do any justice to the protagonists of both the Schools. He should have refuted these two elements by taking them in their wide sense and not by giving them just a narrow sense. However, Alaṁkāra and Rīti, even in their wide sense also, cannot be assigned as the soul of poetry as both these are basically external form of beauty and not its internal form like *dhvani* as declared by Ānandavardhāna at several places:

(a) प्रतीयमानं पुनरन्यदेव वस्त्वस्ति वाणीषु महाकवीनाम् ।
यत्तत् प्रसिद्धावयवातिरिक्तं विभाति लावण्यमिवांगनासु ॥

Dh. A., 1.14

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1. अस्फुट-स्फुरितं काव्यतत्त्वमेतद् यथोदितम्।
अशक्नुवद्भिर्व्याकर्तुं रीतयः सम्प्रवर्तिताः॥ Dh. Ā., 3.47

2. called '***asaṁlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya-dhvani.***

(b) मुख्या महाकविगिरामलंकृतिभृतामपि ।

प्रतीयमानच्छायैषा भूषा लज्जेव योषिताम् ॥[1] *Ibid*, 3.38

Undoubtedly, this suggested sense or *dhvani* deserves to be called the 'soul' of poetry as compared to the external elements like *alaṁkāra* or *rīti*

× × ×

Ānandvardhana, supporting his view, says that various charms of poetry bank upon *dhvani* In fact, by the touch of *dhvani* the speech becomes novel He has accepted the three forms of poetry: *Dhvani, Guṇibhūta-vyaṁgya and Citra* in accordance with the proportion of *vyaṁgyartha (dhvani)* present in it mainly, subordinately and indistinctly in respective order:

(i) The *Dhvani-kāvya* has five principal varieties including *rasa*, etc.,[2]

(ii) while the *Guṇibhūta-vyaṁgya-kāvya has* eight.

All these varieties of both the kinds of kāvyas are further divided into sub-varieties ranging from (syllable), *padaṁśa* (part of a word), *pada* (word), and *vākya* (sentence) to *prabandhatva* (continuity of a narration).

(iii) The *Citra-kāvya* (what we may call Picture-Poetry)

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1. (a) Just as the beauty of the ladies is different from their limbs (face, eyes, hair etc.), in the same way the suggested sense conveyed through the compositions of the great poets is different from the words and meanings of them.

(b) Just as the real beauty of the women even when wearing ornaments (bracelets, ear-rings etc.) lies in their bashfulness, similarly the real beauty of the compositions of the great poets even when they are embedded with figures of speech (alliteration, simile, etc.) lies in the suggested sense.

2. See page 61, f.n. 2.

is possessed of three *guṇas,* i.e., Mādhurya, Ojas and Prasada, three *rītis* connected with *guṇas;* and the charm of all the *alaṁkāras*[1]. According to Ānandvardhana, as says Mammaṭa, even the *guṇas* and the *alaṁkāras* are not devoid of suggestion, they too have suggestion, though it is indistinct.[2]

Thus according to Ānandvardhana the element of *dhvani* whether prominent, subordinate or indistinct is necessarily present in every type of poetic beauty. And it is one of the reasons why *dhvani* has been called the soul of poetry.

There is another reason which deserves mention in this context. Ānandvardhana and his followers Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha too have given the definitions of *alaṁkāra, guṇa, rīti* and even of *dośa,*[3] as said above, on the basis of *rasa*, the best variety of *dhvani-kāvya*.

On the ground of all the aforesaid reasons, Ānanda-vardhana declared ***dhvani* to be the soul of poetry,** and at the same time, accepting the existence of all other components of poetry, he connected them with *dhvani* and explained their relavant position.

4. The Vakrokti School

The next notable poetic theory to be considered in this context is *vakrokti*, i.e., an oblique utterance, which was accepted as an essence of poetry by Kuntaka. In order to emphasise his view, he named his book as '*Vakrokti-jīvitam*', and in the definition of Vicitra-mārga he used the word *jīvita* for '*vaichitrya*', i.e., extra-worldly statement[4]. Vakrokti

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1 चित्रमिति गुणालंकारयुक्तम् । K.P.1.15

2. अव्यंग्यमिति स्फुटप्रतीयमानार्थरहितम । *Ibid*, 1.4

3. रसापकर्षका दोषा: । S.D., 7.1

4. विचित्रो तत्र वक्रोक्ति वैचित्र्यं जीवितायते ।
परिस्फुरन्ति यस्यान्त: सा काप्यतिशयाऽभिधा ॥ V.J., 1.42

means 'वैदग्ध्य-भंगी-भणिति' (*'vaidagdhyā bhangi-bhaṇiti'*),[1] i.e , strking mode of speech born out of poetic proficiency. In other words: poetic element which generates super-worldly charm in a statement is called *vakrokti*.[2] It means that a statement strikingly different from the *'loka-vārtā'* (an ordinary speech) would come under *vakrokti*.

Before Kuntaka, the *alaṁkāra* had been accepted as all-in-all of poetry, and the *rīti* and the *dhvani* as the soul of poetry. The nature of *rasa* too had been well-established by Bharata and Ānandvardhana. Kuntaka was well-acquainted with all these four theories. Of these, considering *rīti* worthless, he did not think it proper to throw special light on it.[3] Accepting the other three — either connecting them with Vakrokti or incorporating them into it -- he nowhere refuted them.

Though his views regarding *alaṁkāra* were more in line with those of Ānandvardhana[4] than with those of Bhāmaha, Daṇdin and Udbhaṭa, the advocates of Alaṁkara School, yet he could not forget the wider meaning of *alaṁkāra* as propounded by them: 'Poetry consists in its embellished form—it is a fact.[5] Influenced by this view, as it were, he called Vakrokti as an *apūrva alaṁkāra*, i.e., 'an extraordinary *alaṁkāra*'.[6] In this very context he called *vakrokti* as *vichitrā abhidhā,* i.e., vyañjanā *śakti* or *dhvani*. Thus calling Vakrokti as an '*alaṁkāra*' on the one hand, and '*dhvani*' though indirectly, on the other, indicates that Kuntaka had appreciated and recognised both the schools-- specially the *dhvani* school. As regards the *rasa*, he has open-heartedly accepted it and

1. वक्रोक्तिरेव यत्र वैदग्ध्य-भंगी-भणितिरुच्यते । V.J., 1.10
2. लोकोत्तर-चमत्कारकारि-वैचित्र्य-सिद्धये । *Ibid*, 1.5
3. तदलमनेन निस्सारवस्तुपरिमलव्यसनेन । *Ibid*, 1.24, vṛ
4. Cf. V.J.1.36, 37.
5. तत्त्वं सालंकारस्य काव्यता । *Ibid*, 1.6
6. काव्यस्यायमलंकारः कोऽप्यपूर्वो विधीयते । *Ibid*, 1.2

given place to it at several places in his book.[1]

Thus though liberally inclined towards the three poetic elements — *alaṁkāra, dhvani and rasa*—basically he is the protagonist of *Vakroktivāda*. The only reason for this is that he calls every utterance, which is placed on a higher level than the day-to-day ordinary speech, as Vakrokti. The result is that he has divided it into various varieties and sub-varieties and has indirectly incorporated all the poetic elements into its realm and thus claiming it to be the soul of poetry.

At first, he enumerated six kinds of Vakrokti banking upon *varṇa* (syllable), *pada-pūrvārdha* (basic word), *pada-parārdha* (suffixes, etc.), *vākya* (sentence), *prakaraṇa* (an episode), *prabandha* (an epic poem), and then he indicated 41 varieties of all the above-said six kinds. According to him, all these *vakroktis* (forms of linguistic beauty) give birth to poetic brilliance individually as well as in combination of more than one. In the latter case, the poetic mode shines much more.[2]

According to Kuntaka all sorts of poetic beauty, whether external or internal, fall within the perview of any of these varieties and subvarieties. For example:

(a) The brilliance brought about Śabdālaṁkāras like Anuprāsa (Alliteration), Yamaka (Rhyme), etc., is the *Varna-vinyāsa-vakratā*, and

(b) the linguistic beauty due to Arthalāṁkaras like Upamā (Simile), Rūpaka (Metaphor) is *Vākya-vinyāsa-vakratā*.

(c) The charm caused by Parikara and such other *alaṁkāras* is *Paryāya-vakratā*.

(d) Both the varieties of *dhvani* based on Lakṣaṇā (the indicated sense), namely '*arthāntara-saṁkramita-*

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1. V. J., 2.33, 35; 3.8, 46; 4.8, 10, 16, 17, 20, 21.

2. परस्परस्य शोभायै बहवः पतिताः क्वचित् ।
प्रकारा जनयन्त्येतां चित्रच्छायामनोहरम् ॥ *Ibid*, 2.34

vācya' and '*atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya*' may be included in *Rūḍhi-vaicitrya-vakratā*

(e) The sub-varieties of *dhvani* based on suffixes, case-ending, number, prefixes and *nipāta* (a particle) can come under the *vakratā* of a word — either in its *pūrvārdha* (substansive part) or *parārdha* (terminal part).

(f) The *dhvani* connected with sentence is close to *Vākya-vakratā*, and that connected with *prabandha* is close to *Prabandha-vakratā*

(g) According to Ruyyaka almost all the varieties of *dhvani* can be included under the head '*Upacara-vakratā*'— a sub-variety of *Pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā*.[1]

Thus the Vakrokti of Kuntaka includes in itself almost all the varieties of poetic beauty as enumenated by Ānandavardhana — whether external or internal. The difference lies in name only -- **what is called *dhvani* by Ānandvardhana is termed *vakrokti* by Kuntaka. And upon this very basis he declares *vakrokti* as the *jīvita* (soul) of poetry.**

5. The Rasa School

The *kāvyāṅga* (poetic element) that enjoyed greatest respect in the field of Poetics is 'Rasa'. Bharata is considered to be its founder. He accepted it as an indespensable property of the drama [2] and also shed light on the relation of certain poetic elements like *alaṁkāra, guṇa, doṣa* with *rasa*.[3]

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1. उपचारवक्रताभिः समस्तो ध्वनि प्रपञ्चः स्वीकृतः । A.S., Page 10
2. (क) एतद् रसेषु भावेषु सर्वकर्मक्रियासु च ।
सर्वोपदेशजननं नाट्यमेतद् भविष्यति ॥ N.S., 1.110
(ख) बहुरसकृतमार्गं सन्धिसन्धानयुक्तम् ।
भवति जगति योग्यं नाटकं प्रेक्षकाणाम् ॥ *Ibid*, 17.123
3. एवमेते ह्यलंकाराः गुणाः दोषाश्च कीर्तिताः ।
प्रयोगमेषां च पुनः वक्ष्यामि रससंश्रयम् ॥ *Ibid*, 17.108

Although the *alaṁkārvādin ācāryas*—Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa called the *rasa*, *bhāva,* etc., by the name of *rasvada alaṁkāra*, *preyasvad alaṁkāra,* etc., yet they accorded sufficient respect to it from their own point of view as follows.

Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin accepted it as a necessary element for an epic [1] According to Bhāmaha even an academic discussion admixtured with *rasa* becomes sweet just as the bitter medicine is made sweet by sugar-coating.[2] The *mādhurya guna* of Dandin is nothing but '*rasavad*' possessing of flavour in words as well as in the sense of a piece of poetry. By this flavour the men of taste are intoxicated as bees with honey.[3] One of the varieties of *mādhurya,* as propounded by Dandin, is '*vastugata-mādhurya*'. Its another name is '*agrāmyatā*' (non-vulgarity), which is mostly responsible for infusing *rasa* (delectation) in poetry.[4]

Now let us take the viewpoint of other *ācāryas* regarding rasa:

Rudrata, who was influenced by both the schools of *alaṁkāra* and *dhvani*, considered *rasa*, like Bhāmaha and Dandin, as an essential element for epic.[5] For the first time, he directed that the *rītis (Vaidarbhī,* etc.) and the *vṛttis* (Madhurā, Lalitā, etc.) be used in accordance with the *rasa* [6] He also accepted the prominence of Śṛṁgāra rasa,[7] and

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1. (क) युक्तं लोकस्वभावेन रसैश्च सकलैः पृथक् । K.A. (Bh.), 1.21
   (ख) अलंकृतमसंक्षिप्तं रसभावनिरन्तरम् ॥ *Ibid*, 1.18
2. स्वादुकाव्यरसोन्मिश्रं शास्त्रमप्युपयुंजते ।
   प्रथमालीढमधवः पिबन्ति कटु भेषजम् । *Ibid*, 5.3
3 मधुरं रसवद् वाचि, वस्तुन्यपि रसस्थितिः ।
   येन माद्यन्ति धीमन्तो मधुनेव मधुव्रताः ॥ *Ibid*, 1.51
4. कामं सर्वोऽप्यलंकारो रसमर्थे निषिञ्चतु ।
   तथाप्यग्राम्यतैवैनं भारं वहति भूयसा ॥ *Ibid*, 1.62

5-7. K.A. (Ru.), 16.1,5; 14.37; 14.38.

suggested the poets to attempt to compose their poetry possessing of *rasa* [1]

Ānandvardhana, though accepting *dhvani* to be the soul of poetry, declared *rasa* as the best variety of *dhvani* as compared to all its other varieties. The poet should concentrate only on *rasa-dhvani* Having high esteem for *rasa*, he says that a composition, of course, expresses the desirable sense in various forms, but it becomes splendid when it is infused with *rasa* [2] Even a common expression assumes a new brilliance in the contact of *rasa*, as the trees do [having the contact of gentle wind] in spring season.[3] A composition containing various themes becomes beseeming only when it is infused with *rasa, bhāva,* etc.,[4] and the main function of a poet is to plan his poetry in this enchanting way.[5]

Mammaṭa too, a follower of Ānandvardhana, accepted *rasa* as the upper-most purpose of poetry.[6]

Kuntaka, the founder of Vakrokti School, accepted *rasa* as the nectar of poetry and an expanding faculty of inner

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1. तस्मात्तत्कर्तव्यं यत्नेन महीयसा रसैर्युक्तम् ।
उद्वेजनमेतेषां शास्त्रवदेवाऽन्यथा हि स्यात् ॥ K.A. (Ru.), 12.2
2. अवस्थादि-विभिन्नानां वाच्यानां विनिबन्धनम् ।
भूम्नैव दृश्यते लक्ष्ये तत्तु भाति रसाश्रयात् ॥ Dh.A., 4.8
3. दृष्टपूर्वा अपि ह्यर्थाः काव्ये रसपरिग्रहात् ।
सर्वे नवा इवाभान्ति मधुमास इव द्रुमाः॥ *Ibid*, 4.4
4. वाच्यानां वाचकानां च यदौचित्येन योजनम्।
रसादि-विषयेणैतत् कर्म मुख्यं महाकवेः॥ *Ibid*, 3.32
5. व्यंग्य-व्यंजक-भावेऽस्मिन् विविधे सम्भवत्यपि ।
रसादिमय एकस्मिन् कविः स्यादवधानवान् ॥ *Ibid*, 4.5
6 सकल-प्रयोजन-मौलिभूतं समनन्तरमेव रसास्वादन समुद्भूतं विगलित वेद्यान्तरमानन्दम् । K.P., 1st U.

brilliance, and thus indirectly announced it to be the foremost purpose of poetry.[1] He called the *rasavad alamkāra* as the life of all other *alamkāras* and thus admitted the importance of *rasa*.[2] He talked of *rasa* in the context of *upsarga-vakratā* and *nipāta-vakratā* that these are accepted only when they illuminate *rasa*.[3] According to him *rasa* is inevitable for *prakaraṇa-vakrtā* and *prabandha-vakrtā* also.[4]

According to the author of *Agnipurāṇa*, the poetry without *rasa* does not look graceful like the wealth without charity. In his time the *rasa* was esteemed so high that it was called the soul of poetry.[5] Similarly Mahimabhaṭṭa directed that *rasa* undoubtedly be accepted as the soul of poetry.[6]

In the meantime the metaphor of '*kāvya-puruṣa*' had also been established—its seeds had appeared in the time of Daṇḍin and Vāmana.[7] Rajaśekhara and, after him, Viśvanātha declared, within this metaphor, that rasa is the soul of poetry,[8]

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1. चतुर्वर्गफलास्वादमप्यतिक्रम्य तद्विदाम् ।
काव्यामृतरसेनाऽन्तश्चमत्कारो वितन्यते ॥ V.J., 1.5

2. यथा स रसवन्नाम सर्वालंकारजीवितम् ।
काव्यैकसारतां याति तथेदानीं विवेच्यते ॥ *Ibid*, 3 14

3. रसादिद्योतनं यस्यामुपसर्गनिपातयोः।
वाक्यैकजीवितत्वेन साऽपरा पदवक्रता ॥ *Ibid*, 2.33

4. V.J., 4. 4, 8, 10, 16, 21.

5. (a) लक्ष्मीरिव विना त्यागान्न वाणी भाति नीरसा । A.P. 339.9
(b) वाग्वैदग्ध्यप्रधानेऽपि रस एवाऽत्र जीवितम् ।

6. काव्यस्यात्मनि संगिनि .... रसादि-रूपे न कस्यचिद् विमतिः।
S.D., 1st ch.

7. Daṇḍin had used the word '*prāṇa*' and Vāmana '*ātman*' (see p. 43)

8. काव्यस्य शब्दार्थौ शरीरम्, रसादिश्चात्मा, गुणाः शौर्यादिवत्, दोषाः काणत्वादिवत्, रीतयोऽवयवसंस्थानविशेषवत्, अलंकाराः कटककुण्डलादिवत् इति । S.D., 1st ch., page 16

and he for the first time, based his definition of poetry on this very concept· "वाक्यं रसात्मकं काव्यम्" ('Poetry is a sentence the soul whereof is *rasa*').[1]

And, above all, the importance of *rasa* lies in this respect that *alaṁkāra*, *guṇa* and *rīti* are meant to highten the *rasa*. Even *dosa* is accepted only when if any saying mars the glamour of *rasa*, otherwise it is a normal statement. This view of Ānandavardhana has been accepted by Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and other *ācāryas*[2]

Thus *rasa* on all the grounds stated above have been designated as the soul of poetry.

The Conclusion

What poetic doctrine among the five ones, discussed above, be called the soul of poetry. The word 'soul', in this context, stands for such poetic element which serves as a *means* to accomplish a piece of poetry, and this means should be (i) inevitable, (ii) *vyāpaka*, i e., extensive and (iii) an *āntarika*, i.e., suggestive of internal form of poetic beauty.

Alaṁkāra, Rīti and Vakrokti all these poetic elements serve as means, and also are (i) inevitable according to their innovators or founders, (ii) are extensive too, as they contain many varieties and sub-varieties; but all these three, in their entirety, are not innate constituents of poetry, hence they can not be accepted as the soul of poetry.

Out of the remaining two Rasa and Dhvani, both are inmost inward elements of poetry, and extensive too owing to their many varieties and sub varieties, but out of these two, the word '*rasa*', in fact, stands for the poetic delight

1. S.D., 1st ch.
2. For the definition of *alamkara* see Dh.A.,2.6; K.P., 8.67; S.D., 10.1; for that of *guna* see Dh. A.,2.7, K.P., 8.1, for that of *riti* see S.D., 9.1, and for that of *dosa* see K.P., 7.1 and S.D. 7.1.

which itself is not a means to accomplish a piece of poetry, but an achievement gained with the help of *dhvani* (suggested sense) It is *dhvani* which serves as a means for achieving poetic bliss. *Rasa* is perceived only when *dhvani* is cognized. Moreover, the word '*rasa*' is not ascribed to all sorts of poetic pleasure, but technically it is accepted only in the following situation:

When a *sthāyıbhāva* (permanent mood) like *rati* (love) or the like is combined with *vibhāva* (an excitant), *anubhāva* (an ensuant) and a *saṁcāribhāva* (an accessary), it is manifested into *rasa* (poetic relish) in the mind of a *sahṛdaya*, i.e., a man of poetic sensitivity.[1]

It may be noted where there is *rasa*, the existence of *dhvani* is a must, but where there is *dhvani*, it is not necessary that *rasa*, in its technical sense, should exist. In such a case, any one of the other kinds, varieties or susb-varieties of *dhvani* or *guṇibhūta-vyaṁgya* is accepted. For example, the sentence 'The sun sets', of course, is a statement, but it would be taken an example of '*vastu-dhvani*' and not of '*rasa*' when such type of suggested sense is conveyed through it as to 'now let us go home and enjoy dinner after the day's toil', etc. Hence the orbit and scope of *dhvani* is much wider than *rasa* which is one of the main five kinds of *dhvani-kāvya*.[2]

Hence dhvani should be taken to be the soul of poetry and not rasa.

× × ×

Now let us discuss the ***Aucitya-tattva*** whether it should be called the *atman* of poetry or not:

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1. विभावेनानुभावेन व्यक्तः संचारिणा तथा ।
रसतामेति रत्यादिः स्थायिभावः सचेतसाम् ॥ S.D.3.1

2. The five kinds are: (1) अर्थान्तर-संक्रमित-वाच्य-ध्वनिकाव्य, (2) अत्यन्त-तिरस्कृत वाच्य-ध्वनिकाव्य, (3) वस्तु-ध्वनिकाव्य, (4) अलंकार-ध्वनिकाव्य and (5) रस-ध्वनिकाव्य.

An *Aucitya-tattva* or the theme of propriety, originally introduced by Ānandavandhana,[1] was eleborated and developed by Kṣemendra (11th c.A D.) He, therefore, is known as the propounder of this poetic element. According to him: 'what befits a particular thing is called proper and the state of being proper is propriety.'[2] This very element, as he says, should be pervading in all the components of poetry like word and sentence, the verb, the case, the gender, the number, the *guṇas* (the attributes), the *alaṁkāras* (the figures of speech), the *rasa* (the relish), etc. Kśemendra has called *aucitya* as the *jīvita* (soul) of poetry also at a number of places like:

औचित्यं रससिद्धस्य स्थिरं काव्यस्य जीवितम् ।[3] A.V C. 5,

काव्यस्यांगेषु च प्राहुरौचित्यं व्यापि जीवितम् ।[4] A.V. C. 10,

But, in fact, he has not at all used the word '*jīvita*' in the sense of soul, but in the sense of an essential element which should pervade in all the componants of poetry, viz.:

उचित-स्थान-विन्यासाद् अलंकृतिरलंकृतिः ।

औचित्यादच्युता नित्यं भवन्त्येव गुणा गुणाः ॥ A.V.Ch.

(An *alaṁkāra*, i.e., a figure of speech is a real embellishment if applied at proper place; and the *guṇas*, i.e., the attributes, are real *guṇas* only when they are not divested of properiety.)

Aucitya, therefore, is not to be accepted as the soul of poetry, but a refining element in it.

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1. Dh. Ā., 2.17; 3.6; 3.10-14; 3.33.
2. उचितं प्राहुराचार्याः सदृशं किल यस्य यत् ।
   उचितस्य च यो भावस्तदौचित्यं प्रचक्षते ॥ A.V., C., 1
3. Propriety is the abiding life of poetry which is full of *rasa* (poetic delight).
4. Propriety is the very life in all the components of poetry.

6

The Nature of Rasa (Aesthetic Pleasure)

[1]

At the very ourset let us have the following passage which distinguishes a poet from an ordianary person:

yāneva śabdān vayamālapāmāḥ,
yāneva cārthān vayamullikhāmāḥ |
taireva vinyāsa-viśeṣa-bhavyaiḥ
sammohayante kavayo jaganti | |[1]

—Śivalīlārṇava (Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita)

(The poets infatuate the whole world with the help of those very words and their senses — which we people use in our daily life—just by arranaging them in their suitable and elegent order.)

What we observe or act in our daily life, we, invariably, want to express it to other persons. When we see the beauty of the sun and the moon at their rising or setting; of the clouds and the lightening in the rainy season; of the blossom of flowers of red, pink, white or blue colour in the spring

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1. यानेव शब्दान् वयमालपामः यानेव चार्थान् वयमुल्लिखामः ।
तैरेव विन्यास-विशेष-भव्यैः सम्मोहयन्ते कवयो जगन्ति ॥

—Śivalīlārṇava (Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita)

season, of the trees with no leaves at all– standing like skeltons — on both the sides of the road in the autumn season, we wish to relate the charming and even dreadful features of these phenomena to our friends, to our kith and kin, and to our neighbours

We travel by road and see the tall builidngs, the trees, the lakes, the springs, the hillocks, and what not running along with us towards our opposite direction. While travelling by sea we listen to the music of water being cut by the saw-like ores of the ship, and also see the huge mass of foam setteling around, -- and we wish to share the delight, what we get out of our journey, with other people also.

We enjoy our domestic life. We get pleasure out of our reciprocal love and care from our spouse. We cherish the affection for our children, and also from them out of their affection and obedient behaviour. We get all sorts of comforts from our well-furnished and well-decorated houses, and we wish that someone may share our pleasure by listening to us about all these amenities and facilities, or by reading our letters in which we narrate comforts and even discomforts of our daily routine.

Think of a soldier coming to his sweet home after taking part in a dreadful and disastraous war, and quite eager to tell the horrors of it, and also his own acts of bravery in the battle-field to each and everyone he meets in the street.

Well these are a few topics out of a huge lot, which we come acrosss in the literary works of the whole world.

The desire to express our emotions and feelings is, of course, our inborn nature. Most of us relate all sorts of experiences to other persons, and they do so, just in the form of a statement in a very simple and straight forward language. But a mere statement, unless suggestive, cannot be termed a piece of creative literature.

[2]

But, when a person describing any event, uses the language and diction according to its contents, and also narrates it—not as a statement, but in a fanciful manner on the basis of his imagination and richness of thought, that verbal or written narration is called a piece of literature—whether presented in the form of verse, blank verse, or even prose or drama, and the narrator is called a poet in the broad sense of the word. Every person, thus, who describes any event, is not a poet. but only one, who, soaring on the flight of his imagination, expresses it in an adorned and embellished language and elegent diction according to its subject-matter. I may quote:

nirantara-rasodgāra-garbha-sandarbha-nirbharāḥ |
giraḥ kavīnāṁ jīvanti, na kathā-mātramāśritāḥ || [1]

V.J.1.11 (vṛ.)

(Only those sayings and narrations of the poets remain in human-memory and record, which express the episodes manifesting poetic relish, and not mere statements.)

An ordinary person, red with rage at the murder of his father by someone, would express his feelings to the person whom he suspects in such type of ordinary sentences:

"You have murdered my father. You—rogue, You—cheat, I must take revenge. I shall kill you one day," and so on. But Shakespeare would get his character Hamlet say the following words to his uncle whom he suspects to be one of the conspirators in committing the cruel act of murdering his father:

1. निरन्तर-रसोद्गारगर्भ-सन्दर्भनिर्भराः।
गिरः कवीनां जीवन्ति न कथामात्रमाश्रिताः ॥ V.J.1.11 (Vṛ.)

A cutpurse of his empire and the rule,
That from a shelf the precious diadem stole,
And put it in his pocket!

Hamlet, iii.4.100

Think of a person, who is not a poet, and he looks down from the oriel of an aeroplane at a river running through a hillock. If he describes the scene, he would simply say that the river from such a height looked very charming and beautiful going through the ravines of the mountain. But, Bhāmaha, a rhetorician, indicates that by merely using the words like 'extremely good', 'exceedingly charming', etc., one does not convert his feelings and emotions into a piece of poetry:

na nitāntādi-mātreṇa jāyate cārutā girāṁ||[1]

K.A (Ru.)1.10

But about the above-mentioned scene of seeing a river from a very high altitude, the Yaksha of '*Meghadūta*' (by Kalidāsa) would say fancifully to the cloud as follows—through whom he wanted to send the message to his beloved wife:

revām drakṣyasyupala-viṣame
vindhya-pāde viśīrṇām|
bhakticchedairiva viracitāṁ
bhūtimaṅge gajasya||[2] M.D., I, 19

(O cloud! you will see the river Narmadā,
Spread out at the foot of the mountain Vindhya—
Uneven owing to rocky hills; and thus

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1. न नितान्तादिमात्रेण जायते चारुता गिराम्। K.A. (Ru.) I 10
2. रेवां द्रक्ष्यस्युपल-विषमे विन्ध्यपादे विशीर्णाम् ।
भक्तिच्छेदैरिव विरचितां भूतिमङ्गे गजस्य ॥ M.D., I, 19

Looking like the decorations on an elephant's body
Made by scattered marks of painted streaks.)

[3]

We read a piece of creative litrature whether in lyrical or epical form, or composed in any other genre like drama, story, novel or even essay written in an elegent style, we get pleasure out of it as a reader, and when we watch a drama or one-act play on the stage or on the screen, we enjoy it as a spectator. This sort of pleasure, according to Indian Poetics is termed as '*rasa*', which in English language is translated as aesthetic pleasure, aesthetic enjoyment, aesthetic bliss, poetic pleasure, poetic relish, poetic delight, poetic delectation, etc., and technically, the word '*rasa*' is termed as 'sentiment' also. How far the poetic pleasure is different from the wordly pleasure—we shall discuss later.

How the poetic pleasure is achieved, or what the process of enjoying it is—the celebrated rhetorician, Bharata had tried his best to solve this psychological phenomenon in one sentence, say in one *sūtra*, (aphorism), only and expounded it in much detail in his famous treatise Nātyaśāstra, which deals mainly with dramaturgy. It goes thus:

"vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṁyogād rasa-niśapattiḥ | "[1] (N.S. 6th ch.)

It interprets that the *rasa* (aesthetic pleasure) manifests itself when the *sthāyibhāva*, i.e., the emotion of a reader or a spectator is correlated with the following three aspects expressed in a piece of creative literature. (i) excitant, (ii) ensuant response and (iii) transitory feelings—and all these three should be accumulated as one.

1. विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगाद् रसनिष्पत्तिः । (N.S 6th ch.)

The above aphorism was explained and discussed by a good number of *ācāryas* till 11th c.A.D. Out of them, the following four are note-worthy: Bhaṭṭa-lollaṭa, Śrīśaṁkuka, Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka and Abhinavagupta, and the view-point of the last one is very much appreciated and accepted till this date. The scholarly discussions and discourses of these *ācāryas* is not being discussed here in much detail, yet let us have some fore-knowledge of the following terms divided into two groups:

1. (a) *sthāyibhāva*, i.e., permanent emotion, and
   (b) *vyabhicāribhāva*, i.e., transitory feelings,
2. (a) *vibhāva,* i.e., excitant, and
   (b) *anūbhāva*, i.e., ensuant response.

(a) **Permanent emotions** always inhere, in dormant stage, in all the human minds as basic instincts, and are fed by a number of minor feelings called transitory, accessary or auxillary feelings. Permanant emotions in us are inborn. These are not acquired by any experience or training and also are not born out of any emotion or feeling.

These are eight in number: love, mirth, grief, anger, enthusiasm, fear, disgust and surprise. Acceding to some rhetoricians there are three more emotions also: (i) *nirveda*, i.e., detachment from the worldly affairs, (ii) *vatsalya*, i.e., affection for children, and (iii) *sneha* or *sāhacarya*, i.e., desire for the company of a particular friend of any sex.[1]

All these eleven emotions are manifested into their respective sentiments, viz. love into erotic sentiment, mirth into comic, enthusiasm into heroism, grief into pathos, fear into terrific, etc.

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1. See *Preyan rasa*, p. 147

(b) Contrary to the permanent emotions are **the transitory feelings**. These have been enumerated thirtythree in number, yet more can also be accepted. These—unlike the emotions—are neither inborn, nor permanent, but born out of the emotions themselves. For example, the bashfulness is born out of 'love,' the depression out of 'sorrow', etc. Moreover, the transitory feelings are attached with more than one emotion. For example, the feelings like unsteadiness, longing, madness, remorse, dejection, sickness, agony, despair, depression, nearing death, etc., are attached with the emotion 'sorrow' as well as with 'love' and also with 'fear'.

Now let us have the second group: excitant and (b) ensuant response:

(a) The cause of any basic emotion in worldly affair—when presented in any piece of creative literature, is called an **excitant** It is of two kinds: *ālambana-vibhāva* (substantial excitant) and *uddīpana-vibhāva* (enhancer excitant).

For example, in the case of 'love', exhibited in a drama, say, 'Abhijñāna-śākuntalā' by Kālidāsa or 'Romeo and Juliet' by Shakespeare: Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā, or Romeo and Juliet are the substantial excitant respectivaly.

The secluded place like groves, the *tamāla* or oak tree, the bank of a river, the moonlight, etc., say, the lap of mother nature, are called the enhancer excitant, and the gesticulations of Śakuntalā or Juliet—like side-glances, motions of eyebrows, etc., are also called the enhancer excitant.

(b) The effect of any emotion is called **ensuant response**. For example, in the case of fear, the physical movements of a frightened person from a lion in the jungle, like trembling,

trying to look towards every direction to seek help, perspiration, horripilation, fainting, etc., are called ensuant response. Similarly, in the case of sorrow, say, at the death of a son in a drama like 'Satya-hariśacandra' - wailing, sobs, sighs, falling on the ground, raving, etc., of his parents are termed as ensuant response.

Well, **when these three— excitant, ensuant response and transitory feelings—are correlated with any permanent emotion of a *sahṛdaya* (an aesthete), it is manifested, transformed, or say, converted into poetic pleasure**—in the same way, as milk, when mixed with any thing sour, is converted into curd or cheese.

Furthermore, according to Anandavardhana, the poetic word possesses the power to suggest, and the suggestiveness becomes an inevitable and indispensable medium to stimulate the poetic pleasure into the mind of the reader through the text. That is why, '*dhvani*' (suggestivity) has been proclaimed by him as 'the Soul of poetry'.[1]

To explain all this let us take one verse from Kumārasaṁbhava, an epic by Kalidāsa·

darpaṇe ca paribhoga-darśinī
pṛṣṭhataḥ praṇayino niṣeduṣaḥ |
vīkṣya bimbamanubimbamātmanaḥ
kāni kāni cēṣṭāni na cakāra lajjayā | |[2]

Kumarasaṁbhava, 8.11

(After the expiry of the first night of her marriage, Pārvatī, in the morning hours, was, just, looking in the

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1. See page 53.
2. दर्पणे च परिभोग-दर्शिनी पृष्ठतः प्रणयिनो निषेदुषः।
वीक्ष्य बिम्बमनुबिम्बमात्मनः कानि कानि चेष्टानि न चकार लज्जया॥

Kumarasambhava, 8.11

mirror—the marks of enjoyment on her face. Suddenly, she saw, behind her own reflection, that of Mahādeva, her husband, also, sitting behind her. At this point, says the poet, what the gesticulations, she, in bashfulness, did not perform)

In this passage :

Mahādeva and Pārvatī (subject and object respectively) are substantial excitant. Looking of marks on her face—in the mirror by Pārvatī—is enhancer excitant, her gesticulations after seeing her husband sitting behind her—are ensuant response, and her bashfulness is an accessary or transitory feeling.

Well, all these three aspects suggest to the reader or the spectator that both Mahādeva and Pārvatī are in love with each other. On realizing the above passage as soon as the emotion *rati* (love) inherent in the reader is correlated with the above-mentioned all the three aspects, it is manifested into erotic sentiment (*śṛṅgāra rasa*).

[4]

It may be added here that according to the Indian philosophical point of view, the human-mind is attributed with three modes, called Guṇas: *sattava, rajas* and *tamas*, that is, the quality of (i) goodness or magnanimity, (ii) passion, energy or luxuriousness, and (iii) ignorance or illusion respectively. At the time of enjoying the poetic pleasure the mind of the reader or spectator becomes dominated by the mode of magnanimity, and, is said to be untouched of the other two modes:

"rajastamobhyāmaspṛṣṭam manaḥ sattvamihocyate |"

At this very juncture, a common man is termed as '*sahṛdaya*', that is, a person of poetical sensibility; a magnanimous person. In this state of mind, the reader or

spectator becomes quite free from all the stings of his prior attachment or detachment he has towards any character—whether historical or mythical—and thus, his mind becomes clean and clear like a mirror.[1]

To make out this point, let us have a few lines from two famous dramas: 'Abhijñānaśākuntala' by Kalidāsa and 'Romeo and Juliet' by Shakespeare.

In 'Abhijñānaśākuntala', the king Duṣyanta, the hero of the play, praises the beauty of Śakuntalā to his friend, Māḍhavya, the clown:

anāghrātaṁ puṣpaṁ kisalayamalūnam kararuhai-
ranāviddhaṁ ratnaṁ madhu navamanāsvādita-rasam|
akhaṇḍaṁ puṇyānāṁ phalamiva ca tadrūpamanaghaṁ,
na jāne bhoktāram kamiha samupsthāsyati vidhiḥ.||[2]

Abhi., 2.10

(The flawless beauty of her.
Is a flower, not yet smelt,
A tender sprout, not yet torn by the nails,
A radiant gem, not yet perforated,
The fresh honey, whose flavour, not yet tasted,
A reward of meritorious deeds not yet exhausted.
I know not, my friend, whom destiny would design
As an enjoyer of the beauty of her!)

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1. येषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशाद् विशदीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीय तन्मयीभवन योग्यता, ते हृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः । (Abhinavagupta)

2. अनाघ्रातं पुष्पं किसलयमलूनं कररुहै-
रनाविद्धं रत्नं मधु नवमनास्वादितरसम् ।
अखण्डं पुण्यानां फलमिव च तद्रूपमनघं,
न जाने भोक्तारं कमिह समुपस्थास्यति विधिः॥ Abhi., 2.10

On reading or listening to this verse, the charming, spotless and virgin beauty of Śakuntalā arouses the emotion of love of the reader or the spectator, and trasforms it into erotic sentiment

In 'Romeo and Juliet', Romeo praises the beauty of Juliet when she appears at the window above:

"But soft! what light through yonder window breaks?
It is the east, and Juliet is the sun.

....

The brightness of the cheek would shame those stars,
As day-light doth a lamp;

....

See, how she leans her cheek upon her hand!
that I were a glove upon that hand,
That I might touch that cheek".

On reading or listening to these lines also, the charming beauty of Juliet arouses the emotion of love of the reader or the spectator, and transforms it into erotic sentiment.

It may be added here that in case any spectator, in the auditorium itself, being bewitched by the beauty of the actress—acting the role of Śakuntalā or Juliet, is overpowered by her charm, and then, supposedly, is reminded of the beauty of his own beloved, technically it is termed that his mind is under the influence of *rajoguṇa* and *tamoguṇa*, and not superseded by *sattvaguṇa*, hence, he, like a common man on the street, is enjoying the love of mundane nature, and not like a *sahṛdaya*—enoying the erotic sentiment. But a moment can come in his case too, when he, overpowered by *sattvaguṇa*, is free from mundane love, and his love is transformed into erotic sentiment like other spectators.

[5]

Let us take another point now. In the theatre-hall, the actors on the stage, do help us more to enjoy the poetic relish than through the reading of any drama in our study-room, where we have, through imagination only, the presence of the characters before our eyes. Same is the case with other genres also like epic or novel.

On the stage we do not take Mr. X, an actor, as Mr X, but take him as Duṣyanta, Mahādeva, Rāma, Alexandar, Caesar, Romeo and so on. In such a case, according to Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, in our mind, there becomes quite an identification of Mr. X (the actor) with Duṣyanta or any other character. His theory is called '*āropavāda*' (occurance of identification of any two objects as one).

But according to Śriśaṁkunka, in such a case, it is owing to one of the four modes of proof[1] called *anumāna* (inference)—but of a special nature, to be termed as '*citra-turaga-nyāya*'. As, about a running horse, painted on a piece of paper or canvas, we can not say that it is running, nor can we say that it is not running; similarly, about an actor acting on the stage, we can not say that he is Duśyanta or Romeo, nor can we say that he is not so. But, in such a case of amusing indecision, says Śriśaṁkuka, we are able to enjoy the same sentiment, which was enjoyed by the character himself, whether historical or mythical (in his life time, if historical), whom the actor is immitating, rather representing.

But Bhaṭṭanāyaka modifying the above point of view of both of his predecessors, declared that we can enjoy the sentiment of the character, that is, the original person, only when, he is, in no way, a specific individual for us now a

1. (i) *pratyakṣa* (perceptible to the eye), (ii) *anumāna* (inference), (iii) *upamāna* (resemblance) and (iv) *śabda* (verbal authority).

common person and not a particular one. This doctrine is called '**Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa**', that is 'Generalization' or 'Universalization' And in the manifestation of poetic relish this principle plays an important role.

According to this doctrine, as soon as the reader or the spectator understands the meaning of the text, all the three above-mentioned phenomena *vibhāva* (excitant) etc., become generalized, that is, the characters, and also all sorts of situations connected with them, become devoid of time and space. The characters lose their specific individuality. For example in a drama like '*Uttararāmacarita*' (Bhavabhūti) Rāma and Sītā are no more the son and daughter of Daśaratha and Janaka respectively, nor they belong to any particular country or period; they are just the lover and the beloved, like any other couple of any space and time.

The automatic result of all this becomes that a reader or a spectator of any creed, colour and sex becomes free from all sorts of attachments, prejudices and limitations even towards the venerable and god-like characters like Rāma and Sītā, or Mahādeva and Pāvatī, who, now, become for him ordinary husbands and wives—lovers and beloveds—and not respected ones like his father and mother. Same is the case with the demon-like charecters also—the villains of the plot. And the happy result of this principle for the spectator or the reader becomes that he experiences the same emotions and feelings towards the object as does the subject towards him or her. He, so to say, becomes identical—rather attuned with the subject. For example, the spectator or the reader, whether male or female, experiences the emotion of a lover like Duṣyanta towards a lady like Śakuntalā; or like Romeo towards Juliet and vice versa, and thus, he, the spectator, becomes one with the subject (Duṣyanta) the lover of the object (Śakuntalā). And then at the very next moment he becomes able to enjoy the *rasa*, i.e., the poetic bliss.

Similarly, while watching the play 'Julius Caesar', we, like the citizens of Rome, at first, agree with Brutus when he, at the forum, says:

"Not that I loved Caeser less, but that I loved Rome more....

As Caeser loved me, I wept for him; as he was fortunate,

I rejoice at it; as he was valiant, I honour him; but as he was ambitious, I slew him."

and with the citizens we also utter within ourselves,

"Live Brutus! live, live."

But after a few moments, we agree with Antony, his opponent, also—that Caesar was not at all an ambitius man, as:

"When that the poor have cried, Caesar hath wept;

Did this in Caesar seem ambitious?

....

I thrice presented him a kingly crown,

Which he did thrice refuse. Was this ambition!"

and immediately with the citizens we also utter within ourselves:

"There is not a nobler man in Rome than Antony."

and also we cry:

"Revenge! About! Sneak! Burn! Fire! Kill! Slay!"

(Act iii, scene2)

Need not to say that our identification with both of them (Brutus and Antony) one by one, and also with the mob itself—rather say, with the total impact of the whole episode—is the result of the '*Sadharaṇikaraṇa*', the doctrine of generilazation.

Now let us take a passage from a very famous Hindi-epic '*Kamāyani*,' in which, Jayashankar Prasada, its author, has depicted the bashfulness of Śraddha the heroin of the

epic, and thus her enjoyable submission to her lover—Manu[1].

gira rahīṁ palakeṁ, jhuki thī nāsikā kī noka,
bhru-latā thī kāna taka caḍhatī rahī beroka|
sparśa karane lagī lajjā, lalita karṇa, kapola,
khilā pulaka kadamba sā, thā bharā gadgada bola||[2]

Kāmāyani: Vāsanā-sarga

(Her eye-lids were gently droping,
While the tip of the nose stooped down;
Her creeper-like eye-brows were
climbing right upto the ears.
Her shyness had started touching
her lovely cheeks and ears.
Her joy blossomed like the Kadamba flowers,
Her voice was choked with deep emotion.)

We can enjoy the beauty of her bashfulness only when, we, ourselves, whether male or female, become, invertly, Śraddhā—the beloved of Manu.

Now let us have another passage in this context describing the sexual union between Manu and Śraddhā from the above-said epic:

aur phira eka vyākula cumbana,
rakta khaulatā thā jisameṁ;

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1. This Manu is considered to be the last, the fourteenth, progenitor of the human race, in the beginning of the world according to the Hindu Mythology.

2. गिर रहीं पलकें, झुकी थी नासिका की नोक,
भ्रू-लता थी कान तक चढ़ती रही बेरोक,
स्पर्श करने लगी लज्जा, ललित कर्ण, कपोल,
खिला पुलक कदम्ब सा, था भरा गद्‌गद बोल ।

Kāmāyani: Vāsanā-sarga

śītala prāṇa dhadhaka uṭhatā hai
tṛṣā-tṛpti ke misa se |
do kāṭhoṁ ke sandhī bīca
usa nibhṛta guhā meṁ apane,
agni-śikhā bujha gaī,
jāgane para jaise sapane | |[1]

Kāmāyani Karma-sarga

(And again the impatient passionate kiss,
Which sets impetuous blood to flame,
Cool and patient breaths were quickened,
For quenching thirst of erotic desire.
In between those wooden sticks,
In the solitary cozy cave,
Fiery flame quietly quelled down
Like happy dreams on waking.)

The readers of this passage can not enjoy the poetic pleasure from this description unless they identify themselves with Manu and Śradhā at their respective moments of passion.

Upto this stage, I have quoted the passages where both the subeject and the object Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā or Romeo and Juliet, etc.- -have been presented. But in the poem

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1. और फिर एक व्याकुल चुम्बन, रक्त खौलता था जिसमें;
शीतल प्राण धधक उठता है तृषा-तृप्ति के मिस से।
दो काठों के संधि बीज, उस निभृत गुफा में अपने,
अग्निशिखा बुझ गई, जागने पर जैसे सपने॥

Kamayani: Karma sarga

like 'An Ode to Sleep' by Keats, only the object 'Sleep' has been presented, and not the subject. In such a case, the reader takes the poet as its subject, and by identifying with him, he enjoys the poetic pleasure. He feels, as does the poet, that—'the soft embalmer midnight, shutting his eyes with its careful and benign fingers, protects him (the reader) from the worldly affairs—whether pleasant or painful,' and thus, he, along with the poet, enjoys 'the divine delight of the forgetfulness':

O soft embrace of the still midnight,
Shutting, with careful fingers and benign,
Our gloom pleas'd eyes,
embowered from the light,
.... An Ode to Śleep

And same is the case with the long poem 'In Memoriaum'. We, the readers, attuned with the author Tennyson, feel that our departed friend, even after his death, having come down to our cottage, has sat under the shade of the trees. When the poet praises the busy life of the towns, his friend opposes his views in the following words:

For ground in yonder social mill
We rub each other's angles down.

We also, at that moment—though living in towns, and enjoying the amenities of the town-life—identified as if with our own friend, feel that the town-life is nothing but a mill; which is grinding us down, and, thus, we undermine eachothers individuality—so to say, we all of us become uniform in habits, thoughts and behaviour. And need not to say as to how suggestive are the above-quoted two lines!

But in the poem 'The Cloud' by Shelly, the case is reverse. Here the subject is cloud and not the poet. Identified with the cloud, we also go on 'bringing fresh showers for the

thirsty flowers', of course, not from any pond nearby, but from the 'seas and streams', we also 'bear light-shade for the sleepy leaves in the noon-hours,' and 'waken the buds in every morning by shaking them with the help of dropping dews upon them,'—so on and so forth, and this identification with the cloud, enables us, within no time, to enjoy the *rasa*, i.e., the poetic bliss.

[6]

What is the definition of *rasa*, (aesthetic pleasure or poetic bliss)? In fact, no clear-cut definition, in well-knit words, can be presented of any abstract phenomenon or concept like God, Soul, truth, duty, religion, etc. Same is the case with the *rasa* also. Yet, the following characteristics[1]—combined together—may serve the purpose·

—It is indivisible[2], that is, it is a blend of all the three above-said elements: excitant, etc. Any one or two, of these three, cannot help in its manifestation

—It is self-manifested.[3] For example, as to see the sun, no other lamp is needed, similarly, aesthetic pleasure also, requires no other means to make it manifested, because the emotion, itself, turns into such sort of pleasure.

—It is free from the touch of any other perception, that is, while enjoying it, we require an extreme type of concentration of mind.

—It is nothing but joy,[5] and is, also, a pure state of consciousness. It indicates that this pleasure is not like sensual pleasure which we get out of sound sleep, or from any intoxication—in the state of unconsciousness

—It is a kin to the ecstacy of joy obtained by a contemplator out of perception of Brahman (God),[6] say, out

1. *akhaṇḍa*. 2. *sva-prakāśa*. 3. *svākāravadabhinna* 4. *vedyāntara-sparśa-śūnya* 5. *ānandamaya*. 6 *brahmāsvāda-sahodara*.

of spritual realization It indicates that though this pleasure is not the same as is the spritual pleasure, yet it is similar to it.

—Again, the hyper-physical wonder or surprise is the very life of it.[1] Here the 'wonder' or 'surprise' means a kind of expansion of mind by virtue of which a spectator or a reader becomes liberal—and such state of mind can never take place in other pleasures of sensuous nature.

It may be added that all the characteristics of the *rasa* are due to the fact when an ordinary person attains to the position of being a *sahṛdaya* (an aesthete), i.e., when there is *sattvodreka* (an exaltation of magnanimity) in his mind.

[7]

The question arises whether *rasa* is a spritual pleasure or a mundane one?

—The *rasa* (poetic pleasure) is not a spritual bliss on its equal level, because in the spritual bliss the mundane emotions and feelings like love and merriment, sorrow and grief, as they say, vanish away totally for ever, and thus, the spritual pleasure endures for ever. But on the other hand, the *rasa* is temporal. Though the mundane emotions and feelings of the reader, while enjoying it, vanish away for those particular moments, yet they become more pungent and stimulated after the termination of its enjoying.

—It is not a mundane pleasure also in its equal level, for it is a repose of the mind. In fact it is quite different from other pleasures of life. For example, joy derived out of the affection of one's own son in daily life, can, in no way, be compared to with the poetic pleasure enjoyed out of such an episode narrated in a novel, story or drama. In the former case, the affection is between the two individuals, while in

1. ***lokottara-chmatkāra-prāṇa***

the latter, the affection—being sublimated—becomes universal.

—Then, what is the position of *rasa*? It has been termed as '*lokottara*', i.e., 'hyper-physical'. By this, we mean that though a mundane or secular, yet it is a super-mundane blissfulness, that is, it supersedes all sorts of other wordly pleasures like taking delicious food, having sun-bath or sound sleep, or indulging in gossips—especially censuring others—in the company of friends, or being absorbed in solving the complicated and intricate mathematical problems, or winning a large sum of amount through lottery or winning a case in the judicial court, or having day-dreams of comfortable life in future, etc. Owing to the fact that the mind of a *sahṛdaya*, as said before, becomes magnanimous, the poetic pleasure, hence, is accepted neither mundane, nor spritual, but super-worldly, that is, though it is a worldly pleasure, yet it surpasses all other such pleasures.

[8]

Now we have to take up a very controversial aspect. No doubt that a reader derives an aesthetic pleasure from the sentiments like eros, mirth, etc., but, most of the rhetoricians, accept that he does so from the sentiments like pathos, terror, etc., also. The latter statement, obviously, from a practical point of view, appears to be paradoxical and fallacious.

The famous rhetorician Viśvanatha says that pathos, terror and such other sentiments are as delightful as erotic sentiment, and the proof of it is that the readers and the spectators long and look forward to read the poetry, or to watch the drama with the tragic themes with their desire to get pleasure out of them.

But prior to him Ramacandra and Gunacandra were of the view that the sentiments like pathos, fear, furious, abhorance are painful:

—Their first argument is that no reader or spectator would be able to get pleasure while reading or watching the scene of the abduction of Sītā or undraping and seizure of Draupadī by her hair, or the death of a lovely boy like Rohitāśva, etc.

—Their second argument is that poetry and drama, actually, represent the real life. If in the scene of 'Sītā-svayaṁvara', the selection of Rāma by Sītā as her husband from amongst the galaxy of suitors, provides us pleasure, that of the abduction of her must cause pain to us, and not be delightful in any case; otherwise, the imitation of a worldly episode in a literary work would not be real.

But both the arguments, presented above, are based on the erroneous conception that there is absoluterly no difference between the worldly activities on the one hand, and the activities narrated in a literary work on the other. In fact, both the types of the worldly emotions of a person like love, grief, etc., always differ from their counter-parts in a literary work. The worldly emotions are confined to a particular time, space and individual, while those in a literary work, they do not suffer from any such limitations and restrictions.

The obvious question is why does it happen? The Indian Poetics has a powerful means in the 'doctrine of generalization' as indicated above. By virtue of it, a reader descends from the particular emotional ground to the common ground, that is, his grief or fear does not remain bound to a particular space, time and individual person. Now he is free from all kinds of infatuations and privations. Consequently, a character in a literary piece, say in a drama, loses his individuality to the spectator, and thus, appears to him a common person.

For example, the venerable personalities like Rāma and Sītā turn into ordinary man and woman for him, and the automatic result of it becomes that the reader is freed from all his prior prejudices for them In such a situation, therefore, the reader neither experiences mundane pleasure in the case of eros, nor mundane pain in the case of pathos, the reason being that the poetic situation supplies him a transcenden-tal pleasure in both the cases.

No doubt it is not at all easy to swallow the idea that we get pleasure—I mean poetic pleasure--out of a tragic theme, and to solve this problem, a straight answer is that the grief and sorrow of a widow on the death of her husband in actual life is quite different from the grief and sorrow depicted in a drama or novel connected with this particular situation.

[9]

To sum up :

—The basic emotions like love, mirth, sorrow, anger, etc., always reside in our mind in dormant stage.

—When the emotions are aroused stimulated--in the worldly affairs through any cause, effect and auxilliary feelings, they are termed as love and mirth, anger and sorrow, etc., and, among these, love and mirth impart us joy and delight, while sorrow and anger affliction and agitation of mind.

—But while reading any literary piece of work when these emotions--love, mirth, anger, sorrow, etc.--are correlated with excitant, ensuant response and auxiliary feelings—all the three accumulated as one they, themselves, manifest into erotic, comic, furious and pathos, sentiments respectively on the ground of the principle of the 'suggestiveness' as well as 'generalization'.

—And both the types of sentiments, whether erotic or pathetic, impart us poetic pleasure, and not worldly pleasure or pain respectively.

Before finishing this topic, I would like to quote a short poem by the Late Faiz Ahmad Faiz, a renowned Urdu Poet, in which we will see that we, ourselves, are the subject at one moment, while at the next we, ourselves, are object too:

vaha loga bahuta kẖuśakisamata the
jo kāma se aśīqī karate the,
yā iśaq ko kāma samajhate the |
hama jīte jī masrūfa rahe,
kucha kāma kiyā, kucha iśqa kiyā,
iśqa, kāma ke āḍhe ātā rahā,
aur iśqa se kāma ulajhatā rahā,
ākhir tang ākar hamane
donoṁ ko adhūrā choḷa diyā[1] |

(Ah, those fortunate people:
Who consider their love—nothing but work,
Or their work—nothing but love.

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1. वो लोग बहुत खुशकिस्मत थे --
जो काम से आशिकी करते थे,
या इश्क को काम समझते थे ।
हम जीते जी मसरूफ रहे,
कुछ काम किया, कुछ इश्क किया,
इश्क काम के आड़े आता रहा,
और इश्क से काम उलझता रहा;
आखिर तंग आकर हमने
दोनों को अधूरा छोड़ दिया ।

We kept busy all our lives:
We made some love,
We did some work;
Love got in the way of work,
Work kept interfering with love,
At last, we got sick of it all
And left both half-finished)[1]

Dear readers! I believe that you have enjoyed this monograph This enjoyment also can very well be termed as an aesthetic pleasure, as your mind was dominated by '*sattva-guṇa*', that is, by magnanimity while reading it, and all of you, on those moments, were to be termed as '*sahṛdayas*' – magnanimous, the enjoyors of poetic bliss.

1. Translated by naomi lazarrd, but with a few alterations.

Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa
(The Theory of Generalization)

The theory of *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (Generalization or Universalization) is quite significant in the context of manifestation of *rasa*[1]. Of the four commentators of Bharata's *rasa-sūtra*[2] — Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, Śrīśaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta, it was Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka who, with the help of this theory, tried to explain the process of *rasa* to be experienced by a *sahṛdaya*[3]. Abhinavagupta too accepted this theory. Later on Dhanañjaya, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha also threw light upon it. It is quite interesting to go through various stages of the development of this theory.

[1]

The first two commentators of the Bharata's *sūtra*— Bhaṭṭalollaṭa and Śrīśaṅkuka — were of the opinion that a *sahṛdaya*, through the medium of an actor, enjoys the very *rasa* which was enjoyed by the *anukārya* (the real character) himself in his life-time.

But both the commentators were criticized by Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka. The most serious objection raised against their views

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1. *Rasa* - an aesthetic bliss, poetic pleasure / delight / delectation.
2. विभावानुभाव व्यभिचारि-संयोगाद् रस-निष्पत्तिः
(vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicari-saṁyogād rasa-niṣpatti). N.S 6.1
3. A man of poetical sensibility, an appreciator of poetic beauty, connoisseur, an aesthete.

was how can a *sahṛdaya* (reader or spectator) derive *rasa* from the sentiments expressed by the real characters like (i) Rāma and Sīta or Mahādeva and Pārvati or Dusyanta and Śakuntalā, or from the sentiments of the characters which are purely imaginative, and also (ii) from those of the actors and actresses who imitate the original characters in their form, dress, language and action. The realization of *rasa* becomes all the more difficult in case a *sahṛdaya* has pre-conception of any sort against them, i e., has the feeling of reverence, devotion, attraction, hatred, etc., towards them.

According to the first two commentators, the locus of the *rasa* was supposed to be in the *anukāryas*, i.e., the real characters. However, they did not explain properly how it is transferred to the actor and how the spectator is charmed by the feelings expressed by the actor which originally do not belong to him. Bhaṭṭanāyaka presented the theory of *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (Universalization) in an attempt to answer these questions. The statement of Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka is available in the *Abhinavabhārtī*[1]. He not only elucidates the theory but also tells the readers what is universalized and how does it help in the realization of *rasa*. He maintains that to enjoy any piece of composition (poem or drama) one has to go through the following three *vyaparas* (functions) of word, i.e., the text:

—Through *abhidhā-vyapara* (the first function of the word, the conventional image associated with the text is aroused in the mind of the reader or spectator, that is, he grasps the sense of the text through the traditional meanings of each and every word arranged in a sentence or sentences.

—Then through the *bhavakatva vyapara* (the second function of the word) all the three *vibhava* (the excitant), *anubhāva* (the ensuant) and *sañcaribhava* (the accessary

1. A commentary on Natyasastra by Abhinavagupta (10th 11 c A.D.).

sentiment) which were connected with a particular situation, now become *sādhārnīkṛta* (generalized)[1], i.e., all the three *vibhāva,* etc., being free from the individuality, become universalized, with the result, the reader or spectator gets rid of all sorts of prejudices or preconceptions against the above-said trio (*vibhāva,* etc.).

And finally, through the *bhojakatva* or *bhoga-vyāpāra* (the third function of the word), the *sahṛdaya* enjoys the *rasa*[2].

Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka, thus, indicates that the *sādhāraṇikaraṇa-vyāpāra*, i.e., the function of generalization, is an inevitable means for the realization of *rasa.*

[2]

The above statement of Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka, though simple and short, needs elucidation. Abhinavagupta was the first to offer his views on this theory as follows:

After grasping the sense of the text with the help of *abhidhā-vyāpāra*, the reader or spectator through *Sādhāranīkaraṇa,* feels that the particular persons and even the objects presented in a poem or drama are freed from all the relations of space and time in which they had occured. For example, while reading or hearing the verse "*grīvā-bhaṁgābhirāmam.....*" (from the drama *Abhijñāna-śākuntalam* 1.3), the king Duṣyanta, the terror-stricken deer and the *sthāyibhāva* (dominant emotion) fear—all are freed from space and time The emotion of 'fear' experienced by the reader while reading these lines, becomes free from such beliefs that I am afraid, or he is afraid, or the friend is afraid or the foe is afraid. This feeling is different from that of

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1. असाधारणस्य साधारणीकरणम् इति साधारणीकरणम्, i.e., generalization of any particular phenomenon.

2. काव्ये × × × नाट्ये × × × निबिड-निजमोहसंकटता-निवारणकारिणा, विभावादि-साधारणीकरणात्मना, अभिधातो द्वितीयांशेन भावकत्व-व्यापारेण भाव्यमानो रसः । A.Bh., P. 646.

worldly fear Thus the whole episode is enjoyed in its general character without any reference to its specific occurrence, agent or object.

The gist of Abhinavagupta's exposition may be put in the following words:

The characters presented by the poet in a poem or play lose their individual identity and assume the qualities of common men and women Crossing the limits of space and time, they become universal, and are understood in their general character Seeing them in their universal or general form, the reader becomes free from all sort of prejudices.[1]

[3]

After Abhinavagupta, Dhanañjaya shed light, though indirectly, on the theory of Universalisation. He declared that it is the reader or spectator who enjoys the aesthetic pleasure, but raised the question, "Who is the object for the reader? If the historical character Rama or Sita is taken as an object, how can the reader identify himself with them? How can he owing to his past sentiments and conceptions about the historical characters identify himself with the

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1. तस्य (सहृदयस्य) च 'ग्रीवाभंगाभिरामं...' × × × इत्यादिवाक्येभ्यो वाक्यार्थ प्रतिपत्तेरनन्तरं मानसी साक्षात्कारात्मिका अपहसित तत्तद्वाक्य-कालादि विभागा तावत् प्रतीतिरुपजायते । × × × तस्यां च यो मृगपोतकादिर्भाति तस्य विशेषरूपत्वाभावात् भीत इति, त्रासकस्य अपारमार्थिकत्वात् भयमेव परं देशकालाद्यनालिंगितम् । तत एव 'भीतोऽहं, भीतोऽयं, शत्रुर्वयस्यो मध्यस्थो वा' इत्यादि प्रत्ययेभ्यः दुःख सुखादि-कृतबुद्ध्यन्तरोदय नियमवत्तया विघ्नबहुलेभ्यः विलक्षणा × × × भयानको रसः । × × × तत एव न परिमितमेव साधारण्यम् अपितु न विततम्। × × × तदत्र साक्षात्कारायमाणत्वेन परिपोषिका नटादि सामग्री । यस्यां वस्तुसतां काव्यार्पितानां च देश काल प्रमात्रादीनां नियमहेतूनामन्योन्य-प्रतिबन्धबलात् अत्यन्तमपसरणे स एव साधारणीभावः सुतरां पुष्यति ।

A. Bh., p. 470-471

characters as have been portrayed by the poet in his work? He will surely differentiate between the two, e.g., Rāma of his mind and Rāma portrayed by the poet in question.

Trying to solve the riddle Dhanañjaya says: "The character *Rāma*, for example, portrayed in a poem is not a historical figure, he only represents the salient characteristics of a *dhīrodātta* (noble-gallant) hero, and thus excites the reader's basic emotion of love or valour, etc., and brings about aesthetic relish.[1]

Thus Dhanañjaya speaks of two stages through which one has to pass in order to experience aesthetic bliss:

(i) The characters portrayed in a poem are not historical figures, they symbolise the characteristics of a *dhīrodātta (*the noble-gallent hero) or any other hero like *dhīrodhatta*[2], etc. The poet in fact can not faithfully portray the virtues and vices of the historical characters—he only paints them according to his own knowledge about them and also on the basis of his imagination keeping the ultimate aim of his work in view.

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1 (क) रसः स एव स्वाद्यत्वाद् रसिकस्यैव वर्तनात् ।

(ख) ननु च सामाजिकाश्रयेषु रसेषु को विभाव:? कथं च सीतादीनां देवीनां विभावत्वेन अविरोध:? D.R., 4 40 (the start)

(ग) धीरोदात्ताद्यवस्थानां रामादिः प्रतिपादकः।
विभावयति रत्यादीन् स्वदन्ते रसिकस्य ते ॥
ता एव च परित्यक्त-विशेषा रसहेतवः। D.R , 4.40, 41

(घ) न हि कवयो योगिन इव ध्यान-चक्षुपा ध्यात्वा प्रातिस्विकीं रामादीनामवस्थामितिहासवदुपनिबध्नन्ति । किं तर्हि? सर्वलोक-साधारणाः स्वोत्प्रेक्षा-कृत-सन्निधीः धीरोदात्ताद्यवस्थाः क्वचिदा-श्रयमात्र-दायिनीः विदधति। D.R , 4 40 (vṛ)

2 A hero characterized by carefree composure and insolence of conduct.

(ii) When these peculiar situations are free from individuality and limitation of space and time, they provide poetic pleasure to the reader. It means that when the characters portrayed in a poem shed their individuality and are understood in their general character as men or women of any space and time, then they become the source for enjoying poetic relish. In that situation Rāma and Sitā or Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā are not historical persons, they are common men and women respectively. And that is exactly what Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka had said The conclusion is:

We, reading a poem or witnessing a play, in fact, do not see the historical figures, but only those which have been created by the poet's imagination. Thus, we shorn of our prejudices (reverence, hatered, etc.) towards the historical persons—feel no difficulty in reaching the state of poetic bliss.

Thus Dhanañjaya and his commentator Dhanika, while explaining the theory of 'Generalization' have clearly referred to the poet's role which according to them is quite significant. No doubt the learned predecessors of Dhanañjaya, i.e., Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka and Abhinavagupta also, had realized this factor, but they did not mention the role of the poet explicitly. Dhanañjaya and Dhanika's contribution is that they talked of the role of poet's imagination in undubious and clear tone

[4]

The next *ācārya* who elucidated the theory of Universalization was Viśvanātha He stated that the feelings of love, etc., of the characters depicted in a poem or a drama, stimulate the sentiments of the reader, but the question arises how it happens.

Answering it, he states that it is due to the total impact of the trio: (i) the excitant (*vibhava*); (ii) the ensuant (*anubhāva*) and (iii) the accessory sentiment (*samcaribhava*),

and this whole impact is called *Sādhāraṇikaraṇa* (Generalization). Due to this process, the reader, for a few moments, identifies himself with the great personality like Hanuman crossing the vast ocean in one leap. In other words, the reader experiences the same feelings and emotions as are experienced by the characters themselves in a poem or in a drama.[1] These sentiments basically are those of the *anukarya*, i.e., the real characters like Rāma, Hanumān, etc.

If we, for an argument sake, accept that in an episode of love, the spectators take the sentiment of love of their own, then they can feel other emotions also as its offshoots like fear, bashfulness, etc. but such state of affair cannot take place as soon as the eposode is generalized. And if we ascribe them to the real characters, Rāma, etc., it is not plausible, because experiencing the sentiments of others does not result in poetic bliss. As these sentiments are only generalised sentiments, at the time of experiencing poetic bliss, they cannot be related with any particular individual— either the reader himself or his friend or foe.

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1. ननु कथं रामादिरत्याद्युद्बोध-कारणैः सामाजिक-रत्याद्युद्बोधः?

S.D. 3.9 (vṛ)

व्यापारोऽस्ति विभावादेर्नाम्ना साधारणी कृतिः॥
तत्प्रभावेण, यस्याऽऽसन् पाथोधि-प्लवनादयः।
प्रमाता तदभेदेन स्वात्मानं प्रतिपद्यते ॥
उत्साहादि-समुद्बोधः साधारण्याऽभिमानतः।
नृणामपि समुद्रादि-लङ्घनादौ न दुष्यति ॥ S.D., 3.9-11

रत्यादेरपि स्वात्मगतत्वेन प्रतीतौ सभ्यनां व्रीडाऽऽतङ्कादिर्भवेत् ।
परगतत्वेन तु अरस्यता-पातः। S.D. 3.12,13 (vṛ)

परस्य न परस्येति ममेति न ममेति च ।
तदास्वादे विभावादेः परिच्छेदो न विद्यते ॥ S.D. 3.12, 13

Thus Viśvanātha has presented the views of Abhinavagupta in more lucid and simple words. The gist of his statement is.

(1) The whole scene in a drama becomes generalised. The chain of events is not related to a particular person, space or time. It sheds its individuality.

(2) It leads to the identification of the reader with the character Hanumān, etc Both share the same emotions. The reader experiences the sentiments (noble or mean) of the characters and behaves mentally in the same way.

(3) And this mental state is the preground for the realization of the poetic bliss.

[5]

After Viśvanātha, Jagannātha, quoting the statement ascribed to the *navya ācāryas* (neo scholars),[1] said, "While reading a poem, or viewing a drama, we, the readers or spectators, at first through our stretch of imagination and suggested power of word feel that Duṣyanta has erotic feelings towards Śakuntala. Then due to common affinity, we experience a similar sentiment, that is, we think ourselves to be Duṣyanta and begin to have the feelings of love, etc. towards Śakuntalā. Though these feelings are false, yet we begin to experience poetic relish in it. It all happens because of illusion. Just as we take a piece of shell to be a piece of silver due to illusion, similarly, for a few moments, we

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1. नव्यास्तु 'काव्ये नाट्ये' च कविना नटेन च प्रकाशितेषु विभावादिषु व्यञ्जन व्यापारेण दुष्यन्तादौ शकुन्तलादि रतौ गृहीतायाम् अनन्तरं च सहृदयतोल्लासितस्य भावना विशेषरूपस्य दोषस्य महिम्ना कल्पित-दुष्यन्तत्वावच्छादिते स्वात्मनि अज्ञानावच्छिन्ने शुक्तिकाशकल इव रजतखण्डः समुत्पद्यमानोऽनिर्वचनीयः साक्षिभास्यः शकुन्तलादि विषयक रत्यादिरेव रसः। अयं च कार्यो दोषविशेषस्य। नाश्यश्च तन्नाशस्य।

R. G., Ist ch., p. 30

imagine ourselves to be the person taking part in a scene of a drama."

The view of Jagannātha differs from that of Bhaṭṭanāyaka in two ways:

(i) Jagannātha accepts the '*vyañjanā*-śabdaśakti', i.e., the suggestive power of word, while Bhaṭṭanāyaka accepted '*bhoga-vyāpara*', i.e., an application of mental pleasure.

(ii) He, unlike Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka, refers to the illusion that clouds the mind of the reader.

However, the main contention of Jagannātha is that due to illusion, the reader or the spectator has the same feeling of love towards the object (*ālambana*), i.e., Shakuntalā as the subject (*āśrya*), i.e., Duṣyanta has towards her.

This view is not novel. The same had, actually, been pointed out by Viśvanātha — of course, in other words — while explaining the theory of universalization when he talked about the reaction of the reader about the event of crossing the ocean by Hanumān.

[6]

Thus we see that right from Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka to Jagannātha there have been constant and continuous attempts by various scholars to shed light and explain the theory of universalisation, but their basic concept remained the same which was put forth by Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka that we can enjoy poetic relish only when a particular event becomes generalized (universalized).

Abhinavagupta has very clearly said that the *rasa* does not come from outside. It springs from within the self. The *sthāyibhāvas* (permanant emotions) belong to the *sahṛdaya*, and he identifies himself with the subject (*āśraya*) mentally. That is to say that the reader or the spectator, while witnessing the physical activities of historical or mythical characters

like Rāma, Hanumān, Parśurāma, Duṣyanta, etc., does not behave like them physically, but responds to their behaviour mentally. As far as the object (*ālambana*) is concerned, his or her physical actions and inner feelings also are reflected in our psyche. The basic sentiment of the reader or spectator, thus, matures into *rasa*, when it co-relates with the excitant, the ensuant and the accessary sentiment which have been produced in the mind of the *sahṛdaya* himself. However, the excitant, etc., are, of course, the prototypes of those expressed in a poem or drama. In short, through universalisation elements of space and time and individuality having been inhibited, the whole episode becomes universal and it appeals to all.

Conclusion

(1) Universalization means turning of a particular into general.

(2) In a poem or drama the whole episode or the total action is universalised.

(3) Through the Universalisation a reader or a spectator becomes free from all his prejudices.

(4) Universalisation serves as a foreground for poetic bliss (*rasa*).

(5) As the Universalisation takes place, the *sthāyibhāva*, i.e., the basic emotion (innate in human psyche) matures into *rasa* (sentiment) as soon as it co-relates with the trio, excitant, etc., which also have become innate in human psyche.

8

Śṛṅgāra (Erotic) : The Rasarāja

Though the Sanskrit *ācāryas* did not call *śṛṅgāra rasa* (eros sentiment) by the epithets *rasarāja, rasapati, etc.,*[1] yet they had been giving it highest honour ever since the beginning of the poetics. In the words of Bharata, "Whatever is sacred, pure, placid and worth-seeing can be compared to *śṛṅgāra.*"[2] According to *Rudraṭa*, "No other *rasa* is capable of producing that bliss of pleasure which the *śṛṅgāra rasa* does. This sentiment permeates all human beings, and more than that even the flora and fauna. The poetry in its absence is of an inferior order. Therefore it demands special effort on the part of the poet."[3] And in the words of Ānandavardhana, "Of all the *rasas, śṛṅgāra rasa* alone is the sweetest and the most exhilarating."[4]

In the sayings referred to above, *śṛṅgāra rasa* has been exalted above all other *rasas* indirectly. There was probably

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1. Rūpagoswāmī has, however, given the epithet of '*bhakti-rasarāṭa*' to the *mādhura rasa*. (U N.M., page 4)
2. यत्किंचिल्लोके शुचि मेध्यं दर्शनीयं वा तच्छृङ्गारेणाऽनुमीयते ।
N.S., 9.45.(Vr.)
3. सर्वरसेभ्यः शृङ्गारस्य प्राधान्यं प्रचिकटयिषुराह–
अनुसरति रसानां रस्यतामस्य नान्यः
सकलमिदमनेन व्याप्तमाबालवृद्धम् ।
तदिति विरचनीयः सम्यगेष प्रयत्नाद्
भवति विरसमेवानेन हीनं हि काव्यम् ॥ K.A. (Ru.), 14.38
4. शृङ्गार एव मधुरः परः प्रह्लादनो रसः । Dh A., 2.7

a group of *ācāryas* who not only wanted to confer the name *rasa* on *śṛṅgāra* exclusively, but also held it to be the basis of all other *rasas*—*vīra*, *karuṇa*, etc. Relying on the available records, the views of Bhojarāja and the author of *Agnipurāṇa* can be put forth as an authoritative evidence

Bhojarāja

Bhojarāja has reserved the name *rasa* for *śṛṅgāra* exclusively and does not designate the nine other *vīra*, *karuṇa*, etc., as *rasa*.[1] He holds *śṛṅgāra* to be synonyms of self and ego (*ahaṅkāra* and *abhimāna* respectively).[2] The term *ahaṅkāra* or *abhimana* used by Bhoja does not mean false pride or arrogance, but is indicative of an innate attachment of man to one's own self. Because of this very ego and self-attachment, he begins to expand his personality. When a lovely damsel casts glances on a man, this happeing awakens an emotion of self-consciousness, self-confidence and self-attachment into his mind, and plunges him headlong into bliss. That is verily the state of *ahankara (srngara)*, in which he feels an ecstatic thrill, regards himself as fortunate, gratified and an object of sweet and tender love:

अहो अहो नमो मह्यं यदहं वीक्षितोऽनया ।
मुग्धया त्रस्त-सारंग तरलायत नेत्रया ॥ Śṛ. Pra., page 464

(Bravo, Bravo, homage to me that I have been looked at languidly by this dame, whose waving eyes immitate those of a frightened fawn.)

This very ego is called *rasa*. According to Bhoja, *rasa* is the [realisation of] pleasing self consciousness [even] in the midst of emotions like pain, etc., which are [welcome] in a

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1. शृङ्गारवीरकरुणाद्भुतरौद्रहास्य
बीभत्सवत्सलभयानकशान्तनाम्नः ।
आम्नासिषुर्दश रसान् सुधियो, वयं तु
शृङ्गारमेव रसनाद्रसमामनामः ॥ Sr. Pra., page 470

2. रसोऽभिमानोऽहंकारः शृङ्गार इति गीयते । S.K.A., page 8

particular mood[1]. This very *ahankāra* is alternatively called *śṛṅgāra* as it elevates the reader or spectator to the *śṛṅga* (summit) of bliss. Bhoja is, therefore, in favour of calling *ahankāra* or its synonym *śṛṅgāra* only by the name of *rasa*,[2] and not the other so-called *rasas*.[3]

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1 'मनोऽनुकूलेषु दुःखादिषु आत्मनः सुखाभिमानः रसः।' (Śr Pra., p 466) for example.
दुःखदातापि सुखं जनयति यो यस्य वल्लभो भवति ।
दयित-नख-दूयमानयोः विवर्धते स्तनयोः रोमांचः ॥ Ibid, p. 466

2. (a) स शृङ्गारः सोऽभिमानः स रसः।
(b) रसः शृङ्गार एव एकः। Ibid, p. 77

3 This primary faculty called *ahankara* is not available to every body. That is attained by righteous persons by virtue of the pious actions and the experiences of their previous births as well as this birth. This alone is the precious possession of man's soul and is the source of all his noble qualities. That person alone is entitled to be called a *sahṛdaya*, or *sāmājika* in whom this faculty of *ahaṅkāra* wakes up. He alone is called *rasika* (the recepient of pleasure) who happens to possess *ahankāra* or *sṛṅgāra*, otherwise he will be called ṅīrasa (one devoid of susceptibility). An *ahankārī* (egoist), say, a *śṛṅgārī* (erotic), poet or *sāmājika* alone can make the world pleasant and receive poetic pleasure. The emotions *rati*, *hāsa*, *utsāha*, etc., rise only in the egoist or an erotic individual and not in one who has no ego, no eros and no susceptibility. Therefore it is not reasonable to agree with Bharata that *rasa* results from *rati* (love), etc., it is more logical to attribute the emergence of *rati*, etc., to a particular variety of ego in the soul, called *śṛṅgāra rasa*:

(a) सत्त्वात्मनाममलधर्मविशेषजन्मा जन्मान्तरानुभवनिर्मितवासनोत्थः।
सर्वात्मसंपदुदयातिशयैकहेतुः जागर्ति कोऽपि हृदि मानमयो विकारः॥
Ibid, P. 646

(b) शृङ्गारो हि नाम × × × आत्मनोऽहंकारविशेषः सचेतसा रस्यमानो रस इत्युच्यते, यदस्तित्वे रसिकोऽन्यथात्वे नीरस इति ।
Ibid, p. 517

(c) 'नहि रत्यादिभूमा रसः' किं तर्हि ? शृङ्गारः। शृङ्गारो हि नाम × × × आत्मनोऽहंकारविशेषः × × ×। रत्यादीनामयमेव प्रभवः इति । शृङ्गारिणो शृङ्गारी हि रमते, रमयते, उत्सहते, स्निह्यतीति ।
Ibid, p. 470

In order to better understand this aspect, it is very necessary to throw light on the views of Bhoja in regard to the *bhāvas—rati, hāsa* etc., the mutual relationship between *ahaṅkāra* (or *śṛṅgāra*) and *rati, etc.*, and also the number of *rasas*:

—Bhoja does not agree with Bharata in calling the eight *bhāvas* (such as *rati*, etc.,) as *sthāyibhāvas* (permanent moods), thirty three *bhāvas* (*nirveda* etc.) as *sañcāribhāvas* (transient feelings), and the eight *bhāvas* (*stambha* etc.) as *sāttvikabhāvas* (involuntary or spontaneous movements). According to him all the 49 (8+33+8) *bhāvas* may be *sthāyibhāvā* or *sañcāribhāva* depending on their circumstances and the situations; and all of them be called *sāttvika* in-as-much-as they spring from *sattva*, i.e., the mind.[1]

—All the above *bhāvas* originate from *ahaṅkāra*, and they themselves together constitute *ahaṅkāra* itself in the same way as flames arise from fire and together constitute fire itself. *Ahaṅkāra* is as if an emperor and *bhāvas* his nobles, who seated round him add to is majesty.[2]

It May be noted here that the word '*śṛṅgārın*' of the author of *Agnipurāṇa* is also expressive of *rasika* (*sāmājika*) and not that of *ratipriya*, i.e. fond of love:

> शृङ्गारी चेत् कविः काव्ये जातं रसमयं जगत् ।
> स चेत् कविर्वीतरागो नीरसं व्यक्तमेव तत् ॥ A.P., 339.8
>
> (cf., Dh. Ā., 3.43 (Vr); S.K. Ā. 5.3)

1. Sr. Pra., page 417, 517

2. (a) रत्यादयोऽर्धशतमेकविवर्जिता हि भावाः पृथग्विध-विभव-भुवो भवन्ति।
शृङ्गारतत्त्वमभितः परिवारयन्तः सप्तार्चिषं द्युतिचया इव वर्धयन्ति ॥
Ibid, p. 469

(b) भावाः संचारिणो ये स्थायिनो ये च सात्त्विकाः।
सविभावानुभावास्ते शृङ्गारस्य प्रकाशकः।
प्रकृतिजमभिमानसंज्ञं सममनुभाव-विभाव-वर्गः।
स्वमवसरमुपेयिवानुपास्ते नृपतिमिवाधिकृतेषु नीतिवर्गः॥
Ibid, p. 471

—Bhoja holds that all the above 49 *bhāvas*—and not only the so-called eight *sthāyibhāvas* as maintained by Bharata, and others—permeated by *ahankāra* reach their perfection with the help of the *vibhāva*, etc., and become capable of giving poetic pleasure to the *sahṛdaya*. And if these are termed *'rasa'* it is only by courtesy. In fact, they are primarily *bhāvas* for two reasons: firstly, they do not answer to the above-quoted definition of *rasa* advanced by Bhoja (मनोऽनुकूलेषु ..... रसः), secondly, through their faculty (*vyāpāra*) they serve to illustrate the *rasa*, i.e., *ahaṅkāra*. There is no obvious difference between *bhāva* and *rasa*. *Bhāvas* lie in the realm of emotional experience (*bhāvanā-patha*), whereas *rasa* is something beyond it.[1]

—Bhoja accepts only one rasa '*ahaṅkāra*' (*śṛṅgāra*). He says further that if the imparting of pleasure by *bhāvas* (*rati*, etc.) is to be called *'rasa'* metaphorically, then all the *bhāvas* may be called *rasa* because of their capacity to impart

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1. (a) यच्चोक्तम् 'विभानुभाव-व्यभिचारि-संयोगात् स्थायिनो रसत्वम्' इति तदपि मन्दम्, हर्षादिष्वपि विभावानुभाव-व्यभिचारि-संयोगस्य विद्यमानत्वात् । तस्माद् रत्यादयः सर्व एवैते भावाः। शृङ्गारः एव एको रस इति । तैश्च सविभावानुभावैः प्रकाशमानः शृङ्गारः विशेषतः स्वदते । *Ibid*, page 517

   (b) यद्यपि शृङ्गार एव एको रसः, तथापि तत्प्रभावा ये रत्यादयः तेऽप्युद्दीपनविभावैरुद्दीप्यमानाः, तदनुप्रवेशादेव, संचारिणाम् अनुभावानां च निमित्तभावमुपयन्तः रस-व्यपदेशं लभन्ते । *Ibid*, page 472

   (c) अभावनोदयमनन्यधिया जनेन यो भाव्यते मनसि भावनया स भावः ।
   यो भावनापथमतीत्य विवर्त्तमानः साहंकृतौ हृदि परं स्वदते रसोऽसौ ॥
   Ibid, page 520

ते (रत्यादयः) तु भाव्यमानत्वाद् भावा एव, न रसाः । यावत्सम्भवं हि भावनया भाव्यमानो भाव एवोच्यते, भावनापथमतीतस्तु रसः। मनोऽनुकूलेषु दुःखादिषु आत्मनः सुखाभिमानो रसः। स तु पारम्पर्येण सुखहेतुत्वाद् रत्यादि-भूमसु उपचारेण व्यवह्रियते । अतो न रत्यादीनां रसत्वम्, अपि तु भावना-विषयत्वाद् भावत्वमेव । *Ibid*, page 517

pleasure, and their number would be forty nine.[1]

—Bhoja has divided *rasa* into three categories:

(i) deep rootedness of *ahaṅkāra* in man (*rūḍhāhaṅkāratā),*

(ii) to assign the name *rasa* to the super-excellence (*parāprakarṣatā*) of the 49 *bhāvas* metapharically, and

(iii) the development of the *bhāvas—rati* (attachment), *hāsa* (humour), *utsāha* (fervour), etc., into *preman* (love). Bhoja has called the third category as *perman rasa* also.[2]

× × ×

The substance of the above discussion is that in the opinion of Bhoja all the 49 *bhāvas* which arise from man's ego, when described or dramatised with the help of *vibhāva*, etc., in a piece of poetry or drama, awaken and re-inforce the ego of the *sahṛdaya*. In his view the word *ahaṅkāra* is a synonym of both *rasa* and *śṛṅgāra*. Holding *rasa* to be a synonym of *ahaṁkāra*, he has analysed the human mind. According to *Bṛhadārańyaka Upaniśad's* statement 'आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति',[3] the emotions like affection, sorrow, derision,

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1. रत्यादीनामेकोनपंचाशतोऽपि विभावानुभाव-व्यभिचारियोगात् परप्रकर्षाधिगमे रस-व्यपदेशार्हता । *Ibid*, page 450

2. (a) रसं तु इह प्रेमाणमेवामनन्ति सर्वेषामपि रत्यादि-प्रकर्षाणां रतिप्रियो रणप्रियोऽमर्षप्रियः परिहासप्रियः इति प्रेमण्येव पर्यवसानात् ।

Ibid, page 517

(b) Kavikarṇapūra most probably taking the hint from this statement of Bhoja accepted the incorporation of all the *rasas* in *preman*:

उन्मज्जन्ति निमज्जन्ति प्रेमण्यखण्ड-सत्वतः
सर्वे रसाश्च भावाश्च तरंगा इव वारिधौ । A.K., page 487

3. Every thing is dear to us for the gratification of our ownself

Br. A.U. 2.4,5

ardour, anger, aversion, wonder, fear, stoicism, etc., displayed by man towards other beings, are in fact meant for self-gratification only. The word *ahaṅkāra* or *abhimāna* used in the technical sense by Bhoja indicates this very gratification and self-love The *ahaṅkāra* is at once the source of *rati*, etc., and the accumulation of them. The supreme aim of poetry is only to evoke and gratify this *ahaṅkāra*.

× × ×

The above-said novel concept is undoubtedly an unprecedented contribution of Bhoja in the field of Poetics and in that of Psychology too. The *rasa* of Bharata was indicative of 'transcendental delight', but in the view of Bhoja "सुखाभिमान: रस:" (*'sukhābhimānaḥ rasaḥ'*), has been presented as the basic cause of *rasa*, (poetic delight). It is, therefore, not improper to equate *ahaṁkāra* with *rasa* though indirectly.

But on the basis of the following etymology: 'शृंगं रीयते गम्यते येन इति शृंगार:' (by which climax is attained is called śṛṅgāra): to accept '*śṛṅgāra*' as a synonym of '*ahaṁkāra*' or '*rasa*' would be misleading, because it disregards the traditional meaning of *śṛṅgāra*, which is the elevation of *rati* (love). In fact this etymology is due to an inclination towards a particular notion.

—Bhoja was under the spell of a group of the *ācāryas*, who believed '*śṛṅgāra*' to be the basis and pivot of the *rasas (bhāvas)*. He therefore on the one hand, through this etymology, accepted the word '*śṛṅgāra*' as an equivalent of *rasa* in the broad sense, and on the other declared it to be the basis of all the *rasas* holding it to be synonym of *preman*. In his view *rati* alone is the vital element of the so-called *rasas: śṛṅgāra, hāsya*, etc., agreed to by Bharata and other *ācāryas*. For instance, an amorously inclined man is regarded as being love-minded, and a man full of ardour for battle as war-minded.

—Similarly, an individual filled with the emotions of anger, humour, etc., is thought to be anger-loving and humour-loving respectively. Obviously the *śṛṅgāra* has been given such a broad base on the strength of prejudice prevalent among a group of *ācāryas* with a view to raise it to the position of the fountain-head of all the *bhāvas*. Similarly, an *ācārya* partial to *vīra rasa,* may conjure up the persons like *ratyutsāhi* (*rati-utsāhī*, i e , one having ardour for love), *raṇotsāhi* (one having ardour for battle), *amarśotsāhi* (one having ardour for anger), *parihāsotsāhi* (one having ardour for humour), etc.

—And then, taking *śṛṅgāra* to be a synonym of all the four—*śṛṅgāra*, *ahaṅkāra*, *rasa* and *preman*—though is suggestive of a novel view on the part of Bhoja, yet it shows prejudice as noted above. In fact, all this notion creates confusion.

× × ×

Bhoja has accepted three categories of *ahaṅkāra* or *rasa:*

(a) the deep-rootedness of ego in man (*rūdhāhaṅkāratā),*

(b) metaphorical designation of all the 49 emotions love, etc., as sentiment,

(c) incorporation of the *śṛṅgāra* rasa as held by Bharata and others in *preman rasa*.

He has, in this way, no doubt, managed to include in the above categories, as far as possible, the entire material presented by other *ācāryas* by maintaining that the singular instinct of *ahaṅkāra* is the root of all these elements. But there is nothing specially novel in the first two categories except the principle of *ahaṅkāra*:

—In the first category the idea of deep rootedness is analogous to the *vāsanā* of Bharata and other *ācāryas*.

—In the second category Bhoja has accepted that there is 'पूर्वापर-सम्बन्ध' ('prior and subsequent relation') between

the *bhāvas* and *abhimāna* (*rasa*). But we come accross this type of relationship in Bharata also when he points out a time-lag between the act of chewing (*carvaṇā* = *vyakti*) and the relished pleasure (*āsvāda*). In this second category Bhoja has termed the *'prakarṣa* (an exaltation) of the *sañcāribhāvas* and *sātvikabhāvas* metaphorically as *rasa*, but even this concept of his is not absolutely original, as Bharta and others have principally admitted the pleasure caused by the *sañcārbhāvas*, but for the sake of clarity they have termed it '*bhāva*' instead of *'rasa'*.

Now let us take the third category in which all the *rasas* are subsumed in *preman*. But, as shown above, it is indicative of group prejudico. Once the view of Bhoja is conceded, the classification of any subject-matter of any *śastra* would be unnecessary.

To sum up

1. *'Ahaṅkāra'* may, no doubt, be admitted as the origin of all our feelings, i.e., an element which is made up of all the emotions, and when it reaches its acme, it may be termed '*rasa*' also.
2. On the basis of the etymology 'येन शृगं रीयते', the word *śṛṅgāra* may be accepted as the synonym of '*rasa*' and *'ahaṅkāra'* though by implication or remotely.
3. But we are not prepared to follow Bhoja in accepting *śṛṅgāra* as the synonym of *preman*, and consequently to regard *'śṛṅgāra'* (or *rati*) as the base of all the *rasas* (*bhāvas*), and thus to bring within its orbit all of them.

In the end it may be pointed out that Bhoja has made no attempt to establish the supremacy or excellence of the *śrṅgāra rasa* over other *rasas*.

The Author of Agnipurāṇa

The views of the author of *Agnipurāṇa* are also almost similar to those of Bhoja:

Delight is as old as is supreme soul. The experience of delight is called *rasa* or *caitanya camatkāra*. The development of the *rasa* or *camatkāra* is called *ahaṁkāra*. *Ahaṁkāra* gives rise to *abhimāna*, and the latter to *rati* (love). This *rati* when associated with the *vyabhicāribhāvas*, etc., is called śṛṁgāra, and the *rasas* like Hāsya, Karuṇa, Bhayānaka, *etc.*, strengthened by their respective *sthāyibhāvas* are the variants of the *rati* or *śṛngāra*.[1] Although like Bharata, accepting Śṛṅgāra, Raudra, Vīra and Adbhuta as the four basic *rasas*,, the author of Agnipurāṇa attributes their origin to *rati* only. *Rati* has four forms *rāga* (attachment), *taikśaṇya* (intensity), *avastambha* (pride), and *saṁkoca* (hesitation). These give rise to the above four rasas Śṛṅgāra, Raudrā, etc., respectively and from these four arise the Hāsya, Karuṇa, Adbhuta and Bhayānaka respectively.[2]

It may be noted that Bhoja treats *ahaṁkāra, abhimāna* and *śṛṁgāra* as synonyms, and yet he accepts that *śṛṅgāra* is originated from *abhimāna* though indirectly and remotely.[3] But according to the author of *Agnipurāṇa, ahaṁkāra* gives birth to *abhimāna*; *abhimāna* to *rati* and from *rati* are originated all the *rasas* like śṛṁgāra, hāsya, etc.

There is yet another difference between the views of these two *ācāryas*. According to Bhoja *śṛṅgāra* in its broad sense is synonym of '*rasa*' , but the author of *Agnipurāṇa* admits it to be a principal variety of the *rasa*, whose other varieties are *hāsya, karuna*, etc. Of course, Bhoja also regards *rati* as the source of all the *rasas*, yet he puts forward a third category of the *rasa (śṛṅgāra)* in the form of *preman*.

1,2. A.P., 339.1-8

3. आत्मस्थितं गुणविशेषमहंकृतस्य ।
शृङ्गारमाहु: जीवितमात्मयोने: ॥ Śṛ. Pra., page 513

Though *śṛṅgāra* orginates from *ahaṅkāra*, yet he calls it its synonym.

The conclusion is that with a little difference in the method of elaboration, both Bhoja and the author *Agnipurāṇa* accept *śṛṅgāra* alone as source of all the *rasas*.

× × ×

After the above discussion of the views of the two *ācāryas* belonging to the same school of thought, we now turn to the main theme of our subject.

As has been stated above, though the Sanskrit *ācāryas* have not explicitly called *śṛṅgāra* as the *rasarāja* (crown of all the *rasas*), yet they have accepted it as the best of the *rasas*. The views of Bharata, Rudraṭa and Ānandavardhana in this regard have been quoted above as an evidence. The different view-point of Bhoja and the author of *Agnipurāṇa*, though not wholly appealing and satisfying, do lead to the acceptance of the supremacy of the *śṛṅgāra rasa* indirectly. The succeeding *ācāryas* have advanced a few more reasons to substantiate the supremacy of the *śṛṅgāra* and there are some other reasons too which may be put forward here:

Hemacandra, Vidyādhara, Rāmacandra-Guṇcandra and other *ācāryas* have assigned the top position to the *śṛṅgāra rasa* on the ground that its influence is not confined to human race only, but is common to all the species, and is very familiar and pleasing to all without exception.[1]

Viśvanātha claims universality of the *śṛṅgāra rasa* on the ground that it is the only *rasa* with which all the *sañcāribhāvas* exccepting ferocity, mortality and indolence and all the *sthāyibhāvas* barring revulsion are connected.[2] In fact, in the ultimate analysis, even ferocity, mortality, indolence and revulsion are also related to *śṛṅgāra* in one

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1. तत्र कामस्य सकल-जाति-सुलभतयाऽत्यन्तपरिचितत्वेन सर्वान् प्रति हृद्यतेति पूर्वं शृङ्गारः। (K Anu, page 81; Ekā , page 99; N D., page 163)

2. त्यक्त्वौग्र्य-मरणालस्य-जुगुप्सा-व्यभिचारिणः । S.D., 3.186

way or the other: Śāradātanaya votes for the association of all the *sañcāribhāvas* with the *śṛṅgāra rasa*.[1] Not only *sthāyibhāvas* and *sañcaribhāvas*, but also the largest number of *anubhāvas* and *sātvikabhāvas* exist dominantly in the two varieties of *śṛṅgāra rasa—saṁbhoga* (union) and *vipralaṁbha* (separation).

Again, this *rasa* is connected with so many other aspects like:

(i) the five divisions of the *vipralaṁbha śṛṅgāra—pūrvarāga* (predisposition), *māna* (anger in love), *pravāsa* and *śāpa* (separation due to travel and curse), karuṇa (sepration causing grief);

(ii) the twelve stages of *kāma* such as cakśu-prīti (pleasisng sight) etc., and ten other stages of *kāma* such as *abhilāṣa* (longing) etc.,[2]

(iii) the elaborate classification of *nāyaka* and *nāyikā* and their companions *dūtī*, *sakhī*`, etc., under the *ālambana-vibhāva*,[3]

(iv) the *sattvaja* alaṁkāras, i.e., the subjective embellishments of the *nāyikās*, such as *bhāva* (gesture of love), *hāvā* (coquetry), *helā* (sportive gestures), etc.[4]

In this way, the wide range of the subject proves the universality and the excellence of the *śṛṅgāra rasa* of all the *rasas*.

Besides, this is the only *rasa* where both the *ālambanas,* i.e., *āśraya* (recipient) and the *viṣaya* (object) incite each other. In other words, the pair of *ālambanas* in other *rasas* are mutually hostile or indifferent, but in this *rasa* they are very intimately attached to each other.

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1. समग्रवर्णनाधारः शृङ्गारो वृद्धिमश्नुते । Bh. Pra., page 91
2. Vide P. R. Y. Bh., page 194; S.D., 3.190.
3. Vide S.D., 3rd ch.
4. R.M. (the whole book).

Further, *sauhārdra* (amity), *bhakti* (devotedness), *kārpaṇya* (wretchedness) all these so-called *rasas* accepted by different *ācāryas* from time to time get merged in the extensiveness of the *śṛṅgāra rasa*.[1]

In view of the above it can categorically be stated that:

1 Of all the *rasas* the *śṛṅgāra rasa* is the most excellent. On that account it may not be out of place call it *rasarāja* or *rasapati*. The basis for such superlative epithet is its all comprehensive nature and its universal appeal.

2. The view of Bhoja that *śṛṅgāra* is the synonym of *rasa,* and that other *rasas* are only the variety of *śṛṅgāra rasa,* and on this account, the notion that *śṛṅgāra* is the pre-eminent *rasa* of all the *rasas* may not be taken as wholly acceptable.

3. Many thinkers may be inclined to regard the *śṛṅgāra rasa* as the supreme *rasa* on the ground that all the *rasas* originate from it, but this view would be very difficult to sustain in its entirety; all that can be accepted is that although all other *rasas* are certainly related to it—some by virtue of compatibility, and others through incompatibility—yet they do not originate from it.

9

Karuṇa (Pathetic) and other such Rasas:

Their Nature of Aesthetic Pleasure

A *sahṛdaya*[1] derives aesthetic pleasure not only from the *rasas* (sentiments)—*śṛṅgāra, hāsya*, etc., but also from the *rasas—karuṇa, bhayānaka*, etc. This is a statement which from a practical and logical point of view appears to be paradoxical and fallacious. Therefore several Sanskrit *ācāryas* have called *rasa as sukhaduhkhātmaka*, i.e., causing both pain and pleasure. Of these Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra, the authors of *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* are most prominent, because they have provided the maximum material on the subject. Their statement in this connection is 'सुखदुःखात्मको रसः' ('*sukhaduhkhātmako rasaḥ*') (N.D. 3.7).

Clarifying this maxim they have observed that while five *rasas—śṛṅgāra, hāsya, vīra, adbhuta* and *śānta*[2] provide pleasure, the other four *rasas—karuṇa, raudra, bhayānaka and bībhatsa*[3] cause painful feelings. The *rasas* of the first group are indisputably delightful, but these *ācāryas* do not accept the second group of *rasas* as such. They have offered four arguments in this connection:

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1. An appreciator of merits etc., a man of taste, a man of critical faculty.
2 (1) the Erotic, (2) the Humour, (3) the Heroic, (4) the Marvellous and (5) the Quietistic respectively.
3. (1) the Pathetic, (2) the Furious, (3) the Terrible, (4) the Disgustful respectively.

1. The like *rasas, karuṅa, bhayānaka,* etc , lead the *sahṛdaya* to some indescribable state of agony. The spectators are perturbed by them.[1] But does anybody feel perturbed during moments of pleasure? Is there anyone who enjoys such scenes on the stage as the abduction of Sītā, undraping and seizure of Draupadī by her hair, the servitude of Hariścandra under a *cāṇḍāla* (guard of the cremation ground), the death of Rohitāśva, etc.?[2]

2. The second argument is that the worldly affairs and conduct are realistically presented in poetry and drama. Poets describe the worldly pleasures in the pleasing way, and sorrows in the painful way. The pathetic condition of those, whose life is being enacted, e.g., Rāma and Sītā separated from each other, would undoubtedly be painful Therefore if their poetic and dramatic representation be admitted as delightful, it follows that immitation would not be real, as it would be contrary to the realities of the practical world.[3]

3. Those, who hold *rasa* to be fundamently pleasing, may plead that just as the description or dramatisation of the touching scenes before the persons in sorrow comforts and soothes them, similarly the *rasas* like

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1. भयानको बीभत्सः करुणो रौद्रो रसास्वादवताम् अनाख्येयां कामपि क्लेशदशामुपनयति। अतएव भयानकादिभिः उद्विजते समाजः । न नाम सुखास्वादाद् उद्वगो घटते । N.D., page 291.

2. *Ibid.*, page 291-92.

3. (क) कवयस्तु सुखदुःखात्मक-संसाराऽऽनुरूप्येण रामादिचरितं निबध्नन्तः सुख-दुःखात्मक-रसानुविद्धमेव ग्रथ्नन्ति ।

   (ख) तथाऽनुकार्यगताश्च करुणादयः परिदेवताऽनुकार्यत्वात् तावद् दुःखात्मकाः एव । यदि चाऽनुकरणे सुखात्मनः स्युः, न सम्यग् अनुकरणं स्यात् विपरीतत्वेन भासनाद् इति ।

   Ibid, page 291-92

karuṇa and *bhayānaka* are pleasing and not painful. But Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra observe that in fact on such occasions too the pleasure which the afflicted persons appear to get is basically a painful experience, because that individual does not experience pleasure from the pleasant contexts [like other persons], but feels discomfortable and distressed Therefore to accept the fact that he derives pleasure from the sorrowful contexts is nothing but an illusion. Thus the *rasas karuṇa,* etc., are painful.[1]

4. Though the *rasas karuṇa*, etc., are radically painful, yet if the spectators receive supreme delight from them, it is because of the skilful acting of the actor, the brilliant composition of the poet and also the beautiful setting of the stage.

By this last statement they mean that the pleasure—which we get from reading the graphic and touching description of a poet, or by seeing the beautiful and captivating acting of an actor—inspires us to read or witness them again and again. Thus the longing to undergo that delightful experience provides pleasure to the *sahṛdaya* even when he reads a poem or witnesses a drama full of horror and pathos, otherwise these *rasas* are basically painful. In support of this statement they give an illustration. Just as the brave man

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1. येऽपीष्टादि-विनाश-दुःखवतां करुणो वर्ण्यमानेऽभिनीयमाने वा सुखास्वादः सोऽपि परमार्थतो दुःखास्वाद एव । दुःखी हि दुःखवार्तया सुखमभिमन्यते । प्रमोद-वार्तया तु ताम्यति इति करुणादयो दुःखात्मन एव इति ।

   Ibid., Page 292

2. यतृ पुनरेभिरपि चमत्कारो दृश्यते स रसास्वाद--विरामे सति यथावस्थित-वस्तु-प्रदर्शकेन कवि-नट-शक्ति-कौशलेन । × × × अनेनैव च सर्वाङ्गाऽऽह्लादकेन कवि-नट-शक्ति-जन्मना चमत्कारेण विप्रलब्धाः परमानन्द-रूपतां दुःखात्मकेष्वपि करुणादिषु सुमेधसः प्रतिजानते।

   Ibid., page 291

gets wonder-struck at the skill of his foe while the latter strikes at him,[1] in the same way the spectator too gets delightfully struck by the skill of a poet or that of an actor.

× × ×

Now let us examine all these arguments. The first one has been advanced with reference to the mental perturbance of the *sahṛdaya*, and the second keeping in view the organic unity between the worldly dealings and the poetic composition. The third argument is connected with the worldly sympathy and consolation, and the fourth one takes into account the external beauty of poetry as well as skillful performance of the actor and also the stage-craft.

Obviously, all the four arguments are based on the erroneous conception that there is absolutely no difference between worldly activities and a work of poetry. That is why in the first argument a *sahṛdaya* has been supposed to be as distressed and disturbed by the *rasas karuṇa, bhayānaka,* etc., as a worldly man in ordinary life is supposed to be frightened or woe-begone. But in fact the worldly emotions of love and grief, etc., always differ from their counter-parts in poetry. The worldly emotions are confined to a particular space, time and individual, while those in poetry do not suffer from any such limitations.

Similarly, in the second argument on the strength of this very concept the events of ordinary life have been thought to be similar to those described in poetry. But this is inadmissible, because both are different for many reasons. One striking difference between the two is that unlike the events of the world, in poetry reality alone is not depicted, it is necessarily mixed with the element of imagination of the poet. Therefore to say that the pleasure and pain of the

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1. विस्मयन्ते हि शिरश्छेदकारिणाऽपि प्रहार-कुशलेन वैरिणा शौण्डीर-मानिनः।
Ibid., page 291

sahṛdaya are the same as those of the *anukārya* (one whose role is enacted) is basically wrong.

Now let us take the third argument. There is a marked difference between the grief of a mother, who in her real life is bereaved of her son and that of the *sahṛdaya*, who witnessing the performance of such an event on the stage or reading it in a *kāvya*, becomes sad. In the former case, various situations are possible such as the softening of the sorrow by consolation, its intensification, or its total disappearance at some calm and settled moments. But in the case of the *sahṛdaya* the question of such situations does not arise, as he is no way related to the events other than depicted in poetry and drama. And, if at all, such incidents occur before him, during these moments he is not a *sahṛdaya*, but is a worldly individual.

The fourth argument, no doubt, contains truth but only unilateral. The brillance of the poetic composition and especially that of acting no doubt bewitches the *sahṛdaya*. This statement may be corroborated by a converse example that how a most pathetic and heart-rending scene, because of the inefficient performance of an actor, produces ridicule instead of pathos. Thus the brilliance born of the actor's skill and poet's gift cannot be denied, but this brilliance only intensifies the already existing effect on the *sahṛdaya* and is not its generative cause. For instance, it intensifies the emotion of love of the *sahṛdaya* in the *śṛṅgāra rasa*, the emotion of grief in the *karuṇa rasa*, and so on. In addition, this brilliance born of skill produces a feeling of admiration and wonder in the spectator for the genius of the poet as well as the actor. But this feeling of admiration should not be held to account for the realisation of pleasure in the *rasas karuṇa, bhayānaka*, etc. This feeling of admiration is on the worldly plane, so it can produce worldly pleasure and not the poetic delectation.

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Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra were not the first to hold the view that *rasas karuṇa, bhayānaka*, etc., are both pleasing and painful Some definite statements to this effect are available even prior to them:

(a) येन त्वभ्यधायि सुखदुःखजननशक्तियुक्ता विषयसामग्री बाह्यैव सुखदुःखस्वभावो रसः।

(some unknown *ācārya,* vide A.Bh., Pt. I, page 278)

(b) रसस्य सुखदुःखात्मकतया तदुभयलक्षणत्वेन उपपद्यते, अतएव तदुभयजनकत्वम् । (Rasa-kalikā, vide N.of R., page 115)

(c) रसा हि सुखदुःखरूपाः । (Śṛ. Pra., page 369)

Though it is not clear from the statements whether the said *ācāryas* held all the *rasas* both as pleasing and painful, or some of them pleasing and others painful, yet the probability is that they would have, like Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra, accepted the *rasas śṛṅgāra*, *hāsya*, etc., as pleasing, and the *rasas, karuṇa*, *bhayānaka*, etc., as painful. Beside these statements Vāmana has quoted in the name of certain *ācārya* a verse which clearly shows that he himself and probably some others *ācāryas* too believed in the existence of both pleasure and pain in the *karuṇa rasa*:

करुणा-प्रेक्षणीयेषु सम्प्लवः सुखदुःखयोः।
यथाऽनुभवतः सिद्धस्तथैवौजः प्रसादयोः॥[1]

K.S. Vṛ , 3.1.9 (vṛ)

But from this statement we get no clear indication that in Karuṇa *rasa* whether pleasure precedes pain or vice versa. It appears, however, that they accepted precedence of pain over pleasure. In other words the *sahṛdaya*, though experiencing worldly pain, does ultimately enjoy the delectation of poetry.

1. Experience tells that as in the pathatic dramas there happens an overlapping of pain and pleasure, in the same way, such state also happens in the case of *ojas* and *prasāda guṇas*.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (17th c A.D.) was probably the first to explain this conception in an original way His conclusion is that pleasure is experienced from all the *rasas*, though its degree varies from *rasa* to *rasa*. The main reason for this is that the predominance of the *sattva guṇa* is the principal factor of pleasure, and it does never so happen that in any *rasa* the *rajoguṇa* and the *tamoguṇa* are completely subdued, and the *sattva guna* becomes perfectly manifest, the former two are always present to some extent.[1] No doubt it is difficult to determine the measure in which they exist in a particular *rasa*, but they do exist. Therefore in all the *rasas,* the mixture, rather overlapping, of pleasure and pain is determined by the proportion in which the two *guṇas* referred to above exist. Thus the following four alternative views are before us:

(a) All the *rasas* are pleasing.

(b) All the *rasas* are both pleasing and painful.

(c) The *rasas* like *śṛṅgāra, hāsya* are pleasing, but the *karuṇa, bhayānaka* are painful.

(d) The *śṛṅgāra*, hāsya etc., are pleasing, but *karuṇa*, bhayānaka etc., are both pleasing and painful.

Of these four alternatives, Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra very clearly accept the third one, yet from the hint they have given in the following quotation, we are led to believe that they ultimately accepted the *rasas, karuṇa, bhayānaka,* etc., as pleasing:

पानकमाधुर्यमिव च तीक्ष्णास्वादेन दुःखास्वादेन सुतरां सुखानि स्वदन्ते इति ।[2] N.D., Page 291

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1. सत्त्वगुणस्य सुखरूपत्वात् सर्वेषां भावानां सुखमयत्वेऽपि रजस्तमोंश-मिश्रणात् तारतम्यमवगन्तव्यम् । अतो न सर्वेषु रसेषु तुल्यसुखाऽनुभवः ।

Number of Rasas, p. 156.

2. Just as a beverage [prepared with the sweet, sour and bitter ingredients] becomes all the more delicious because of its pungent taste, similarly in the rasas, karuṇa, etc., the mixture or overlapping of pleasure and pain makes the poetry all the more pleasant.

In fact the analogy between the beverage and the *rasas*, *karuṇa*, etc , is not appropriate, because there may be sequence in the admixture of ingredients, sweet, sour, bitter, etc., in the preparation of the beverage, but there is no such sequence in its taste. But in the poetry or drama dealing with *karuna rasa* there does exist a sequence between the grief (worldly pain) and the poetic pleasure. The gap of time however is so short[1] that it is not possible to assert with certainty any time-lag between the pain and pleasure.

Whatever be the case, this quotation of Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra is sufficient to make us believe that they accepted the fourth (and not the third) view that the *rasas, karuṇa, bhayānaka,* etc., are both pleasing and painful, i.e. at first painful and then pleasing immediately afterwards. If that be their view, it can certainly be explained. But if they hold these *rasas* to be absolutely painful, it would not only be opposed to the principles of rhetorics [and psychology too], but will be contrary to practice and thus wholly inacceptable. A single argument, presented by Viśvanātha that the *rasas, karuṇa*, etc., are pleasing because the *sahṛdayas* long and look forward to witness such dramas, is enough to annihilate the view-point of Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra:

करुणादावपि रसे जायते यत्परं सुखम् ।
सचेतसामनुभवः प्राणं तत्र केवलम् ।
किं च तेषु यदा दुःखं, न कोऽपि स्यात्तदुन्मुखः[2] ॥

S.D. 3.4,5

No keen reader of *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* will be prepared to admit after the perusal of their entire text that the philoso-

1. 'शतपत्रक पत्रशत भेदन-न्यायेन'।
2. If the sahrdayas experience pleasure in the rasas like karuṇa (Pathos), etc , it is the only proof the these rasa are capable of produing poetic delectation; if in these there were pain, then no one would turn a look towards them.

phers and thinkers of the calibre of Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra held that the *rasas* like *karuṇa*, etc., are purely painful. They may have accepted these to be so, though only in the initial stage, but ultimately they would have accepted these as pleasing ones. This view can be explained in several ways and from several points of view:

1. All the *sthāyibhāvas* like *rati, śoka*, etc., in all the *rasas* like *śṛṅgāra, karuṇa*, etc., are experienced as mere worldly pleasure and pain until they are perfectly matured or made manifest in the form of *rasa* by the combination of *vibhāva*, etc. For instance, in an erotic play if a spectator gets reminiscent of his own beloved, or in a pathetic play if he is reminded of his own dead son, his emotion of love and grief respectively will be an experience of worldly pleasure or pain only. That person, even while sitting in the auditorium, is, for the moment, not a *sahṛdaya* but a worldly individual only. But the moment, in which that individual rises above the self, is the moment of his aesthetic pleasure. The worldly pleasure born of love, and also the worldly pain born of grief, become the precursors of this ultimate state of *rasa*.

2. The worldly cause, effect and accessory are called *vibhāva, anubhāva* and *sañcāribhāva*[1] respectively in poetry, because they now transcend from the worldly to the super-worldly plane.[2] As long as the emotions, grief, fear, etc., are related to worldly cause, effect and accessory, even in the auditorium itself, they are no doubt painful, but when give associated with *vibhāva*, etc., they convert into the *rasa* like *karuṇa, bhayānaka*, etc., which give always transcendental pleasure.

1. an excitant, an ensuant and an accessary.
2. K.P., 4.27, 28.

3. The Indian poetics has a powerful means in the doctrine of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*[1] to prove that the *rasas, karuṇa, bhayānaka,* etc., are always pleasing at the time of their maturity. By virtue of it the *sahṛdaya* decends from the particular to the common emotional ground,[2] i.e., his grief or fear do not remain bound to a particular place and time.[3] He is free from all kinds of infatuations and privations.[4] Consequently the character in poetry or play loses his individuality and thus appears to be a common person. For example, Rāma and Sītā turn into an ordinary man and woman, respectively,[5] and the automatic result of all this is that the *sahṛdaya* is freed from his individual feelings and relationships. Therefore in such situations it cannot be accepted that the *sahrdaya* experiences worldly pleasure in the case of *śṛṅgāra rasa*, etc., and worldly pain in the case of *karuṇa rasa*, etc. This situation gives us transcendental pleasure in both the cases.

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Thus we can conclude that:

1. Every *sthāyibhāva* (permanent mood) gives worldly pleasure or pain in its immature stage, but when mature, it turns into transcendental pleasure.
2. In the *rasas, karuṇa, bhayānaka*, etc., the spectator, no doubt, at some particular moments, experiences pain born of grief and fear, etc., but that pain is

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1. See pages 87-96.
2. 'असाधारणस्य साधारणकरणम्' इति साधारणीकरणम् ।
3. भयमेव परं देशकालाद्यनालिंगितम् । A.Bhā., page 470.
4. काव्ये.....नाट्ये.....निबिड-निजमोहसंकटता-निवारणकारिणा विभावादि-साधारणीकरणात्मना। Ibid. page 464, 465
5. तत्र सीतादिशब्दाः परित्यक्त-जनक-तनयादि-विशेषाः स्त्रीमात्रवाचिनः। D.R., 4.40 (vṛ.)

worldly only, exactly in the same way as he enjoys, at some particular moments, the worldly pleasure of love and humour, etc., in the *rasas, śṛṅgāra, hāsya*, etc. But this sort of pain or pleasure precedes the state of *rasa*.

3. (a) This worldly pain or pleasure, however, is not at all indispensable, because it is not always necessary that every *sahṛdaya* experiences it. Some [though their number be small] may not do so,

(b) nor this worldly pain or pleasure is an accessary means to the acquisition of the ultimate transcedental pleasure.

(c) Of course this pain or pleasure can prove an effective impetus to the experience of transcendental pleasure in the case of immensely sensitive hearts.

4.(a) It is true that in life the grief, love, etc., cause worldly pain and pleasure, but in poetry and drama both these types of emotions when combined with *vibhāva*, etc., give the *sahṛdaya* transcendental pleasure.[1]

(b) Consequently, the *rasas, karuṇa, bhayānaka*, etc., are not painful, they too are as pleasing as the *rasas, śṛṅgāra, hāsya*, etc.

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1. लौकिक-शोकहर्षादि-कारणेभ्यो लौकिकहर्षादयो जायन्ते इति लोक एव प्रतिनियमः। काव्ये पुनः 'सर्वेभ्योऽपि विभावादिभ्यः सुखमेव जायते' इति । S.D. 3.7 (vṛ.)

10

Raudra vs. Vīra Rasa
(Furious vs. Heroic)

[1]

According to Bharata, the author of the *Nāṭyaśāstra,* the *rasas—śṛṅgāra, raudra, vīra* and *bībhatsa* are the fundamental *rasas,* and *hāsya, karuṇa, adbhuta* and *bhayānaka* originate from them respectively.[1] Sometime afterwards two more *rasas—śānta* and *vātsalya* were added to the list, and the number of *rasas* increased from four to nine or ten. The question, why the *rasas—hāsya, karuṇa* etc., were accepted as originating from *śṛṅgāra, raudra,* etc., can be explained to a certain extent psychologically. There is 'cause and effect relationship' between the pairs of *rasas—śṛṅgāra* and *hāsya; raudra* and *karuṇa; vīra* and *adbhuta;* and *bībhatsa* and *bhyānaka*. Therefore there can be no objection against admitting the above position.

While considering the difference among the four original *rasas*, we notice that there is distinct difference between the *śṛṅgāra* and *bībhatsa*; the former is related to love, while the latter is based on repulsion. But it looks a little inappropriate that *raudra* and the *vīra rasas* which are related to almost similar emotions have been listed among the original *rasas*. Either of these could have been easily regarded as the original *rasa,* and the other one its offshoot. But Bharata

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1. शृङ्गाराद्धि भवेद् हास्यो रौद्राच्च करुणो रसः ।
   वीराच्चैवाऽद्भुतोत्पत्तिर्बीभत्साच्च भयानकः ॥ N.S., 6.40

has not done so. Therefore a natural question arises: what is the difference between the two that has led the *ācārya* to regard both of them as fundamental *rasas* and thus to add one more *rasa* to the list of original *rasas*. Here an attempt is made to answer this question.

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Viśvanātha, the author of *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, pointing to the similarity between *raudra* and *vīra,* said that in both these *rasas*, the *ālambana-vibhāva* is the enemy, and the *uddīpana-vibhāva* is his gestures and postures.[1] The *anubhāvas* too in both these *rasas* are the same, e.g., picking up of the weapons, challanging the enemy, twitching of the eyebrows, reddenig of the eyes and face, roaring and threatening, etc. The *sañcāribhāvas* too—patience, endurance, pride, argu-mentation, furiousness, etc., are the same.

Inspite of the above similarity, the *sthāyibhāvas* of the two *rasas* are different : the *sthāyibhāva* of raudra is *krodha* (anger), while that of *vīra* is *utsāha* (zeal). Here the question arises why either *utsāha* or *krodha* be not accepted as the *sthāyibhāva* of both the *rasas*, and the other be included in it, and consequently, out of the two, only one *rasa* may be accepted—*raudra* or *vīra,* and the other one be included in it.

[2]

Let us consider the first alternative that *krodha* may be incorporated in *utsāha*. In any verse dealing with *vīra rasa* we are bound to come across the words expressing anger, as it is necessarily present in the heart of the warrior on the battlefield. In fact the warrior, at first, feels anger towards his enemy and then is assailed with the fervent feeling to annihilate him.

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1. (a) Raudra : आलम्बनमरिस्तत्र । S.D., 3.227
   Vīra : आलम्बनविभावास्तु विजेतव्यादयो मताः । *ibid*, 3.233

   (b) Raudra : तच्चेष्टोद्दीपनं मतम् । *ibid*, 3.22
   Vīra : विजेतव्यादि-चेष्टाद्यास्तस्योद्दीपन-रूपिणः । *ibid*, 3.233

Let us take one example in Hindi language:

सूर्यास्त से पहले न जो, मैं कल जयद्रथ-वध करूँ ।
तो शपथ करता हूँ, स्वयं मैं ही, अनल में जल मरूँ ॥ [1]

J.V. (M.Sh.G.)

Arjuna feels dynamic zeal to fight the enemy only after his fit of anger towards him. Similarly in the example of *vīra rasa* quoted by Viśvanātha:

भो लंकेश्वर, दीयतां जनकजा, रामः स्वयं याचते,
कोऽयं ते मतिविभ्रमः, स्मर नयं, नाद्यापि किंचिद् गतम् ।
नैवं चेत् खर-दूषण-त्रिशिरसां कण्ठासृजा पङ्किलः
पत्री नैष सहिष्यते मम धनुर्ज्याबन्ध-बन्धूकृतः ॥[2]

S.D., 3.234 (vṛ)

Rāma challanges Rāvaṇa only after he is overpowered with a feeling of fury and anger. Not only in the examples of *Yuddhavīra*, even in the example of *Dānavīra* quoted below there is an undertone of anger in the words of the munificant Hariścandra:

बेचि देह दारा सुअन, होइ दास हूं मन्द ।
रखिहौं, निज वच सत्य करि, अभिमानी हरिचन्द ॥ [3]

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1. Arjuna says, "I solemnly swear that if I do not kill Jayadratha tomorrow before sun-set, I shall burn myself to death."

2. Rāmacandra's message to Rāvaṇa through Aṁgada: "O Lord of Lankā, give me back the daughter of Janaka. Look! Rāma himself is asking for it. What has camouflaged your mind? Learn the ways of conduct. Nothing has yet been lost. Otherwise, my arrow, which is already stained with the blood of Khara, Dūṣaṇa and Triśiras, will not tolerate anything, if it becomes the friend of the string of the bow, i.e., it is stretched on the bow".

3. I, an egoist Hariścandra, would prove true to my word, even if I have to sell off my wife and son and have to undergo servility.

If this position is admitted, the *krodha* should be accepted as the *sthāyibhāva* of both the *rasas*, and consequently the *utsāha* be included into the *krodha* and the *vīra* into the *raudra*.

But in case *utsāha* is included into *krodha,* its importance and position would be lowered down. It would also be dethroned from its position of being a *sthāyibhāva* by arguing that it is not related only to the *vīra rasa*, but to all the other *rasas,* and thus it would be taken to be just a *sañcāribhāva* and not a *sthāyibhāva* . The definition of *utsāha* is:

कार्यारम्भेषु संरम्भः स्थेयान् उत्साह उच्यते । S.D. 3.178

i.e., *utsāha* is needed at the commencement of every sort of work. For example, a person afraid of a lion needs *utsāha* to flee. Lakṣmaṇa too must have been filled with *utsāha* to utter harsh and sarcastic words at seeing the dreadful axe of Parśurāma. Not only this, Duṣyanta must have felt *utsāha* to court Śakuntlā after being bewitched by her beauty. Even the bereaved father needs a particular kind of *utsāha* to lament and cry over the death of his dear son.

Thus the presence of *utsāha* can be admitted in all the *rasas*. That is why many *ācāryas*, rejecting it as only the *sthāyibhāva* of *vīra rasa,* and accepting it as a *sañcāribhāva*, have stressed upon its need or presence in all the *rasas*.[1] Therefore the emotion *utsāha*, which is needed in one form or the other for all the *rasas* should not be elevated to the position of *sthāyibhāva* of *vīra rasa*. It should be considered as the *sañcāribhāva*. And then, accepting *krodha* as the *sthāyibhāva* of both the *rasas*, the *vīra rasa* should be included into *raudra rasa*. Even if we do not include *vīra rasa* into *raudra*, at least *vīra* can be accepted as a variety or part of *raudra*.

Now we come to the second alternative of the issue that *raudra rasa* can be included into *vīra rasa*. A strong argument

1. उत्साह-विस्मयौ सर्वरसेषु व्यभिचारिणौ । (Saṁgītaratnākara)

can be presented to support this view that it is *krodha* which precedes *utsāha* to combat. *Krodha* is cause, while *utsāha* to combat is its effect. Between cause and effect it is always effect that is regarded of greater importance. As it is anger (i.e. cause) that culminates into a heroic deed (i.e. effect), there should be no hitch to include *raudra rasa* into *vīra rasa* Or if we like, accepting the *raudra* as the penultimate stage of *vīra*, we can call it a variety or part of the *vīra rasa*

[3]

But the arguments presented to accept both the *rasas* as one are very weak and unconvincing. In fact these two are separate *rasas*. No doubt Viśvanātha has pointed out similarity between the two, but he has hinted at their dissimilarity too. He has clearly mentioned that the colour of the *raudra rasa* is red, while that of the *vīra* is golden, the deity of the *raudra* is Rudra, while that of the *vīra* is Mahendra. It can be argued that this difference regarding colour and diety is merely based upon *kavi-paramparā* or *śāstra-paramparā*, i.e., a tradition handed down from poets or academicians, and such traditions are not always regarded as a strong proof to accept any issue. But even if we disregard this, the difference between the two *rasas* is quite distinct:

—The *sthāyibhāva* of *raudra* is *krodha* and it remains stationary in this *rasa*; it does not lead to *utsāha* for fighting.

—The *sthāyibhāva* of *vīra* is *utsāha*. In *vira rasa* also *krodha* does crop up, but it does not remains stationary, and ultimately culminates into *utsāha* for fighting. Here *krodha* is a supporting or an inspiring factor for *utsāha* which is a supported or an inspired phenomena. In short, *krodha* is a means, while *utsāha* is an end. Thus *krodha* is at secondary position, while *utsāha* at primary. Therefore the *sthāyibhāva* of *vīra* is *utsāha* and not *krodha*. In fact even the *sthāyibhāvas* in certain circumstances turn into *sañcāribhāvas*. Here *krodha* is only *sañcāribhāva*, therefore it can be called *amarśa sañcāribhāva*.

—Even if it be admitted that *utsāha* is necessary for every *rasa*, yet according to the maxim 'प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशाः भवन्ति' (the things are named on the basis of their main quality), in every *rasa* its *sthāyibhāva* is primary, and *utsāha* serves only as its *sañcāribhāva*, as in the case of *vīra rasa* the *sthāyibhāva* is *utsāha* while *krodha* stands only as its *sañcāribhāva*.

—There is world of difference between the *krodha* that works as *sthāyibhāva* of *raudra rasa* and that which works as *sañcāribhāva* of *vīra rasa*. While in *raudra* the *krodha* is beastly, in *vīra* it is emotional. In the moments of beastly anger, the person loses self-control and is besides himself, while in the emotional anger, the brave person is full of enthusiasm; he retains his courage, bravery and the power to distinguish between foul and fair.

—In *raudra rasa* the person, in a fit of anger, loses his temper even over the weak and the incapable persons, but in *vīra rasa* the brave person shows his *utsāha* to fight only towards those who are either equally powerful or superior to him in strength.

Similarly there is a vast difference between both the *sthāyibhāvas krodhas* and *utsāha:*

—*Krodha* is said to be born of *rajoguṇa*,[1] while *utsāha* to be that of *sattvaguṇa*. That is why, while in anger one loses his balance, but in zeal and enthusiasm he retains it.

—The angry person is imbibed with the feeling of retaliation, while the brave is not.

—The angry person, in the moments of anger especially at the knowledge of the superior power of his opponent, suffers from a feeling of fear, but the brave person, even in the most disastrous moments, would not.

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1. काम एष क्रोध एष रजोगुण-समुद्भवः । Bh. G. 3.37

—The angry person stoops down to injustice while the brave never.

—The angry person indulges in acrobatics or in boasting, but the brave would not: he does display his bravery, but not beyond his capacity.

The face and eyes of both the persons angry and brave do become red because of *krodha* or *utsāha*, but there is lot of difference between the two. The red eyes of the angry person show that he is besides himself, and therefore will try to harm his adversary, and if it is not possible, he will try to harm his children or his property. If he is unable to harm any body or some thing, he will, at least out of disgust, beat his forehead and scratch his face. On the other hand, the red eyes of the brave person testify to his seriousness and discretion, his firm determination to meet the enemy. The brave will neither harm the children or the property of his enemy, nor will he scratch his face out of disgust. The redness is present in both the cases, but the reason as well as the result are different. Perhaps Vishvanātha too by his statement 'रक्तास्यनेत्रता चास्य भेदिनी युद्धवीरत:'[1] (S.D. 3.231) meant this. The difference between the redness on the faces of the two is that as the face of the furious person turns red, his mouth begins to foam, while the face of the brave shines with a glow in its true colour.

[4]

The above analysis clearly shows that both these *rasas* are different from each other and one cannot be included into another. Yet there are certain *ācāryas*, who accepting *amarṣa* as the *sthāyibhāva* of both the *rasas*, are in favour of identifying the two. The definition of *amarśa* as given by Viśvanātha is as follows:

1. It is the redness of the face and eyes that differentiates it (*raudra rasa*) from the *yuddha-vīra rasa*.

निन्दाक्षेपापमानादेरमर्षोऽभिनिविष्टता ।

नेत्रराग-शिरःकम्प-भ्रूभङ्गोत्तर्जनादि-कृत् ॥ S.D 3.156

(The *amarṣa* is the determination of a purpose caused out of censure, false accusation, insult, etc., and leading to the redness of eyes, shaking of the head, knitting of the eye-brows, rebuking and snubbing, etc.)

But, as it has been said above, *amarṣa* too is a form of anger. It may be the *sañcāribhāvas* of both the *rasas*, but not their *sthāyibhāva*. As a matter of fact, *amarṣa* even as *sañcāribhāva* does not strengthen *vīra rasa* as much as it does *raudra rasa*. Defamation, accusation and censure may cause anger, but they alone would not be enough to create *utsāha*. For example, the apathy and indifference shown by Shankuntalā towards Durvāsas caused anger in the latter, because he thought that she had insulted him, but it did not produce *utsāha* in him to combat with her. Similarly in the *Harṣacarita* of Bāṇa, the defamatory words and the mocking laughter of Sarasvatī, the daughter of Brahman, caused anger in Durvāsas, who out of *amarṣa* said:

अयि विद्यालवावलेप-दुर्विदग्धे! किं मामुपहससि?

(O Ye pedantic girl! dare you laugh at me?)

The *amarṣa* in these words too indicates *krodha* and not *utsāha* in the mind of the sage. The illustration of *amarṣa* as given by Vishvanātha will further clear the point:

प्रायश्चित्तं चरिष्यामि पूज्यानां वो व्यतिक्रमात् ।

न त्वेवं दूषयिष्यामि शस्त्र-ग्रह-महाव्रतम् ॥ S.D., 3.156(vṛ)

In Janakapurī at the occasion of the '*Sītā-svayaṁvara*', when the sages asked Parshurāma to remain calm after Rāma had broken the bow of Lord Śiva, he says, "I shall pay amends for disobeying you—worthy of all honour as you are; but still will not belie my great vow of taking arms [against the *kṣatriyas*]."

In the statement of Parśurāma there is a feeling of anger towards Rāma and Laksmaṇa, and not that of *utsāha* for fighting against them. Therefore *amarṣa* can never be the *sthāyibhāva* of *vīra rasa*. *Amarṣa* caused by defamation, accusation or censure may inspire or cause *utsāha*, but it is only a means or a cause and not the end or effect itself.

The conclusions, therefore, are:

1. The *raudra* and the *vīra rasas* are two entirely different *rasas*.
2. They cannot be included into each other, because *krodha*, the *sthāyibhāva* of *raudra rasa* cannot be that of *vīra rasa*. Similarly *utsāha*, the *sthāyibhāva* of *vīra rasa* cannot be that of *raudraa rasa*. They can serve only as *sañcāribhāva* in the other *rasa*.
3. Accepting *amarṣa* as the *sthāyibhāva* of both the *rasas* and thus indentifying them is also untenable, because *amarṣa* works only as *sañcāribhāva* in both the *rasas*, though its scope or role is much greater in the *raudra rasa* than in the *vīra rasa*.

Adbhuta (Marvellous) Rasa vs. Adbhuta (Marvellous) Element

[1]

The *sthāyibhāva i.e.*, dominant mood of *adbhuta rasa* (marvellous sentiment) is *vismaya* (astonishment). Its *ālambana-vibhāva* (supporting cause) is some thing astonishing, and its *uddīpana-vibhāva* (exciting cause) is the description of that thing, such as the portrayal of its colour, size, shape, dimensions, etc., Its *sātvika-bhāvas* (psycho-manifestations) are perspiration, trembling, choking of the voice, etc. Its *sañcāribhāvas* (fleeting moods) are uneasiness, exultation, reasoning, frightening, etc. Thus the process of the manifestation of the *adbhuta rasa* is the same as that of the other *rasas*. Certain *ācāryas*, however, have given more importance to this *rasa* and have proclaimed that it is the basis of all the other *rasas*. The statements of Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra (12th c.A.D), Dharmadatta (12th-13th c.A.D.) and Nārāyaṇa (13th-14th c.A.D.) are worth-mentioning in this respect.

Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra have shed light on the importance and position of the *adbhuta rasa* as follows: "In one of the varieties of *rūpaka* called *nāṭaka* there should be one *rasa* as dominant and other *rasas* as subordinate. It should end in *adbhut rasa*": एकांगिरसम् अन्याङ्गम् अद्भुतान्तम्.

Expounding the compound word '*adbhutantam*,' the *ācāryas* say that towards the end of the drama, i.e., in the *nirvahaṇa sandhi*, there should be *adbhuta rasa*: 'अद्भुत एव रसोऽन्ते निर्वहणे यत्र'. Explaining it further, it is said that in a drama, on the one hand, a beautiful damsel, or an empire and or a conquest of the enemy is acquired by the *nāyaka* (the hero; the chief character, through the *rasas śṛṅgāra, vīra. raudra*, etc.; and on the other, such things are not acquired by the *prtināyaka*, i.e., the rival of the hero—inspite of his best efforts—depicted through *karuṇa, bhayānaka* and *bībhatsa rasas*. But the drama should end with the acquisition of something to be acquired through the *adbhuta rasa*—something which is etherial and almost impossible to achieve. In fact every action must have some result; if the drama is not based on the concept of acquiring something wonderful at the end, all the labour of the dramatist is in vain.[1]

It means that the dominant *rasa* may be any, but the *nirvahaṇa*, i.e., the fruit (the result achieved in the end) connected with that *rasa* should be intermingled with the element of wonder. By 'wonder' he means such an acquisition which on the one hand is impossible to achieve in ordinary circumstances, i.e., for which the hero has to struggle in a way different from normal routine, or has to face great obstacles; and on the other, it is unusual, superworldly and difficult to be obtained by the ordinary people, though for which there is deep longing in every heart.

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1. एकाङ्गिरसमन्याङ्गमद्भुतान्तं रसोर्मिभिः।

× × × अद्भुत एव रसोऽन्ते निर्वहणे यत्र । यतः शृंगार-वीर-रौद्रैः स्त्रीरत्न- पृथ्वीलाभ-शत्रुक्षय-सम्पत्तिः । करुण-भयानक-बीभत्सैः तन्निवृत्तिः । इति इयता क्रमेण लोकोत्तराऽसम्भाव्य-फलप्राप्तौ भवितव्यमन्ते अद्भुतेनैव । अपि च नाटकस्याऽसाधारण-वस्तुलाभः फलत्वेन यदि न कल्प्यते तदानीं क्रियायाः फलमात्रं न किंचिदस्त्येवेति किं तत्रोपाय-व्युत्पादन-क्लेशेन । N.D. 1-15 (*vṛ* also)

For example, in day-to-day life, an acquisition of a lady through marriage has no element of wonder; such an ordinary event, therefore, cannot be the proper theme for a drama. The love-affair between Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā, however, can be the subject of the drama, because on the one hand, in such events we find a behaviour not found in our ordinary life, and on the other, every *sahṛdaya* has a longing to get such a wonderfully beautiful damsel like Shakuntalā The same applies to the event of 'Pṛthvīrāja-Saṁyogitā-marriage'. It has an element of wonder because of the unusual behaviour of Saṁyogitā at the assembly of the kings who had come to seek her hand in mariage, and therefore, it is a proper theme for a drama. Similarly, for the dramas of *vīra rasa* quite unusual events are desirable. For example, Nepolean's utterance 'I went, I saw, and I conquered' can be the basis of a drama only when either the enemy is shown fleeing cowardly, or it is depicted that his blood-thirsty sword could not quench its thirst because of the deserted city of his enemy. Still more effective is the event of battle between Rāma and Rāvaṇa, in which Rāma invaded Laṁkā, completely annihilated Rāvaṇa, his army and his warriors and thus got Sītā free.

The above-noted statement of Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra can be summed up in the following words:

(a) in the events noted above, *śṛṅgāra or vīra* would undoubtedly be accepted as the predominant (*aṁgin*) *rasa*,

(b) if other *rasas* like *hāsya, raudra*, etc., are admixed there respectively, they would be accepted as *aṁga* (assistant) *rasas*, as they only assist the *aṅgin* (dominant) *rasa* in its full manifestation,

(c) but in both the cases whether the dominent *rasa* may be assisted by other so-called subordinate *rasas*[1] or not, the

1 'so-called' in the sense that such *rasas* are technically termed as *bhāvas* and not *rasas*.

kāvya-camatkāra (poetic brilliance . poetic pleasure) of this *rasa* is due to *adbhuta rasa*.

[2]

Most probably inspired by some such ideas, Dharmadatta in his following statement has accepted the omnipresence of the *adbhuta rasa* in each and every piece of poetry:

रसे सारः चमत्कारः सर्वत्राऽप्यनुभूयते ।
तच्चमत्कार-सारत्वे सर्वत्राऽप्यद्भुतो रसः ॥[1] S.D. 3.3

And on the same basis Nārāyaṇa (the great grand father of Viśvanātha) had declared that the *adbhuta rasa* was the only *rasa*:

तस्माद् अद्भुतमेवाह कृती नारायणो रसम् ।[2] S.D. 3/3

Undoubtedly *camatkāra* (poetic pleasure) is the essence of *rasa*. Viśvanātha has called it synonym of 'surpirse', which causes the expansion of the herat of the *sahṛdaya*:

चमत्कारः चित्तविस्ताररूपो विस्मयापरपर्यायः ।[3] S.D. 3.3(vr.)

and this *camatkāra* or *vismaya* may be, by stretching its meaning, accepted as synonym of '*adbhuta*', and this very *adbhuta* is an inevitable element in all the *rasas* because *rasa* cannot become manifest without it.

While accepting all this,

(i) We cannot, like Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra, call this '*adbhuta tattva*' (element of wonder) by the name of '*adbhuta rasa*',

(ii) nor like Nārāyaṇa, can it be regarded as the only *rasa*, because *adbhuta tattva* is only a means to the attainment

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1. The essence in rasa is *camatkāra* (the poetic brilliance) which is felt everywhere in poetry, for this very reason the existence of adbhuta *rasa* has been accepted in every poetic piece.

2 The poet Narāyana, therefore, has declared *adbhuta rasa* to be the only *rasa*.

of the poetic pleasure and not the end itself; the end indeed is the other *rasa*—erotic, etc. Not only this, even where the *adbhuta rasa* is the end, the *adbhuta tattva* must inevitably be present as a means. We can illustrate this by the following passage from the drama '*Rāmābhyudaya*' in which the fire-god enters with *Sītā* in his lap:

धूम्रवातं वितानीकृतमुपरि शिखादोर्भिरभ्रंलिहाग्रैः,
बिभ्रद् भ्राजिष्णु रत्नं ततमुरसि तथा चर्म चामूरवं च ।
भूयस्तेजःप्रतानैर्विरहमलिनतां क्षालयन्नङ्कभाजो,
देव्याः सप्तर्चिराविर्भवति विफलयन् वाञ्छितान्यन्तकस्य ॥[1]

N.D., page 188

This verse is an illustration of *adbhuta rasa*. Its permanent emotion is *vismaya*, the fire-god seating Sītā on his lap is *vibhāva*, his external form is *uddīpana vibhāva* and the pitiable condition, distress, curiosity, sorrow and instability, etc., are the *sañcāribhāvas*. The permanent emotion *vismaya*—combined with *vibhāva*, etc.—is being manifested in the form of *adbhuta rasa*. The process of such manifestation of the *adbhuta rasa* is exactly the same as in the case of the other *rasas*. As regards the presence of the *adbhuta element*, it is present in the *adbhuta rasa* also as it remains in all other *rasas*—erotic, pathetic, etc.

Thus:

(i) The '*adbhuta tattva*' should not be given the name '*adbhuta rasa*', as has been done by Rāmacandra-Guṇancandra,

(ii) nor it should be accepted, according to Vishvanatha, as synonym of the '*vismaya*', because here it creates false

1. The fire-god, making a canopy of thick smoke by its hands of flames touching the sky, wearing a diamond on its breast and shrouded with dear-skin, removing the sad shadow encircling the lovely-looking Sītā sitting in his lap and thus defeating the purpose of Death, is appearing.

impression that it stands for a *sthāyibhāva,* named '*vismaya*'.

(iii) To remove this ambiguity, therefore, it should be named *camatkāra* as has been done by Dharmadatta.

Consequently:

1. ***Adbhuta rasa* is a rasa like all other rasas.**
2. **In all the *rasas*, including *adbhuta* rasa, it is not the adbhuta rasa but the *adbhuta tattva* (the element of wonder) that is present, and it should be called, for the sake of clarity, *camatkāra* and not *adbhuta*.**

Śānta (Quietistic) Rasa

Two main controversial points have been raised regarding *śānta rasa*:

1. Which should be accepted as its *sthāyıbhāva*?
2. Can this *rasa* be a proper subject for drama as it is in poetry?

1. The Sthāyibhāva of Śānta Rasa

Whether *nirveda* or *śama* be accepted as the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta rasa* is a point that demands consideration. The famous *ācārya* Mammaṭa has placed *nirveda* both in the list of *sthāyibhāvas* and *sañcāribhāvas*. This *bhāva* is acceptable to him as both *sthāyī* and *sañcārī of śānta rasa*. But no clear line of demarcation can be drawn between *nirveda* as *sthāyibhāva* and *nirveda as sañcāribhāva*, as he has not defined this *bhāva*. After some time this demarcation was done though indirectly by Rāmacandra-Guṇcandra—indirectly because he has put *śama* as the *sthāyibhāva*. According to him:

—*Śama* is absence of desires.[1]

—The *śama* which denotes the equilibrium of mind, keeps the people away from desire, fury, greed, ego, illusion and attachment towards wordly affairs, is the *sthāyibhāva of śānta rasa*.[2]

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1. निःस्पृहत्वं शमः । N.D., p. 33

2. काम-क्रोध-लोभ-मान-मायाद्यनुपरक्त-परोन्मुखता-विवर्जिताऽक्लिष्टचेतोरूप-शम-स्थायी शान्तो रसो भवति । Ibid, page 317

—This *rasa* orginates by contemplating over the cycle of births and deaths through fear and detatchment and by intensive study of the scriptures that deal with God and Nature, virtue and sin and serve as means to attain salvation.[1]

—On the other hand, Nirveda accrues from the knowledge of Truth and detatchment caused by the afflictions due to poverty, disease, insult, jealousy, delusion, rage, punishment, separation from dear ones, etc.[2]

The above statements of Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra mean that *śama* is genuine and permanent aversion to worldly affairs, while *nirveda* is momentry detachment caused by afflictions due to poverty, bereavement, etc. Therefore *śama* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta rasa,* while *nirveda* is its *sañcāribhāva*. Both these *ācāryas*, clearly rejecting the opinion of Mammaṭa in this context, have expressed that to call one and the same *bhāva*, i.e., *nirveda* both as *sthāyī* and *sañcārī* is a contradiction in itself.[3]

But truly speaking there is no difference between the opinion of Mammaṭa on the one hand and of these two *ācāryas* on the other, which is clear from the well-known example of *śānta rasa* given by Mammaṭa:

अहौ वा हारे वा कुसुमशयने वा दृषदि वा।
मणौ वा लोष्ठे वा बलवति रिपौ वा सुहृदि वा।।
तृणे वा स्त्रैणे वा मम समदृशो यान्ति दिवसाः।
क्वचित् पुण्यारण्ये शिव शिव शिवेति प्रलपतः।।

K.P., 4.44 (verse)

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1. N. D., 3.20 (vṛ also)
2. Ibid. 3.28 (sūtra & vṛ 183)
3. मम्मटस्तु व्यभिचारिकथनप्रस्तावे निर्वेदस्य शान्तरसं प्रति स्थायितां 'प्रतिकूलविभावादिपरिग्रहः' इत्यत्र तु तमेव प्रति व्यभिचारितां च, ब्रुवाणः स्ववचनविरोधेन प्रतिहत इति । Ibid, p. 332.

[Be it a serpent or a garland of flowers round my neck, be it a bed of roses or of a stone...... ..,I, possessed of equanimity, pass my days, uttering *'Shiva, Shiva'*.]

It is quite evident that here the *sthāyibhāva nirveda* denotes detachment caused by freedom from worldly affairs and not by worldly afflictions, though of course the latter would be called only *sañcāribhāva* and not *sthāyibhāva*. The commentators of Mammaṭa also had understood his viewpoint and clearly stated that:

स्थायी स्याद् विषयेष्वेष तत्त्वज्ञानाद् भवेद् यदि ।

इष्टानिष्ट-वियोगाप्ति-कृतस्तु व्यभिचार्यसौ ॥

K.P.(B.B.), p. 116

[This *nirveda* would be called *sthāyibhāva* only when it is caused by the knowledge of Truth, while it would be called *sañcāribhāva* if produced by the ill falling upon our dear ones and separation or bereavement.]

However, by keeping *nirveda* and *śama* on separate footing, *Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra* have contributed to the clarity of the subject, and perhaps taking hint either from their work or from some other work, Vishvanātha, propounding similar view, has accepted the separate entity of *śama* and *nirveda*.[1]

In conclusion we may say that:

(a) *Śama* should be accepted as the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta rasa* and *nirveda* its *sañcāribhāva* according to the occasion.

(b) That piece of poetry, where only *nirveda* is dealt with, would be called the example of *śānta-bhāvadhvani* and not that of *śānta rasa*.

1. S.D., 3 142, 175.245

2. Śānta Rasa: the Proper Subject of Drama or Not?

[1]

Dhanañjaya, the author of *Daśarūpaka* and Dhanika, the commentator of this treatise have presented more material than other *ācāryas* upon this topic. Dhanañjaya has hinted that the *sthāyibhāva śama* (quiscene) along with other eight *sthāyibhāvas* has been accepted by some *ācāryas*, but it will not be matured [to the level of rasa] in the dramas:

शममपि केचित् प्राहुः पुष्टिर्नाट्येषु नैतस्य । D.R , 4.35

It indicates that even if *śānta* (whose *sthāyibhāva* is *śama)* be accepted as the ninth *rasa*, it can be, of course, the subject of poetry, i.e., *prabandha* and *muktaka kāvyas* but not that of a drama. Commenting upon the above statement, Dhanika has said that:

(i) *Śama* cannot be the *sthāyibhāva* in a drama as it cannot contribute to its stagibility, because it is nothing but a mental state in which all the actions dissolve altogether. It means that in the state of *śama,* a character in drama becomes so absorbed in himself and contemplative that any action becomes beyond his capacity to be performed on the stage.[1]

(ii) Advocating the view that it can be a subject of poetry, he says that as in poetry the subtlemost topics can be presented in words, *śānta rasa* too can be made a subject of poetic treatment.[2]

But in fact Dhanika himself does not agree in principle that the *śānta rasa* be used predominantly in poetry and also in drama. His view in this regard is as follows:

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1. सर्वथा नाटकादौ अभिनयात्मनि स्थायित्वमस्माभिः शमस्य निषिध्यते । तस्य समस्त-व्यापार-प्रविलय-रूपस्याऽभिनयाऽयोगात् । D.R., 4.35 (vṛ)

2. ननु शान्तरसस्याऽनभिनेयत्वाद् यद्यपि नाटये-ऽनुप्रवेशो नास्ति, तथापि सूक्ष्मातीतादिवस्तूनां सर्वेषामपि शब्द-प्रतिपाद्यताया विद्यमानत्वात् काव्य-विषयत्वं न निवार्यते । D.R., 4.44 (vṛ)

The subject of *śānta rasa* is free from all concern about worldly pain and pleasure, aversion and affection, etc. It is, therefore, the subject of self-realization in which a person is detached from the world, and is thus beyond the scope of both poetry and drama. This view is supported by *śruti* also when it, by employing the words '*neti, neti*', i.e., 'not this, not this', has declared such a theme indescribable. In fact, the enjoyment of *śānta rasa* is beyond those persons who are aesthetically disposed to worldly objects × × × × If *śānta rasa* is dealt with in poetry, drama, etc., it is only by courtesy.[1]

In this very context Dhanika has advanced three points for rejecting the *śānta rasa*:

1. Some *ācāryas*, though accepting this *rasa* in theory, do not deem it to be the proper subject for both poetry and drama, and in support of this view-point they quote the authority of Bharata who has enumerated and defined the *vibhāvas*, etc., of eight *rasas* and not of this *rasa*.
2. Other *ācāryas*, though they accept the *sthāyibhāva śama* and the *rasa śānta*, yet are in favour of merging it with the *bībhatsa rasa or vīra rasa* in the following way:
    (a) The feeling of aversion towards the world is an inevitable constituent of the *śānta rasa*, hence it can be merged with *bībhatsa rasa*.

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1. शान्तो हि यदि तावत्–
   न यत्र दुःखं, न सुखं, न चिन्ता न द्वेषरागौ न च काचिदिच्छा।
   रसस्तु शान्तः कथितो मुनीन्द्रैः सर्वेषु भावेषु शमप्रधानः।।
   इत्येवंलक्षणः, तदा तस्य मोक्षावस्थायामेवात्मस्वरूपापत्तिलक्षणायां प्रादुर्भावात् तस्य च स्वरूपेणऽनिर्वचनीयता । तथाहि – श्रुतिरपि स एष नेति नेति इत्यन्यापोहरूपेणाह। न च तथाभूतस्य शान्तरसस्य सहृदयाः स्वादयितारः सन्ति । × × तदुक्तयैव शान्तरसास्वादो निरूपितः । D.R., 4.45 (vṛ.)

(b) The *sthāyibhāva śama* ultimately culminates in the realization of the supreme or salvation. In other words, *śama* is the means and this realization is the end. If all such means towards this end, among which *śama* occupies a prominent position, be accepted as a *sthāyibhāva utsāha*, the *śānta rasa* can be merged into *vīra rasa*.

3 Other *ācāryas* totally deny the existence of *śama* or *nirveda* so much so that they do not accept it even in common dealings. The reason for this is that the state of *śama* is possible only when the couple of opposite emotions such as love and aversion, etc., are completely annihilated, but no worldy being has found it possible to attain to such a state of mind right from the begining of the creation down today, nor is there any possibility of it in future. Thus the *sthāyibhāva śama* or *nirveda* do not exist at all, and therefore the presence of *śānta rasa* is altogether out of question.[1]

We may conclude from the above statements that:

(i) Dhanika accepts *śānta rasa* to be the subject of poetry and drama only be courtesy.

(ii) Some *ācāryas* like Dhanañjaya accept it as a *rasa* in theory, but do not deem it a proper subject for poetry and drama.

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1. (a) तत्र केचिदाहुः नास्त्येव शान्तो रसः, तस्याचार्येण विभावाद्यप्रतिपादनाल्ल-क्षणाऽकरणात्।

(b) अन्ये तु वस्तुतस्तस्याऽभावं वर्णयन्ति—अनादि-काल-प्रवाहाऽऽयत-राग-द्वेषयोश्च्छेत्तुमशक्यत्वात् ।

(c) अन्ये तु वीर-बीभत्सादौ अन्तर्भावं वर्णयन्ति । एवं वदन्तः शममपि नेच्छन्ति। D.R., 4.35 (vṛ.)

(iii) Some *ācāryas*, while recognizing *śānta rasa*, are in favour of merging it either in *bībhatsa* or in *vīra rasa*.

(iv) Some *ācāryas* have rejected it in toto.

[2]

In this connection we may quote Kulapati, an *ācārya* of the Riti-period of the history of Hindi literature, who, though recognizing this *rasa* in poetry, has rejected it in drama on the following two different grounds:

1. A drama has multifarious episodes, while poetry has one single subject.
2. A *sahṛdaya,* apathetic to the world, does feel no desire to witness the drama apprehending lest any of the episodes may disturb his equanimity, while he feels no such fear from poetry.

Therefore *śānta rasa* should not be used in drama, while there is no bar to its use in poetry.[1]

The argument, which Kulapati advances in regard to the non-acceptance of *śānta rasa* in drama, holds good in case of poetry also. No poem even when dealing with *śānta rasa* primarily, can afford to be single-themed from the beginning to the end. Such a piece will turn into a didactic piece and not remain poetry. Therefore a poem based on the *śānta rasa* is as likely to disturb equanimity—if really it does—as a drama. It is, however, true that a *sahṛdaya* receives impression from a drama much more quickly than from poetry.

Now let us consider the second argument. It is also misconceived. As a matter of fact, in a successful play [and in a poem too] the consummation of the principal *rasa* is effected with such a vehement force and heart-bewitching device that the other episodes become automatically

1. Rasa-rahasya, 3.92 (vṛ.)

suppressed and dim, and thus by contrast make the main *rasa* all the more brilliant. For instance, when in a drama [or poetry] the *sthāyibhāva utsāha* matures into *vīra rasa*, the effect of the cowardly activities of the low characters figuring before totally disappears; and by contrast, it makes the spectator, be he a brave or even a coward person, glow with enthusiasm and consequently all the more strengthens his *sthāyibhāva utsāha*. Similarly, when the *sthāyibhāva śama* or *nirveda* matures in a drama or poetry, the effect of the descriptions producing worldly infatuation is absolutely eliminated. This also strengthens the *sthāyibhāva śama*. If this be the state of a common spectator, it will be all the more intense in the case of one instinctively permeated by *nirveda*. Therefore it is not logical to reject the *śānta rasa* as a subject of drama on this ground too.

It may be further questioned as to how many saints are there in the world who are keen to witness play dominated by *śānta rasa*. It would be easy to answer this question if we take certain parallel examples. There are few persons, who inspite of their chivalrous spirit, have no taste for seeing a play or listening to a poem full of *vīra rasa*, and correspondingly there are several dispassionate persons who have taste for other *rasas*, but have no liking for *śṛṅgāra*. On this logic, these two *rasas* should also be dislodged from the position of *rasa*.[1] As a matter of fact, a play and a poem are meant for the *sahṛdayas* who need not be either saintly or otherwise.

In this context one more objection can also be raised; how many persons will there be in the world, who have genuine taste for *śānta rasa*. But firstly, this objection can be raised even against a poem dominated by *śānta rasa* for

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1. तर्हि वीतरागाणां शृंगारो न श्लाघ्यः इति सोऽपि रसाच्च्यवताम् इति ।

—Dh. Ā.L. (see N. of R., p.24)

which Kulapati has accepted its use. Secondly, the rejection of *śānta rasa* on the basis of this objection would deprive the society of sublime feelings like *nirveda* and tranquility resulting therefrom. And thirdly, to reject a particular *rasa* in literature—simply because of the small number of persons interested in it — is nothing but an injustice to that *rasa*.

[3]

Two objections of Dhanika against the acceptance of *śānta rasa* remain to be answered—the inability of this *rasa* to be staged as a drama and also described in a piece of poetry. The reason behind both these objections is the same, i.e., all activities subside in the *śama*. Abhinavagupta also has stated this view through an antagonist:

न हि चेष्टाव्युपरमः प्रयोगयोग्यः।[1]

i.e., the cessation of actions is incapable of being performed. Of course, the culmination of *nirveda* in which all the feelings and emotions disappear is incapable of being staged or described, but this does not apply only to *niveda*, but to all other *sthāyibhāvas, rati, hāsa*, etc. That is why the staging of the copulation (culmination of *rati*), the murder (culmination of *krodha*), etc., are prohibited. Similarly the culmination of *nivedaa*—disassociation from pleasure and pain, etc.—is incapable of being either staged or described. Yet it is easily possible in a play to describe or portray the following *vibhāvas, anubhāvas and sañcāribhāvas of śānta rasa* as it is possible in the case of other *rasas* like *śṛṅgāra, hāsya, etc.*

(i) *Vibhāvas*: The causes which show that this world is transitory, false and full of illusions and therefore to be shunned.

(ii) *Anubhāvas*: The progressively intensifying struggle of such saintly and meditative individuals as Buddha

1. A. Bh., p. 334; N. of R., p. 24.

who on account of their *nirveda* being evoked, long to be liberated from these bondages.

(iii) *Sañcāribhāvas*: Such as anxiety, or delight in the hearts of people like Buddha.

Most probably prompted by these very ideas Namisādhu, a commentator of *kāvyālaṅkāraa* by Rudrata, had to point out to the existence of *vibhāva,* etc., in the *śānta rasa,* and give the following rejoinder to the *abhāva-vādin,* i.e., who does not believe in the existence of *śānta rasa*, It is illogical not to accept *śānta rasa*, because the emotions, etc., are present here also.[1]

Therefore, in our opinion, *śama* though being radically indescribable, may reasonably be accepted as an appropriate subject of both poetry and drama Dhanañjaya himself in this context has mentioned four different means for the realisation of *śama*: hilarity (*muditā*), amity (*maitrī*), pity (*karuṇā*) and apathy (*upekśā*), and Dhanika has connected them with these moods respecstively · evolution (*vikāsa*), expansion (*vistāra*), agitation (*kśobha*) and distraction (*vikśepa*).[2]

By establishing this connection both these *ācāryas* seek to convey that the mental and internal tendencies—evolution, etc.,—are present in every individual, but in whom-so-ever they culminate in the above physical and external form—hilarity, etc.,—that individual becomes *śānta*. Now his *śama (nirveda)* being externally expressed in the form of hilarity,

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1. कश्चिच्छान्तस्य रसत्वं नेष्टम् । तदयुक्तम् । भावादि-कारणानामत्रापि विद्यमानत्वात्। K.A. (Ru.) : (Commentary), p. 166

2. **Dhanañjaya :** शमप्रकर्षोऽनिर्वाच्यः मुदितादेस्तदात्मता ।

   Dhanika : अथापि तदुपायभूतो मुदिता-मैत्री-करुणोपेक्षादि-विलक्षणः तस्य च विकास-विस्तार-क्षोभ-विक्षेप-रूपतैवेति तदुक्त्यैव शान्तरसास्वादो निरूपितः । D.R., 4 45. (vṛ.)

amity, etc., can be a subject of poetry and drama. In fact this state of *śama* is in a way different vis a vis other *sthāyibhāvas*. According to the theory of rhetorics [as well as of psychology] the *sthāyibhāvas, rati, hāsa* etc. and the *sañcāribhāvas nirveda, glāni* (remorse), etc., exist instinctively in every individual, but they cannot be the subject of either poetry or drama unless they are externally manifested in one form or the other. Precisely the same principle holds good in the case of *śama*. Therefore like other *rasas the śānta* too can be a theme both of poetry and drama. And if the culmination of *śama*, i.e., the realisation of one's ownself cannot be a subject of poetry and drama: 'शमप्रकर्षोऽनिर्वाच्यः', then the same can be true of other *sthāyibhāvas, rati, hāsa*, etc. Their extreme form too has been declared as a taboo for poetry.

In conclusion we may say that *śānta rasa* can be as good a subject for both poetry and drama as any other *rasa*.

Preyān (Associastic) Rasa

[1]

Preyāna rasa has been mentioned for the first time by Rudraṭa and after him Bhojarāja has discussed it. According to Rudraṭa, The *sthāyaibhāva* (essential element) of *preyān rasa* is *sneha*. It's *nāyaka* (hero) is of congenial and noble nature. *Sneha* is that innocent mental attitude which emanates from the congenial and cultured nature of the two persons. In their mutual behaviour there is love, faith, wish for well-being, and sweet conversation. Their eyes moisten because of the tenderness of the heart and they look towards each other with eyes quivering with joy.[1]

It may be noted here that Rudṭata has not illustrated this *rasa*, otherwise it would have been more easy to understand the *sthāyibhāva sneha*. By *sneha* he means innocent and affectionate relationship between the two friends. If we take the word '*suhṛda*' used in the exposition of *sneha* for a friend, the very idea of establishing a *rasa* on mutual friendship is of course original, novel and commendable. If he had given

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1. स्नेहप्रकृतिः प्रेयान् संगत-शीलार्य-नायको भवति ।
स्नेहस्तु साहचर्यात् प्रकृतेरुपचार-सम्बन्धात् ॥
निर्व्याजम-नोवृत्तिः सनर्म-सद्भाव-पेशलालापः।
अन्योन्यं प्रति सुहृदोर्व्यवहारोऽयं मतस्तत्र ॥
प्रस्यन्दि-प्रमदाश्रुः सुस्निग्ध-स्फार-लोचनालोकः।
आर्द्राऽन्तःकरणतया स्नेहपदे भवति सर्वत्र ॥ K.A. (Ru.), 15, 17-19

such an example in which the friends are depicted experiencing anxiety to meet each other or thrill at the actual meeting, the *ālambana* of the *preyāna rasa* would have been a person whose main characteristic is sincerity and affection towards his friend. In the absence of an illustration we are not certain whether he meant by the word '*sneha*' (affection) between two friends or between two lovers. But when we turn to the illustration of *preyān rasa* as given by Bhojarāja we find him describing *sneha* between *nāyaka* and *nāyikā*:

यदेव रोचते मह्यं तदेव कुरुते प्रिया ।
इति वेत्ति न जानाति तत्प्रियं यत्करोति सा ॥

(My beloved feels that she does only those things which are to my taste. But she does not know that whatever she does is delightful to me.)

Elucidating this illustration, Bhoja has given the essential constituents of *preyāna rasa* as follows: its *sthāyibhāva* is *sneha*, its *nāyaka* being of affectionate nature is *dhīralalita*, [he and] his beloved are the *ālmbana vibhāva*, their gentle and soft attitude for each other is the *uddīpana vibhāva*, delusion (*moha*). constancy (*dhṛti*), recollection (*smṛti*), etc., are the *vyabhicāribhāvas* and the external movements of the *nāyaka* are the *anubhāvas*.[1]

In this very context stating the result of *sneha* Bhoja has indirectly shed light on its nature:

अहेतुः पक्षपातो यस्तस्य नास्ति प्रतिक्रिया
स हि स्नेहात्मकस्तन्तुरन्तर्मर्माणि सीव्यति ॥ [2] U.R.C. 5.17

S.K.Ā., 5.75 (verse)

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1. अत्र वत्सलप्रकृतेर्धीरतया ललितनायकस्य प्रियालम्बनविभावाद् उत्पन्नः स्नेह-स्थायिभावो विषयसौकुमार्यात्म-प्रकृत्यादिभिरुद्दीपनविभावैरुद्दीप्यमानः समुपजायमानैः मोह-धृति-स्मृत्यादिभिर्व्यभिचारिभावैरनुभावैश्च संसृज्यमानो निष्पन्नः प्रेयान् इति प्रतीयते। S.K., Ā. 5.74 (verse)

2. A favour which is done without motive [to a person] demands no reward. This is *sneha* which like a thread stiches the delicate parts of the heart [of the other person]

In this context the statement of Bhoja is also worth-quoting:

रतिप्रीत्योरपि चायमेव मूलप्रकृतिरिष्यते ।

(The *sthāyibhāva sneha* is the fundamental of *rati* and *prīti*.) It means that *rati* or *prīti*. According to Bhoja *rati* is that feeling of pleasure which one experiences in things appealing to the heart:

मनोऽनुकूलेष्वर्थेषु सुखसंवेदनं रतिः । S.K.Ā., 5.138

and *prīti* is attained through practice of hobbies like hunting, etc., and is outside the field of words:

शब्दादिभ्यो बहिर्भूता या कर्माभ्यासलक्षणा।
प्रीतिः साभ्यासिकी ज्ञेया मृगयादिषु कर्मसु ॥ S.K.Ā., 5.97

The phrase indicates that *prīti* is not related to any *rasa* at all. It is simply an emotion. As opposed to *prīti*, it may be added, *rati* and *sneha* are related to the *rasas sṛṁgāra* and *preyān* respectively. *Prīti* is, in fact, synonimous of taste; rather hobby. The example of *prīti* as given by Bhoja is:

इति विस्मृतान्यकरणीयमात्मनः
सचिवावलम्बितधुरं नराधिपम् ।
परिवृद्धरागमनुबद्धसेवया
मृगया जहार चतुरेव कामिनी॥ S K.Ā., 5.97 (verse)

[This hunting, lika a clever damsel, has bewitched the king who forgetting his duties has placed the burden of the administration upon his ministers and whose love for hunting has increased because of constant indulgence in it.]

Thus we can arrive at the following conclusions from the exposition of *sneha* by Rudraṭa and Bhoja:

(a) According to Rudraṭa *sneha* is 'निर्व्याजमनोवृत्ति' and according to Bhoja it is 'अहेतुपक्षपात'. Obviously both the definitions are identical.

(b) According to Rudrata *sneha* has possibly close affinity with the mutual love of the two friends, while according to Bhoja it has affinity with love between the two lovers.

(c) According to Bhoja *sneha* is the fundamental of both *rati* and *prīti*.

[2]

Though no *ācārya* before Rudraṭa has mentioned *preyān rasa*, yet some hints about it are available in the definition and examples of the *preyasvat alaṁkāra*. The statement of Bhāmaha regarding this *alaṁkāra* is as follows:

प्रेयो गृहागतं कृष्णमवादीद् विदुरो यथा ।
अद्य या मम गोविन्द जाता त्वयि गृहागते ॥
कालेनैषा भवेत् प्रीतिस्तवैवागमनात् पुनः ।[1]

K.A. (Bh.), 3.1

Daṇḍin presented only a modified version of Bhāmaha:

प्रेयः प्रियतराख्यानम्
अद्य या मम गोविन्द जाता त्वयि गृहागते ।
कालेनैषा भवेत् प्रीतिस्तवैवागमनात् पुनः ॥
इत्याह युक्तं विदुरो नान्यतस्तादृशी धृतिः ।
भक्तिमात्र-समाराध्यः सुप्रीतिश्च ततो हरिः॥ [2]

K.Ā.,2.275.78

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1 There is *preyasvat alaṁkāra* in the words of Vidura spoken to Krṣṇa who had come as a guest—Oh Govind! the *prīti* (pleasure) which I have received today by your arrival will be repeated at the appropriate future moment.

2. Sweet statement is called preyas *alaṁkāra*. For example, Oh Govind! that pleasure, which I have experienced today on your arrival at my house, I hope, will again be experienced by me at some other time in future—these words of Vidura for Krṣṇa are justified because he would have not received such solace form anyone else. That is why Krṣṇa who is adored through devotion was very much pleased.

In this context Daṇḍin has put forth another example:

सोमः सूर्यो मरुद् भूमिर्व्योम होतानलो जलम् ।
इति रूपाण्यभिक्रम्य त्वां द्रष्टुं देव के वयम् ॥
इति साक्षात्कृते देवे राज्ञो यद् रातवर्मणः
प्रीति-प्रकाशनं तच्च प्रेय इत्यवगम्यताम् ॥ [1]

—K.Ā., 2.278.79

It is obvious from the example given by Bhāmaha that the feeling of adoration of Vidura for Kṛṣṇa, which may also be called devotion, is the subject of *preyasvat alaṁkāra*. And the second example given by Daṇḍin all the more supports the view that devotion is the subject of this *alaṁkāra*. After some time Udbhaṭa connected this *alaṅkāra* with the *sthāyibhāva, anubhāva*, etc.:

रत्यादिकानां भावानामनुभावादि-सूचनैः ।
यत्काव्यं बध्यते सद्भिस्तत्प्रेयस्वदुदाहृतम् ॥ K.S.S., 4.2

Most probably it was acceptable to Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin that *sthāyibhāva* and *anubhāva*, etc., were connected with this *alaṁkāra,* but it has been clearly mentioned for the first time by Udbhaṭa. In the example of this *alaṁkāra* he has described the love of an affectionate mother for her child:

इयं च सुत-वात्सल्यान्निर्विशेषा स्पृहावती ।
उल्लापयितुमारब्धा कृत्वेमं क्रोड आत्मनः ॥ [2]

K.S.S., 4.2 (Vṛ)

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1. We should grant the *preyas alaṅkāra* in the words of kind Rātavarman, full of adoration and addressed to Mahādeva at the time of seeing him: "O God! how could we have your glimpse denied to *soma, sūrya* (sun) *marut* (wind) *bhūmi*, (earth), *vyoma* (sky) *hotā* (*yajamāna*) and *jala* (water)"

2. This mother feeling extremely emotional on account of love for her son began to chant [nursery] rhymes taking him in her lap.

[3]

By quoting these examples of *alaṁkāravādin ācāryas* Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa our purpose is to point out that *preyasvat alaṁkāra* is related to affection towards children besides adoration and devotion. In other words, these *bhāvas* have not been included in *rati*, but have been given independent entity. The obvious reason for this is that *rati* indicates sexual love while these *bhāvas* indicate non-sexual love. Similarly all other non-sexual emotions can be included in this *alaṁkāra*. Such being the case, in our opinion in the examples given by *alaṁkāravādin ācāryas* we can trace indirectly, if not directly, the source of the *sneha-bhāva* which has been mentioned by Rudraṭa and Bhojarāja in their discussion of *preyān rasa*.

It may be indicated here that the *alaṁkāravādin ācāryas* placed *rati* under *rasavat alaṁkāra* and all other non-sexual emotions under *preyasvat alaṁkāra*. For example, the affection between two friends can not be placed under *rati*. Not only this, affection or friendly feelings between the lover and his beloved also can not be placed under *rati*. The verse of Bhoja quoted above (यदेव रोचते .....) can be easily put forth as an example of *preyasvat alaṁkāra* according to the *alaṁkāravadin ācāryas* which was named as *preyān rasa* by Rudraṭa and Bhojarāja afterwards. On this very basis there should be no objection in accepting *preyasvat alaṁkāra* as the original source of *preyāṅ rasa*. The view is all the more strengthened when we find that the words *preyasvat and preyān* originate from the word *preyas*. The former is *vatup-ending* and the latter is the singular form of the nominative case of the word *preyas*. Besides, it was not improper on the part of Rudraṭa to call *preyasvat alaṁkāra* as *preyān rasa* like the *rasavādin ācāryas* succeeding him who placed the subject matter of this alaṁkāra, as stated below, under bhāva—in the realm of rasa. It is rather indicative of the fact

that Rudraṭa served as a necessary link between *alaṁkāravādin ācāryas* on the one hand and *rasvādin ācāryas* on the other.

× × ×

In the end, the point to be considered is whether the *preyān* should be accepted as *rasa* or not.

Devotion to God, patriotism, admiration and reverence for the king or a great leader,friendly feeling for a friend, affection for a child—all these emotions are undoubtedly related to *rati*, but technically they themselves do not constitute *rati* because it has been related to sexual love and not to the emotions mentioned above.

The reason is that a *sthāyibhāva* is an inborn emotion and its mature description is called *rasa,* viz. the mature description of *rati* (sexual love) will be called *sṛṁgāra rasa.* But an emotion which is neither an offshoot of any *sthayibhāva* (like shyness of love), nor is learnt or acquired from some source is called *sañcāribhāva*, and its mature description technically is placed under *bhāva.*

The emotion *sneha*—the *sthāyibhāva* of *preyān rasa*—is an inborn emotion, It is neither an offshoot of any *sthāyibhāva*, nor it is an emotion acquired or learnt from someone else. **Hence the mature description of *sneha* should be placed under *rasa* and not under *bhāva*.** Contrary to it, devotion (*bhakti*) towards God is not an inborn or innate emotion. It is an acquired one. Hence its mature description would come under the catagory of *bhāva* and not *rasa*, though Rūpagoswani, with all his reverence for god, has called it *rasa*.

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1. For the detailed study of *Preyān* as the variety of *Bhakti rasa*, see *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu*, L. III

Using the words Rasa, etc., by their own names: A Poetic Flaw

Ānandavardhana accepted *dhvani* as an indispensable element of poetry, and exalted it to the position of 'soul or essence of poetry'. In this context he presented *rasa* (poetic pleasure) as one of form of *dhvani-kāvya*. By the word *rasa,* the *ācāryas*, specially Ānandavardhana and his followers, mean *'rasādi,'* i.e., the following eight poetic elements: *rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa, bhāvodaya, bhāvasandhi, bhāvaśabalatā* and *bhāvaśānti*. If Ānandavardhana called '*rasa*' or to be more correct *'rasādi'*, as a variety of *dhvani-kāvya*, it was because the *vyaṅgyārtha* (suggested sense) is essentially present in all the examples of the '*rasādi*'; the reader cannot enjoy '*rasa*' only after understanding the *vācyārtha* (expressed sense).

The poetic flaw called '*rasasya svaśabdoktiḥ*'[1] is related to the above concept. It was Udbhata, who while presenting the definition of *rasavad alaṁkāra* for the first time in the history of Indian Poetics, used the word '*svaśabda*' in the following text:

रसवद्दर्शित-स्पष्ट-शृंगारादि-रसादयम्।
स्वशब्द-स्थायि-संचारि-विभावाभिनयास्पदम् ॥

K.S.S. 4.3

1. रसस्य स्वशब्दोक्तिः — naming *rasa*, etc., by its own name.

What he means is that the figure of speech called *rasavad* is there where *śṛṅgāra*, etc., presented clearly (principally, prominently) and where *sthāyibhāva, sañcāribhāva, vibhāva, anubhāva and sāttvikabhāva* in all their varieties also are stated by *svaśabda*, i.e., by their own names. To illustrate this figure he has quoted the following three verses:

इति भावयतस्तस्य समस्तान् पार्वतीगुणान्।
संभृतानल्प-संकल्पः कन्दर्पः प्रबलोऽभवत्।।
स्विद्यताऽपि स गात्रेण बभार पुलकोत्करम्।
कदम्ब-कलिका-कोश-केसर-प्रकरोपमम्।।
क्षणमौत्सुक्यगर्भिण्या चिन्तानिश्चलया क्षणम्।
क्षणं प्रमोदालसया दृशाऽस्याऽऽस्यमभूष्यत।।[1]

—K.S.S. 4.4 (vṛ.)

While the above event, according to the rasa-school, is an example of *rasa*, it is claimed to be that of *rasavad alaṅkāra* by the alaṅkāra-school. This difference has ensued from the diversity of their concepts. Here we are not concerned with their diversity, what we have to decide is whether *svaśabdokti* of *rasa*, etc., is essential in a poetic piece or not.

Pratihārendurāja,[2] pointing out towards the *svaśabdokti* of all the *five* elements *vibhāva*, etc., has observed that in the above verses the *sthāyibhāva 'rati'* (love), the

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1. The [effect] of *Kandarpa* (Cupid) along with all its emotions became strong in him (Mahādeva) who thought of all the virtues of Pārvatī. His perspiring body bore the sensations of thrill and rapture, which are like the pollen in the shell of the *kadamba* flower. His face looked beautiful due to his eyes which for a moment became full of curiosity; steady due to anxiety and also languid with joy.

   (In these verses the words like *sveda*, *pulaka*, *autsukya* and cintā have been used.)

2. The commentator of K.S.S. by Udbhaṭa.

sañcāribhāvas curiosity, anxiety and glee, the *sāttvikabhāvas* perspiration and standing of hair — all these along with the two *vibhāvas* Pārvatī and her spouse Mahādeva have been stated by *svaśabda* (their own names). And thus the definition of *rasavad alaṅkāra* as presented by Udbhaṭa is fully applicable to the above verse.

From these statements of Udbhaṭa and Pratihārendurāja, it may be construed that until the times of Udbhaṭa the *svaśabdokti* of *vibhāva*, etc., was invariably accepted in the examples of *rasavad alaṅkāra* or *rasa*.

After Udbhaṭa though Ānandavardhana has not specifically referred to the above *rasadośa*, yet he too has mentioned it indirectly while stating that *rasa* is not based on *vācyārtha* (expressed sense) but on *vyaṅgyārtha* (suggested sense). His view is that mere mentioning of the name of *rasa*, etc., would not bring about poetic pleasure unless the *vibhāva*, etc., attain to full muturity:

न हि केवलं श्रृंगारादिशब्दमात्रभाजि विभावादिप्रतिपादनरहिते काव्ये मनागपि रसवत्त्वप्रतीतिरस्ति । Dh.Ā. 1.4 (vṛ.)

Kuntaka also has contradicted the above statement of Udbhaṭa. The purport of his view is: if it be accepted that by the mere mention of the word *rasa*, etc., thrill of the poetic pleasure is experienced by the reader, it would also have to be acknowledged that the mere utterance of the word 'sweets' would enable a person to derive pleasure of eating them. But it is not so.[1]

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1. यदपि कश्चित् 'स्वशब्दस्थायिसंचारिविभावाभिनयास्पदम्' इत्यनेन पूर्वमेव लक्षणं विशेषितम्, तत्र स्वशब्दास्पदत्वं रसानामपरिगतपूर्वमस्माकम् । × × × यत् स्वशब्दैरभिधीयमानाः श्रुतिपथमवतरन्तः चेतनानां चर्वणचमत्कारं कुर्वन्तीत्यनेन न्यायेन घृतपूरप्रभृतयः पदार्थाः स्वशब्दैरभिधीयमानाः तदास्वादसम्पदं सम्पादयन्ति × × × । V.J., p. 343-344

After Kuntaka, Mammaṭa put the *svaśabdavācyatā* (the naming) of *rasa*, etc., in the list of poetic flaws of *rasa*. Perhaps he got the inspiration for this flow from the above statement of Ānandavardhana and perhaps also from that of Kuntaka. Following Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha too accepted this as a flaw and gave the following examples:[1]

(a) तामुद्वीक्ष्य कुरंगाक्षीं रसो नः कोऽप्यजायत ।

(Seeing that doe-eyed damsel, we enjoyed a peculiar *rasa*).

(b) चन्द्रमण्डलमालोक्य शृङ्गारे मग्नमन्तरम् ।

(Lookng at the full moon, our heart submerged into *śṛṅgāra*.)

(c) अजायत रतिस्तस्याः त्वयि लोचनगोचरे ।

(Seeing you she felt *rati*, i.e., love).

(d) जाता लज्जावती मुग्धा प्रियस्य परिचुम्बने ।

(Kissed by her lover, the damsel felt *lajjā*, i.e., shyness).

Rāmcandra-Guṇcandra, possibly influenced by this discussion of Mammaṭa, disagreed with him and totally rejected this concept as a poetic flaw:

केचित्तु व्यभिचारिरसस्थायिनां स्वशब्दवाच्यत्वं रसदोषमाहुः तदयुक्तम्। व्यभिचार्यादीनां स्ववाचकप्रयोगेऽपि विभावपुष्टौ ।

(Some *ācāryas* consider the naming of *vyabhicāribhāva, rasa, sthāyibhāva*, etc., as a poetic flaw, but it is not so, because inspite of naming them, the *vyabhicārī*, etc., become mature.)

For example, in the following verse inspite of naming the *sañcāribhāva 'uṭsukatā'* (curiosity) by its own name, the *rasa* is produced, i.e., the reader does not feel any obstruction in enjoying the poetic pleasure:

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1. S.D., 7.15 (vṛ.)

दूरादुत्सुकमागते विवलितं सम्भाषिणि स्फारितं,
संश्लिष्यत्यरुणं गृहीतवसने किञ्चाञ्चितभ्रूलतम् ।
मानिन्याश्चरणानतिव्यतिकरे वाष्पाम्बुपूर्णेक्षणं,
चक्षुर्जातमहो प्रपञ्चचतुरं जातागसि प्रेयसि ॥

N.D., p. 328

[It is surprising that the eyes of a *māninī nāyikā*,[1] because of the faithlessness of the *nāyaka*, have become skilled in throwing deceitful glances. They display curiosity (seeing the *nāyaka* coming towards her); they stoop down with bashfulness (fearing that he has seen her curiosity); they are wide with joy when he talks to her; they grow red with feigned anger when he attempts to embrace her; their eye-brows are twitched when he holds her by her clothes; and they are filled with tears when he begins to prostrate on her feet.]

× × ×

Thus after presenting almost all the necessary material regarding this poetic flaw, we can arrive at certain conclusions:

1. When the *vibhāvas*, etc., are presented in incomplete or immature way, or are, so to say, totally absent, the attempt to make the verse poetic by sheer use of the words, *rasa, śṛṅgāra, rati, lajjā*, etc., would fail and such verses would neither be called producing poetic pleasure nor they would be placed under any category of poetry. They would, like the above four sentences quoted by Viśvanātha, only be called simple prosaic statements.

2. If in a verse the *vibhāvas*, etc., are presented fully and in a befitting manner, even if the words *rasa*, etc., are

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1. A woman whose jealousy and anger are excited because of her lover approaching and making love with another woman

incidentally used, this fault should not be accepted. In such cases this fault is ignorable because it does not obstruct in the enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure.

For example, in the verse quoted above by Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra, the amorous and skilful description of the eyes of the damsel produces aesthetic pleasure, therefore the naming of the *sañcāribhāva 'utsukatā'* (curiosity) should not be called a poetic flaw, and hence neither the verse should be condemned as devoid of poetic value nor should it be placed in the category of second-rate poetry.

Similarly, the example given by Udbhaṭa as above on the one hand and also by Mammaṭa[1] on the other cannot be called simple versification; they are capable of producing poetic pleasure inspite of the fact that *rasa*, etc., have been named there. The use of these words do not in any way

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1. (a) सव्रीडा दयितानने सकरुणा मातङ्गचर्माम्बरे
सत्रासा भुजगे सविस्मयरसा चन्द्रेऽमृतस्यन्दिनि ।
सेर्ष्या जह्नुसुतावलोकनविधौ दीना कपालोदरे
पार्वत्या नवसङ्गमप्रणयिनी दृष्टिः शिवायाऽस्तु वः ॥ K.P , 7.322

(May the look of Pārvatī, anxious to meet her lover for the first time, shower benediction upon you—the look that becomes bashful to see him wearing the skin of the elephant; frightened to see him wearing serpents as ornaments; amazed to see the moon out of which the nector is flowing; full of jealousy to see the daughter of Janhu, i.e., the river Gaṁgā on his forehead, and distressed to see the string of skulls on his chest.)

In this verse the words like *vrīdā, karuṇā, trāsa, visamaya, īrṣyā* and *praṇaya* have been used.

(b) तामनङ्गजयमङ्गलश्रियं किञ्चिदुच्चभुजमूललोकिताम् ।
नेत्रयोः कृतवतोऽस्य गोचरे कोऽप्यजायत रसो निरन्तरः॥

K.P., 7.323

(Some indescribable and perennial *rasa* was born in the heart of the *nayaka* seeing the *nāyikā* whose hand is a little stretched upwards, and who is a veritable image of the propitious goddess through whom Kāmadeva (Lord Cupid) won glory.

hamper the enjoyment and aesthetic pleasure of a reader—aware or unaware of such technical poetic faults.

3 The commentators of the Kāvyaprakāśa in this context have hinted that this flaw does not occur if in place of naming the varieties of *sthāyibhāva, sañcāribhāva*, etc., their synonyms are employed. For example in the following line· 'ठणत्कारैः श्रुतिगतैरुत्साहस्तस्य कोऽप्यभूत्' [He felt peculiar *utsāha* (zeal) as the sound entered his ears] the flow results from the use of the word '*utsāha,' a sthāyibhāva*, but if the reading is changed into 'प्रमोदस्तस्य कोऽप्यभूत्' [He felt peculiar pleasure], there would be no flow.

But this opinion is hardly tenable. As a matter of fact the only basis of this fault is the non-maturity of the poetic excellence. The saying quoted by Mammaṭa may be faulty because of this; but it cannot be accepted as faulty simply because of the use of the word *utsāha* in it; nor it is agreeable that this fault would vanish simply by replacing the word *utsāha* by the word *pramoda*.

In fact the only object of recognizing this fault was to emphasise upon the importance of the *vyaṅgyartha, i.e.*, suggested sense. Therefore:

(a) **The ideal state is that the words *rasa, sthāyibhāva*, etc., should not be used.**

(b) **In a verse or verses where *vibhāva*, etc., are mature, the naming of *rasa* etc., is not a fault. If it is accepted at all, it is ignorable.**

(c) **If in any verse where the *vibhāvas* are not mature, but an attempt is made to make it appear delightful simply by naming of *rasa* etc., there would no doubt be a fault. Such verses would, at the most, come under versification and not be called a piece of poetry.**

Thus the opinion of Mammaṭa and Rāmacandra - Guṇacandra are only partially and not fully acceptable.

Śleṣa (Paronomasia) Alaṁkāra

The figure of speech that creates poetic brilliance by the use of word having more than one meaning is called *śleṣa* (paronomasia or pun). It is of two kinds: *śabda-śleṣa,* i.e., based on word and *artha-śleṣa,* i.e., based on sense. *Śabda-ślesa* itself is of two kinds: *sabhaṁga* (when the word is to be split) and *abhaṁga* (when it is not to be split).

The following four points arise about the above-mentioned forms and kinds of *śleṣa* for the comprehensive understanding of the subject:

1 What is the relationship of *śleṣa* with three *śabda-śaktis*[1]*: abhidhā*[2]*, lakṣaṇā*[3] *and vyañjanā*[4].

2. What is the difference between *śabda-śleṣa* and *artha-ślesa?*

3. Why should the *abhaṇga śleṣa* be not accepted as *arthālaṁkāra* (figure of sense)?

4 Is *śleṣa alaṁkāra* independent or not?

1. The Śleṣa and the Śabdaśakti

(a) **The *Śleṣa* and the *Abhidhā*** — The *abhidhā śabdaśakti*, i.e., the primary power of word, conveys the

1. Śabdaśakti, i e., the force or signification of a ward;
2. Denotation, the literal power or sense of a word.
3. Indirect, implied or figurative sense of a word.
4. Suggested meaning.

primary (expressed) sense. As far as words having one signification are concerned, the position of *abhidhā* in conveying the primary sense is clear, but in a word having more than one signification, the question, as to which sense should be taken by *abhidhā* and which not, is to be determined by the following deciding factors called *viśeṣa-smṛti-hetavaḥ*:

1. Association, 2. Disjunction, 3. Companionship, 4. Hostility, 5. Motive, 6. Context, 7. Characteristic, 8. Juxtaposition of an other word, 9. Power, 10. Congruity, 11. Place, 12. Time, 13. Gender, 14. Accent, etc.[1]

For example, in the following Hindi sentence 'नग सूनो बिन मूंदरी' (the *gem* loses much of its glamour when detached from the ring), the word *naga* is paronomasiac, i.e., it has two meanings: mountain and gem. To decide between these two meanings we will have to take resort to one of the above said deciding factors called *sāhacarya* (companionship). In this sentence we have the companionship of the gem and the ring. Consequently we have the expressed meaning of the word *'naga' as* gem and not mountain. Obviously we arrive at such a desired meaning with the help of *abhidhā*, and it has nothing to do with *śleṣa*, because in the field of *śleṣa* more than one meanings are accepted and these meanings also are expressed through *abhidhā*. For example, see 'करन कलित है चक्र नित × × × ' (p.165).

The conclusion is: whether the word be capable of conveying one sense or more than one, its expressed sense is taken by *abhidhā*. In the case of words having more than one meaning, whether we determine one meaning on the basis of any of the *viśeṣa-smṛti-hetus*, or the poet wants to convey both the senses on the basis of *śleṣa* -- all of them are

1. संयोगो विप्रयोगश्च साहचर्यं विरोधिता ।
अर्थः प्रकरणं लिङ्गं शब्दस्यान्यस्य संनिधिः ॥
सामर्थ्यमौचिती देशः कालो व्यक्तिः स्वरादयः ।
शब्दार्थस्यानवच्छेदे विशेषस्मृतिहेतवः ॥ S.D. 2.14 (*vr*)

expressed senses *(vācyārthas)* of the word and are arrived at through *abhidhā śabdaśakti*.

(b) ***The Śleṣa and the Lakṣaṇā*** — The *lakṣyārtha* (indicated sense) arrived at by the *lakṣaṇā śabdaśakti* (indicative word-power) is neither the field of *abhidhā* nor that of *śleṣa alaṁkāra*, because the *abhidhā* conveys only the expressed sense, while the indicated sense comes after the expressed sense. Although the two are inter-related, yet the indicated sense is different from the expressed sense. The indicated sense is not the subject of *śleṣa*, firstly because the two senses conveyed by *śleṣa* are expressed senses, i.e., they are arrived at by *abhidhā*, and secondly, the poet wants to convey both of them to us (see example : 'करन कलित है चक्र नित × × ×', p. 165). On the other hand, in the case of indicated sense, the first sense is arrived at through *abhidhā*, while the second through *lakṣaṇā*. Besides, here the poet wants to convey the indicated sense only and not the expressed one. For example, in the sentence 'गंगायां घोष:' (the hermitage is situated on the river Gaṁgā), only the indicated sense of the word Gaṁgā, i.e., the bank of the river Gangā is acceptable to the poet and not its expressed sense, i.e., the current of the river.

(c) The Śleṣa and the Vyañjanā — The same is true of *the vyañjanā śabadaśakti*. The sense arrived through it is neither the subject of the *abhidhā* nor that of *śleṣa*. The *abhidhā* conveys only the *vācyārtha* (expressed sense), while the *vyaṁgyārtha* (suggested sense) is arrived at after the expressed sense is known and this sense is quite different from the expressed sense.

The suggested sense is not the subject of *śleṣa* too, because both the senses conveyed by *śleṣa* are expressed senses, i.e., they are arrived at by *abhidhā* and stand on par with each other. On the other hand, in the case of the *vyañjanā śabdaśakti*, the first sense is the expressed sense, arrived at

though *abhidhā*, while the second is the suggested sense, arrived at though *vyañjanā*. Besides, these two senses do not stand on equal footing. The poet wants to convey the suggested sense only and not the expressed one.

In this context let us have some light on the ***abhidhā-mūlā vyañjanā***. As said above :

(i) where the poet desires to convey both the meanings of a word, there is *śleṣa,*

(ii) where with the help of the above-mentioned deciding factors—association *(saṁyoga),* disjunction *(viprayoga)* etc.— only one meaning of a word is accepted, that too is the field of *abhidhā*.

But there are occasions where even after accepting a particular meaning of a word with the help of the above-noted determining factors, another sense also strikes the reader which is desired by the poet too. This subject neither comes under *abhidhā* nor under *śleṣa*; it comes under the field of *abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā*, i.e., the suggestive word-power based on *abhidhā*. For example :

मुखर मनोहर स्याम रंग बरसत मुद अनुरूप ।
झूमत मतवारी झमकि बनमाली रस रूप ॥

Expressed meaning: The *banamāli*, that is, the cloud—having a beautiful black colour; thundering; showering an exhilirating joy and dancing in intoxication in the accompaniment with lightening—is a pleasure personified itself.

Suggested sense: This cloud is like Lord Kṛṣṇa, who—being beautiful, black in colour, dancing and playing on flute, showering an exhilarating joy — is a pleasure personified himself.

It may be noted that in this verse the word *banamāli* is paronomasiac and has two meanings : cloud and Kṛṣṇa. Though through the factors *saṁyoga*, etc., we arrive at a

meaning connected with cloud, yet another meaning connected with Kṛṣṇa strikes the reader and it gives the suggested sense to him that the cloud is like Kṛṣṇa. Such examples would come under neither *abhidhā* nor *śleṣa* but under *abhidhā-mūla vyañjanā śabdaśakti*.

2. Difference between Śabda-śleṣa and Artha-śleṣa

There are two forms of the figure *śleṣa*. *śabda-śleṣa* and *arth*-śleṣa. The determining factor of the two is *'anvaya-vyantireka-sambandha,'* i.e., positive and negative assertion. That which remains in one's existence is called *anvaya,* and that which does not remain in one's non-existence is called *vyatireka.*[1] In the *śabda-śleṣa* the poetic brilliance is brought about by the use of one or more words having more than one meanings. If the word is replaced by a synonym, the brilliance is lost. Contrary to it, in the *artha-śleṣa,* a word having more than one meaning is not used; only those words are used which have only one meaning but convey two or more senses naturally; if any word is replaced by its synonym, the brilliance is in no way diminished. For example :

करन कलित है चक्र नित, पीताम्बर छवि चारु ।
सेवक जन जड़ता हरन, हरि! श्रिय करहु अपारु ॥

First meaning: Oh Hari (Viṣnu)! you always hold *Sudarśana cakra* (discus) in your *karas* (hands), the yellow *ambara* (clothing) enhances your beauty and you remove the follies of your worshipers. May you bestow wealth or welfare upon us.

Second meaning: Oh Hari (sun)! you are beautiful by the *cakra* (*kāla-cakra,*, i.e., the cycle of time) made of the *karas* (rays), the yellow *ambara* (sky) embraces your beauty and you remove ..... .

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1. यत्सत्त्वे यत्सत्त्वम् अन्वयः । यदसत्त्वे यदसत्त्वं व्यतिरेकः ।

In this verse the words *karan, ambara* and Hari have two meanings, and because of this the verse is endowed with poetic brilliance. If these words are replaced by their synonyms, the poetic beauty would be lost. Therefore, this is the example of ***śabda-śleṣa***. Let us take another verse:

स्तोकेनोन्नतिमायाति स्तोकेनायात्यधोगतिम् ।
अहो सुसदृशी वृत्तिस्तुलाकोटेः खलस्य च ॥ K.P., 9.379

[In this world, both the beam of the balance and the wicked people behave in the same manner. They rise to great heights and also fall deep below just by a little change.]

In this verse, no word having more than one meaning has been used and the second meaning is conveyed naturally without resorting to the pun. Moreover, even if the words are replaced by their synonyms, there would be no loss of poetic brilliance. Therefore it is an example of *artha-śleṣa.*

The *śabda-śleṣa* comes under the *sabdālaṁkāras*, i.e., the figures pertaining to *śabda* (word) and the *artha-śleṣa* comes under the *arthālaṁkāras*, i.e., the figures pertaining to *artha* (sense).

3. Abahaṁga-śleṣa: Śabdālaṁkāra or Arthālaṁkaṛa?

There are two varieties of *śabdas-śleṣa* — *sabhaṁga* and *abhaṁga*. *Sabhaṁga* is there where the second sense is arrived at by splitting the word, and *abhaṅga* where it need not be split, the word itself containing more than one meaning. For example, in the phrase 'पूतनामारण में सुदक्ष'[1] there are two senses: one connected with Kṛṣṇa as 'पूतनामारण में सुदक्ष', which means 'one who is skilled in killing Pūtanā,' and the other connected with Rāma as 'पूतनामा, रण में सुदक्ष', meaning by 'one whose name is sacred and who is a skilled warrior'. In the phrase 'पूतनामारण' there is *sabhaṁga-śleṣa*, because it is to be split in two ways said above. The example

1. For the whole verse see p. 169.

of *abhaṁga-śleṣa* has been quoted above: 'करन कलित है चक्र नित....'.

Certain *ācāryas* opine that the *sabhaṁga-śleṣa* is *śabdālaṁkāra* while the *abhaṅga-śleṣa* is *arthālaṁkāra*. Those who accept only *śabhaṁga-śleṣa* as *śabdālaṅkāra* argue that in it the second word is stuck to the first word as the gum is stuck on the wood[1]. Though these words are different from the point of view of accent and pronunciation, yet they look like one In the verse 'है पूतनामारण में सुदक्ष....' (p.169) if 'पूतना-मारण में सुदक्ष' is like wood, 'पूतनामा, रण में सुदक्ष' is like gum. But both of them are not different phrases. being stuck together, in fact, they are one. Therefore, such phrases should be accepted as examples of *śabda-śleṣa*.

On the other hand, the argument given for accepting *abhaṁga-śleṣa* as *arthālaṁkāra* is that here the synthesis is not between the two words but between the two senses. For example, the two senses of the word *'pītāmbara'* — yellow cloth and yellow sky—are mutually synthetic. Therefore, a verse where the words are used giving two meanings in different contexts should be treated as an example of *artha-śleṣa* and not that of *śabda-śleṣa*.

But the later *ācāryas* like Mammaṭa, etc., hold both the forms of *śleṣa* (*sabhaṁga* and *abhaṁga*) as *śabda-śleṣa*. Obviously there is no dispute about *sabhaṁga-śleṣa* in accepting it as *śabda-śleṣa*. Their opinion about *abhaṁga-śleṣa* too is that the deciding factor regarding its connection with word or sense is *'anvaya-vyatireka-sambandha'* referred to above. For example, we accept *'pītāmbara'* as *śabda-śleṣa* on the basis of this very relationship. If the word *'pītāmbara'* is replaced by either of its synonyms: *'pīta paṭa'* (yellow cloth or) *pīta ākāśa*' (yellow sky), the poetic brilliance would be lost. Therefore *abhaṁga śleṣa* too is a *śabda-śleṣa*.

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1. जतुकाष्ठन्यायेन

Those who hold *abhaṁga-ślesa* as *arthālaṁkāra* argue that in such examples there is a synthesis of two senses and not of two words. But the later *ācāryas* hold that *pītāmbara* is not one word but two separate words on the basis of the rule 'अर्थभेदेन शब्दभेद:' (because of another meaning one more word should be accepted), 'प्रत्यर्थ शब्दनिवेश:' (each separate sense indicates the existence of separate word).

As a matter of fact, the argument of the *vādin* (antagonist) holds good in a way even in the case of *sabhaṁga-śleṣa*. If two separate words have synthesis in the *sabhaṁga-śleṣa,* there is also a synthesis of two separate senses as in the *abhaṁga-śleṣa*. In the *sabhaṁga-śleṣa* too the importance of both the word and the meaning is equal and therefore only one side need not be given more emphasis. The deciding factor is only one and that is *'anvaya-vyantireka-sambandha.'* That is why other figures like *anuprāsa* (alliteration), etc., where meaning is not altogether neglected are included among the *śabdālaṁkāras* and not among *arthālaṁkāras*. Similarly, the determining factor in *arthaśleṣa* is the above-said relationship. For example in the verse quoted above, 'स्तोकेनोन्नतिमायाति --------', even if the words—through which the balance and the wicked person are compared with each other—are replaced by their synonyms, the brilliance caused by the use of pun will remain. Therefore it is the area of *arthaśleṣe* and not of *śabdaśleṣe.*

In conclusion we may say that *sabhaṅga-śleṣa* too like *abhaṃga-śleṣa* be accepted as *śabdālṁkāra*.

4. Is Śleṣa an independent Alaṁkāra or not?

Can *śleṣa alaṁkāra* exist independently? There is difference of opinion between the pre-dhvani and post-dhavani *ācāryas*.

In the opinion of Udbhaṭa and Ruyyaka, the *śleṣa alaṁkāra* can never have independent existence, that is, it cannot detach itself from other *alaṁkāras*. Wherever there is *śleṣa*, there must be some other *alaṁkāra* also. But as its brilliance subverts the brilliance produced by other *alaṁkāras,* only *śleṣa* is accepted at such texts. Their main logic in this context is that if other *alaṁkāras* are admitted where there is *an existence* of *śleṣa*, there would be no example of *śleṣa* in literature. Though these *ācāryas* were aware of the law of poetics [and of other *śāstras* also] that which leaves its final impression in the end should be accepted as the chief, supported, beautified and supplemented factor, yet they thought that this rule would have to be relaxed in the case of *śleṣa alaṁkāra*. Otherwise if some other *alaṁkāra* is admitted along with the *śleṣa*, the *śleṣa* would always recede to secondary position, and be dethroned from the position of being an *alaṁkāra*.

But *Mammaṭa* and *Viśvanātha* do not accept this position. According to them *śleṣa* sometimes has an independent existence and sometimes it has not. Where it is not independent, sometimes its brilliance subverts the brilliance produced by other *alaṁkāras*, and sometime its own brilliance is subverted by the other *alaṁkāra* whom it supports. Thus in the opinion of these *ācāryas,* the *śleṣa alaṁkāra* is possible in the following alternate positions :

1. It exists independently.

2. Where not independent, it either subverts the position of other *alaṁkāras,* or supports the other *alaṁkāras*.

Out of these positions, only first two are connected with the *śleṣa alaṁkāra*.

Let us take first such examples where there is brilliance only of the *śleṣa* :

है पूतनामारण में सुदक्ष जघन्य काकोदर था विपक्ष ।
की किन्तु रक्षा उसकी दयालु, शरण ऐसे प्रभु हैं कृपालु॥

[Rāma and Kṛṣṇa both the gods are benevolent and shield those who come to them for shelter. Rāma is of sacred name and is a skilled warrior; Kṛṣṇa is skilled in killing Pūtnā.[1] Rāma is the protector of his adversary Kākodara, i.e., Jayanta (the son of Indra) and Kṛṣṇa is the protector of his adversary, Kākodara, i.e., the serpent Kālīya.]

In this verse, according to Ubdhaṭa and Ruyyaka, there should have been a figure called *tulyayogitā,* because in it a relationship is established between the two objects of description, Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, through one *dhrama* (characteristic),[2] but the brilliance of *śleṣa* has subverted the brilliance of *tulyayogitā*. Therefore this verse be admitted as an example of *śleṣa alaṁkāra.*

But according to Mammaṭa and Viśvanāta there is brilliance caused by *śleṣa* only, because the figure *tulyayogitā* does not exist here at all. Firstly, relationship between Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, the objects of description, has not been established through one characteristic — as Rāma is of sacred name and is a skilled warrior, while Kṛṣṇa is skilled in killing Pūtanā. Secondly, in this verse, the *vācyārtha* (expressed sense) of both the objects is desired by the poet, and in fact, this is exactly the field of *śleṣa*. Therefore here the *śleṣa* has its own independent existence.

Let us take another example:

येन ध्वस्तमनोभवेन बलिजित्कायः पुरास्त्रीकृतो।
यश्चोद्वृत्तभुजंगहारवलयोगङ्गां च यो ऽधारयत् ॥

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१. पूतनामा; रण में सुदक्ष vs पूतना-मरण में सुदक्ष ।

२. cf पदार्थानां प्रस्तुतानामन्येषां वा यदा भवेत् ।
एकधर्माभिसम्बन्धः स्यात्तदा तुल्यगोगिता ॥ S.D. 10.48

यस्याहुः शशिमच्छिरोहर इति स्तुत्यं च नामामराः।
पायात् स स्वयमन्धकक्षयकरस्त्वां सर्वदोमाधवः॥

—A S., p. 122; S.D. 10 12 (vṛ)

In this verse too both the senses — one connected with Mādhava, i.e., Viṣṇu and the other related to Umādhava, i.e., husband of Umā (Mahādeva) — are desired by the poet and both of them are expressed senses. Therefore in the view of Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha this is the example of *śleṣa alaṁkāra*.

In the view of Udbhaṭa and Ruyyaka too, there is *śleṣa* in this verse, though in fact *tulyayogitā alaṁkāra* should have been accepted here because the relationship between the two objects has been established through one characteristic. For example, in the sense of Viśṇu: 'अगं गां च योऽधारयत्', i.e., who as Kṛṣṇa carried *'aga'* (the Govardhana mountain) and as tortoise carried *'go'* (earth); and in the sense of Mahādeva 'गंगां च योऽधारयत्', i.e., who placed the river Gaṁgā [on his head]. But the brilliance of *tulyayogitā* is subverted by that of *śleṣa*.

In conclusion we may say that both the groups of the *ācāryas* accept *śleṣa alaṁkāra* in these examples, but from quite different angles.

Now let us take examples where in spite of the presence of another *alaṁkāra*, the brilliance of the *śleṣa* is greater and hence they are presented as examples of *śleṣa alaṁkāra* :

नीतानामाकुलीभावं लुब्धैर्भूरिशिलीमुखैः ।
सदृशे वनवृद्धानां कमलानां तदीक्षणे ॥ S.D. 10.11 (vr)

[The eyes of this damsel are like lotus and deer. On the one hand the lotus teased by the greedy *śilimukhas* (black bees) tend towards the *vana* (water), on the other hand the deer terrorised by the hunters equipped

with many *śilīmukhas* (arrows) are lying in the *vana* (jungle).]

According to Udbhaṭa and Ruyyaka, though there is *tulyayogitā alaṁkāra*[1] in this verse too, because the relationship has been established between the two *upamānas*[2] — the lotus and the deer through one characterisitc, but the brilliance of *śleṣa* overshadows that of *tulyayogitā*. The brilliance of *tulyayogitā* is not only secondary, but it strengthens that of *śleṣa*. Therefore there is *ślesa alaṁkāras* in this verse. This position has been accepted by both Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha also.

Thus in the second position of śleṣa too, all these four *ācāryas* agree on the same ground.

Now let us take the examples of the third category where in the view of Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha, *śleṣa*, receding to secondary position, supports some other *alaṁkāra* or *alaṁkāras*. The examples of the *alaṁkāras* like *virodha* (paradox) or *virodhābhāsa* (contradiction) and *parisaṁkhyā* (special mention) come under this category:

सन्निहितबालान्धकारा भास्वन्मूर्तिश्च ।

In this statement the *virodha* (paradox) is that the *bāla* (undeveloped) darkness resides near the *bhāsvat* (sun) which is not possible. But this paradox can be removed by taking the following meaning of the above sentence: that (girl) with whom resides the darkness in the form the *bāla* (hair) is of *bhāsvat* (lustrous) form. Here the brilliance of *śleṣa* in the words *bāla* and *bhāsvat* supports the brilliance caused by the paradox. Therefore in this example the poetic beauty is accepted due to *virodhābhāsa alaṁkara* and not to *śleṣa*.

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1 According to Śālagrāma this verse is the example of *dīpaka alaṁkāra*. (S.D., V.T., p. 287)

2 *Upamāna* means the object or article with which anything is compared.

Similarly in the following line:

यस्मिंश्च राजनि जितजगति चित्रकर्मसु वर्णसंकराश्चापेषु गुणच्छेदाः।

[In the kingdom of that invincible king there was *varṇasaṁkara*, i e., the mixture of colours only in the painting, (otherwise there was no *varṇasaṅkara,* i.e., progeny born of parents belonging to different castes), the *guṇas*, i.e., strings were snapped only of the bows (otherwise the *guṇas*, i e., virtues were nowhere destroyed).]

Here too the brilliance of *śleṣa* supports the brilliance of *parisaṁkhyā alaṁkāra*. Therefore we would accept only *parisaṇkhyā* and not *śleṣa alaṁkāra* in this passage.

In this very context let us now quote the following statement of Rudraṭa which will further elucidate this topic:

स्फुटमर्थालंकारावेतावुपमासमुच्चयौ किन्तु ।
आश्रित्य शब्दमात्रं सामान्यमिहापि सम्भवतः॥ K.A. 4.32

[Though the *upamā* and *samuccaya alaṁkāras* are evidently *arthālaṇkāras*, but both these are possible even when similar words are used for *upameya* and *upamāna*.]

It means that though *upamā* and *samuccaya* are *arthālaṇkāras,* yet they are based on similarity of words. Quoting this very statement of Rudraṭa, both Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha came to the conclusion that in the *upamā alaṁkāra* there is similarity not only of action and quality in both the *upameya* and *upamāna*, but that of words also. For example:

सकलकलं पुरमेतज्जातं सम्प्रति सुधांशुबिम्बमिव ।

[This city has become like the orb of the moon, because on the one hand, the orb of the moon is *sakala-kala*, i.e., possessed of all the (sixteen) *kalās* (digits) and on the other hand, this city too is *sakala-kala*, i.e., full of din and bustle.]

About this example both Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha have said that here only *upamā* (simile) should be admitted and not *śleṣa (pun)*, and the simile is based on the similarity of the word *'sakala-kala'*.

Our view, however, is that here the poetic beauty lies in *śleṣa*. No doubt here the aim of the poet is to create simile, but the reader is struck by the brilliance of *śleṣa*; the brilliance of simile has receded to secondary position. To the readers of refined taste such a simile might appear ludicrous. In fact in deciding the aesthetic beauty the emotional appeal to the reader should be taken as greater determining factor than the aim of the poet himself. Therefore in the above example, we should accept *śleṣa* in place of *upamā*.

As a matter of fact here too the same position prevails as in the verse 'नीतानामाकुलीभावम्.......' where the *ācāryas* of both the groups had admitted *śleṣa* in place of *tulyayogitā*. However, in the passage 'सकलकलम्.. .....' we may admit *śleṣa* as supported by *upamā*. If several *alaṁkāras* like *virodhābhāsa* or *parisaṁkhyā*, etc., based on *śleṣa* have been admitted, there should be no objection to admitting *śleṣa* based on *upamā*. In the following couplet of the famous HIndi poet Rahīma also there is *śleṣa* and not *upamā*:

ज्यों रहीम गति दीप की, कुल कपूत गति सोय ।
बारे उजियारो करै, बढ़े अन्धेरो होय ।।[1]

In fact, Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha should have also quoted the preceding *kārikā* of Rudraṭa given below before quoting the above-said *kārikā*:

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1. (a) Here is a pun in two words: (i) बारे = (a) kindled, (b) born; and (ii) बढ़े = (a) extinguished, (b) grows up.

(b) The conduct of a bad son is like that of a lamp. While the lamp illuminates when kindled and darkens when extinguished, the bad son illuminates when born and darkens as he grows up.

भाषाश्लेषविहीनः स्पृशति प्रायोऽन्यमप्यलंकारम्।
धत्ते वैचित्र्यमयं सुतरामुपमा-समुच्चययोः ॥ K.A. 4.31

[The *śleṣa* with all varieties barring that based on language often touches the other *alaṁkāras* too and when it touches the *upamā* and *samuccaya,* it becomes all the more brilliant.]

Rudraṭa here is influenced by the statement of Daṇḍin that *śleṣa alaṁkāra* enhances the brilliance of almost all the *alaṁkāras*:

श्लेषः सर्वासु पुष्णाति प्रायः वक्रोक्तिषु श्रियम् । K.Ā. 2.363

Thus it is quite obvious that the main subject of treatment in the above statement of Rudraṭa is *śleṣa* and he wanted to discuss how it becomes more charming and brilliant. The following example given by him supports our view:

सुरचितवराहवपुषस्तव हरेश्चोपमा घटते । K.A. 4.34

[O King! comparison can be made between you and Hari, because Hari incarnated himself as Varāha (boar), while your body is built like that of a boar.]

In this verse there is *śleṣa alaṁkāra*. In fact the brillance caused by *śleṣa* provides much more delectation to the reader than the comparison between the king and Viśṇu.

In this context a question has been raised by Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha that if in the passage 'सकलकलम्........' we admit *śabda-śleṣa* instead of *upamā,* then in the passage 'कमलमिव मुखं मनाज्ञमेतत्........' we should accept *artha-śleṣa* instead of *pūrṇopamā*, because even if the word '*manojña*' ('beautiful') does not have two meanings, yet there is difference between the '*manojñatā*' (beauty) of the lotus and that of the face, and thus it complies with the definition of the *artha-śleṣa* :

शब्दैः स्वभावादेकार्थैः श्लेषोऽनेकार्थवाचनम् । S.D. 10.58

Evidently the word '*manojñatā*' means beauty and is expressive of the beauty of both the lotus and the face.

Undoubtedly there is difference between the shades of beauty of these two objects. Therefore just as in the example 'सकलकलम्..... .' we admit *śabda-śleṣa* because of the secondary role of the simile, similarly in the passage 'कमलमिव......' we shold accept *arth-śleṣa* for the same reason. But this logic of Mammaṭa, however, subtle it might be, cannot be accepted because in our view the deciding factor should be the emotional appeal to the reader. If there is simile in the 'कमलमिव.. ....' according to Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha and *artha-śleṣa* in the verse 'स्तोकेनोन्नतिम्......' (though the element of similarity in both the cases is almost analogous) the basis for it is simply the emotional appeal to the reader. Therefore on the same basis in the passgaes like 'सकलकलम्.. ....' even when the poet aims at bringing out similarity, we should accepet *śabda-śleṣa* and not *upamā*.

Thus our conclusions are :

1. The *śleṣa alaṁkāra* is not only independent, it also can be combined with other figures.
2. Where it is combined with other figures, sometimes it suppots them and at other places it is supported by them[1].

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1. For the detailed study of this topic see K.P. 9.120 (vṛ), S.D. 10.11 (vṛ), K. Anu. pp. 231-232.

Three Alaṁkāras: Hetu, Sūkṣma & Leśa

Udbhaṭa is regarded as a strong supporter of Alaṁkāra School. His *Kavyālaṁkāra-sāra-saṁgraha* deals with the figures of speech. Another book of his named *'Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa'* suggests that either it presents an exposition of the *Kavyālaṁkāra* written by Bhāmaha, the first *ācārya* of the Alaṁkāra School or it was a work of Alaṁkāra School expository in nature based on Bhāmaha.[1] In short, Udbhaṭa too, like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, belonged to the Alaṁkāra School.

If we compare the chapters dealing with *alaṁkāra* written by these three *ācāryas*, Daṇḍin appears to be indebted to Bhāmaha; while Udbhaṭa to both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. The latter, however, has not included in his treatise certain figures discussed by Bhāmaha and similarly Udbhaṭa has not included a few figures discussed by both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. As the three *ācāryas* are related to one another in chronological order, one may ask why the latter *ācāryas* did not include in their treatises the figures discussed by the former ones. For example, Udbhaṭa has not dealt with *hetu, sūkṣma* and *leṣa*[2]

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1 Dr. R. Pischel is of the opinion that Udbhaṭa's *Kāvyālaṁkāra-sāra-saṁgraha* is an extract from *Bhāmaha-vivarana*. (Rudrabhaṭṭa's *Śṛṅgāratilaka* : Introduction, p. 6.)

2 Cause, subtle and artful praise respectively.

along with certain other *alaṁkāras* in his work, while the two *ācāryas* preceding him had dealt with them.

The editor of *'Kavyālankāra-sāra-saṁgraha'*, Śri Narāyaṇa Daso Banahaṭṭi, has tried to resolve the above-said observation in the introduction. Distinguishing between the *Kāshmīrī* and non-Kāshmīrī rhetoricians, he has, along with other arguments, mentioned that the Kāshmīrī *ācāryas* did not accept these three figures, while the non-kāshmīrī *ācāryas* did accept them. He has included Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, Rudraṭa, Ruyyaka and Mammaṭa in the fold of Kāshmīrī ācāryas, while Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Bhojarāja, Hemacandra and Vāgabhaṭa (the author of Vāgabhaṭālaṁkāra) have been mentioned as non-Kāshmīrī *ācaryas*[1].

But if we examine the works of these *ācāryas* from this angle, we cannot agree with Banahaṭṭi. On the one hand, amongst the Kāshmīrī *ācāryas* Rudraṭa discussed all the three figures, and Maṃmaṭa, though rejecting *hetu* and *leśa*, accepted *sūkṣma*, while on the other hand among the non-Kāshmīrī *ācāryas* Vāmana, Hemacandra and Vāgabhaṭa have excluded these figures, Bhojarāja has dealt with *hetu* and *sūkṣma* but not with *leśa*. This study presents an interesting history of these figures which reveals that these figures have been subject of controversy from the very beginning.

Bhāmaha has admitted *vakrokti* as an essential element of *alaṁkāra*.[2] By *vakrokti* he does not mean a particular *śabdālaṁkāra* accepted by the later *ācāryas*. This word as used by him means a speech full of peculiar poetic brilliance. According to Bhāmaha *hetu*, *sūkṣma* and *leśa* should not be

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1. K.A.S.S , Introduction, p. 17-20.

2. सैषा सर्वैव वक्रोक्तिरनयाऽर्थो विभाव्यते ।
यत्नोऽस्यां कविना कार्यः कोऽलङ्कारोऽनया विना ॥ K.A. 2.85

recognized as *alaṁkāras,* because they denote *samudāya* (just an ordinary statement) and not *vakrokti* (cleverness of speech):

> हेतुश्च सूक्ष्मो लेशोऽथ नालंकारतया मतः।
> समुदायाभिधानस्य वक्रोत्यनभिधानतः॥ K.A. 2.86

It is difficult to say definitely what he precisely meant by *'samudāya'*, yet it can be guessed from the above quotation that he meant by it the absence of *vakrokti*. In this context he has also used the word *'vārtā'* :

> गतोऽस्तमर्कः भातीन्दुर्यान्ति वासाय पक्षिणः ।
> इत्येवमादि किं काव्यं वार्त्तामेनां प्रचक्षते ॥ K.A. 2.87

[The sun is setting, the moon has appeared and the birds are going back to their nests, who will call this sentence a poetic one? It is only a *'vārtā'*, i.e., a common talk.]

Thus on the basis of the above statements we may ascribe the following views to Bhāmaha :

1. The words *vārtā* and *samudāya* are almost synonymous and are diametrically opposed to *vakrokti* in meaning.
2. If *vakrokti* means a poetic speech, rising much above the ordinary *vārtā,* the words *vārtā* and *samudāya* stand for ordinary speech.
3. *Hetu, sūkṣma* and *leśa* being devoid of *vakrokti*, should not be included in the category of *alaṁkāras;* they are simply *vārtā.*

Now let us discuss all the three *alaṁkāras* one by one.

1. Hetu

Daṇḍin openly criticized the view of Bhāmaha as given above and said that these three *alaṁkāras* are the ornaments of speech:

हेतुश्च सूक्ष्मलेशौ च वाचामुत्तमभूषणम् । K.Ā. 2.235

In other words, they should not be rejected as figures as Bhāmaha had done. Bhāmaha had accepted the sentence 'the sun has set', etc., as *vārtā*. Quoting the same sentence Daṇḍin declared that it indicates a particular time, i.e., sun-set:

गतोऽस्तमर्कः भातीन्दुर्यान्ति वासाय पक्षिणः।

इतीदमपि साध्वेव कालावस्थानिवेदने ॥ K.Ā. 2.224

According to him, *hetu* is of two kinds: *jñāpaka* and *kāraka* (causal reason and reason which helps to know). The sentence quoted above is the example of *jñāpaka hetu*. Thus in the opinion of Daṇḍin, *jñāpaka hetu* is there where mere mention of the cause is indicative of the effect or the desired meaning.

This statement of Daṇḍin also shows that Bhāmaha had illustrated only *hetu alaṁkāra* and not the other two.

It is difficult to decide as to what was the current form of *hetu alaṅkāra* in the time of Bhāmaha. While Bhāmaha has rejected the presence of *hetu alaṁkāra* in the above-quoted verse, Daṇḍin has accepted *jñāpaka hetu* in it. If this opinion of Daṇḍin was to reject the view of Bhāmaha, it should be accepted that the form of *hetu alaṁkāra* in the age of Bhāmaha was the same as it was in the time of Daṇḍin. But Daṇḍin too has not defined it. From the examples given by him, it is clear that according to Daṇḍin in *hetu alaṁkāra* the co-presence of cause and effect was necessary. The effect need not be expressed through words, it may even be suggested. For example in the verse 'गतोऽस्तमर्कः.......' only the cause has been mentioned, the effect, i.e., the sun-set is suggested. In this context he has given another example where the effect is expressed through words :

अवध्यैरिन्दुपादानामसाध्यैश्चन्दनाम्भसाम् ।

देहोष्मभिः सुबोधं ते सखि कामातुरं मनः॥ K.Ā. 2.245

(Oh friend! the agony of your heart afflicted by love is indicated by the heat of your body, which is not removed by the moon-beams and not allayed by sandal-water.)

In this verse the *jñāpya* (suggestive) sense that your heart is love-stricken has been expressed clearly through words.

Both these examples illustrate *jñāpaka hetu*. In order to understand the difference between *jñāpaka hetu* and *kāraka hetu*, let us take the example of the latter as given by Daṇḍin:

चन्दनारण्यमाधूय स्पृष्ट्वा मलयनिर्झरान् ।
पथिकानामभावाय पवनोऽयमुत्थितः ॥ K.Ā. 2.238

(This fragrant wind, after shaking the sandal forest and passing by the falls of the Malaya mountain, has come to agonize the travellers.)

Here the agony of the travellers is the effect and the Malaya-wind is *kāraka hetu*. Thus in the opinion of Daṇḍin there are three forms of *hetu alaṁkāra* in all as given below:

(1) *Jñāpaka hetu* where the effect has not been expressed in words.

(2) *Jñāpaka hetu* where the effect has been expressed in words.

(3) *Kāraka hetu*.

It was Rudraṭa, who for the first time, clearly defined *hetu alaṁkāra*—simultaneous mention of *kārya* and *kāraṇa,*[1] i.e., effect and cause, But this definition of *hetu* is different from that given by Daṇḍin as co-presence of cause and effect is different from the simultaneous mention of them. Let us take the following verse given by Rudraṭa where there is simultaneous mention of both of them:

अविरल-कमल-विकासः सकलालिमदश्च कोकिलानन्दः ।
रम्योऽयमेति सम्प्रति लोकोत्कण्ठा-करः कालः॥ K.A. 7.83

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1. हेतुमता सह हेतोरभिधानमभेदकृद् भवेद् यत्र ।
सोऽलंकारो हेतुः स्याद् × × × ॥ K A 7 82

(This beautiful spring season has now approached which is the bloom of several lotuses, intoxication of all the black bees, the joy of the cuckoos and which makes the people curious.)

Here the spring season has been described not as one which causes the blooming of the lotuses, but as 'the bloom of lotuses itself', and therefore *hetu alaṁkāra* is accepted here. In the same context the commentator of Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālaṁkāra*, Namisādhu, has given another example.

आयुर्घृतं नदी पुण्यं भयं चौरः सुखं प्रिया ।
वैरं द्यूतं गुरुर्ज्ञानं श्रेयो ब्राह्मणपूजनम् ॥ K.A. (Ru) 7.83

(Ghee is an age, river virtue, thief dread, beloved comfort, gambling enemy, teacher knowledge and adoration of a Brāmaṇa bliss.)

From these examles it is clear that the *hetu alaṁkāra* of Rudraṭa is different from that of Daṇḍin.

After Rudraṭa, in the post-dhavani period, only the author of Agnipurāṇa, Bhojarāja, and Appayadīkṣita gave the definitions of *hetu alaṁkāra.* Of these, the definition of Agnipurāṇakāra has the semblance of the definition of Daṇḍin,[1] there is no novelty in the definition of Bhojarāja,[2] and in the definitions of *hetu,* as propounded by Appayadīkṣita, there is acceptance of the views of both Daṇḍin and Rudraṭa— simultaneous descripton of *kāraṇa* and *kārya* as well as unity of *kāraṇa* and *kārya.*[3]

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1. सिषाधयिषतार्थस्य हेतुर्भवति साधकः ।
कारको ज्ञापकश्चेति द्विधा सोऽप्युपजायते ॥ **A.P., 334.29, 30**

2. **S.K.Ā. 3.12.**

3 **(a)** हेतोर्हेतुमता सार्धं वर्णनं हेतुरुच्यते ।

(b) हेतुर्हेतुमतोरैक्यं हेतुं केचित् प्रचक्षते ॥ **Ku. Ā. 167, 168.**

There had been attitude of indifference towards *hetu* in the period between Daṇḍin and Appayadīkṣita. On the one hand, except the three *ācāryas* Bhojarāja, etc., no one else had mentioned it, and on the other hand, profound scholar like Mammaṭa rejected it in clear terms and thus revived the views of Bhāmaha. The first type of indifference is not so serious as the second one. The basis for rejecting the *hetu* remained the same as adopted by Bhāmaha; the difference only was how it was rejected. While Bhāmaha rejected it because of the absence of *vakrokti* in it, Mammaṭa did so because it lacked *'vaicitrya'* ('peculiarity'). Rejecting the *hetu alaṁkāra* as defined by Rudraṭa, Mammaṭa included it in the figure *kāyaliṁga.*[1]

But the observation of Mammaṭa deserves consideration. On the one hand, he says that there is lack of *vaicitrya* in the sentences like *'āyurghṛtam'*, and therefore the question of the presence of the *hetu* there does not arise (though he has accepted *sāropā lakṣṇā* in this very sentence)[2], and on the other hand, in the verses like 'अविरल-कमल-विकास.......' the *hetu* is not present because of the above- mentioned lack of *vaicitrya*, and even if it is accepted there, the *kāvyaliṁga alaṁkāra* as defined by him is *hetu* itself. But these statements of Mammaṭa are contradictory. When the absence of *vaicitrya* is accepted in the example of the so called *hetu alaṁkāra*, it does not look proper to accept them as the examples of *kāvyaliṁga*.

In our opinion the *kāvyaliṁga* as defined by Mammaṭa is different from *hetu* as defined by Rudraṭa. According to the definition of *kāvyaliṁga* given by Mammaṭa, *hetu* is called

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1 'हेतुमता सह हेतोरभिधानमभेदतो हेतुः' इति हेत्वलंकारो न लक्षितः। 'आयुर्घृतम्' इत्यादिरूपो हि एष न भूषणतां कदाचिद् अर्हति वैचित्र्याऽभावात् । 'अविरलकमलविकास .... ' इत्यत्र काव्यरूपतां कोमलानुप्रास-महिम्नैव समाम्नासिषुः न पुनः हेत्वलंकार-कल्पनयेति पूर्वोक्त-काव्यलिंगमेव हेतुः।
—K P. 10.186 (*vr*)

2. K. P., 2.12 (*vr*)

kāvyaliṁga, and it is of two kinds· (1) pertaining to the sense conveyed by a sentence, and (2) pertaining to the sense conveyed by a word: 'काव्यलिंग हेतोर्वाक्यपदार्थता'. As a matter of fact, the word *liṁga* is used in the sense of *hetu* in the science of logic. To differentiate it from that *liṁga*, the word *kāvyaliṁga* has been used here. It is obvious that Mammaṭa has not clearly explained the *kāvyaliṁga* (or *hetu*) in the above-said definition. But it appears from the following example that he admitted the figure *kāvyaliṁga* in passages where the cause has been presented:

वपुःप्रादुर्भावादनुमितमिदं जन्मनि पुरा ।
पुरारे न प्रायः क्वचिदपि भवन्तं प्रणतवान् ॥
नमन् मुक्तः सम्प्रत्यहमतनुरग्रेऽप्यनतिभाक् ।
महेश क्षन्तव्यं तदिदमपराधद्वयमपि ॥ [1] K P 10. 502

The figure *kāvyaliṁga* has been accepted in this verse because the reason for apologizing to Lord Śiva is given here. When we compare it with the example given by Rudraṭa 'अविरलकमल विकास.. ......', it is clear that the *kāvyaliṁga alaṁkāra* of Mammaṭa is different from the *hetu alaṁkāra* of Rudraṭa. In one, the effect and cause (the immediate blooming of the lotus and the time) are mentioned simultaneously, while in the other, the cause (cause of not saluting) of the effect (apology) is presented. Thus in our view these two elements are different from each other, hence different are these two figures of speech from each other.

Moreover, the question of the absence of *vaicitrya* also does not arise in the case of verses like 'अविरलकमल- विकास:....'

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1. Oh Lord Śiva, I imagine, on the basis of this birth of mine, that I did not worship you in my preceding life (otherwise I would have got salvation); I shall not be able to worship you in my next life too, because worshipping you in my present life I [due to your benevolence] would get salvation and would not to have take birth again May you pardon me for both these lapses of mine.

Such a speech, on the one hand, is an illustration of *sāropā* and *sādhyavasānā laksānā,* as accepted by Mammaṭa, on the other, it reminds one of the new figures of speech by the name of 'Transferred Epithet' in Western Poetics.

It may be noted that even after Mammaṭa, the controversy about *hetu alaṁkāra* did not stop. *Nagojibhaṭṭa*, the commentator of *Kāvyaprakāśa*, did not accept it as synonymn of *kāvyaliṁga* and included it in the first variety of *atiśayokti*. But, as has been said above, the poetic brilliance of *hetu alaṁkāra* should be recognized independently.

2. Sūkṣma

What was the form of *sūkṣma* in the age of Bhāmaha cannot be said with definiteness because of the non-availability of the material. According to Daṇḍin, *sūkṣma alaṁkāra* is considered where the meaning is indicated delicately by facial gesture or by the condition of the body:

इंगिताकारलक्ष्योऽर्थः सौक्ष्म्यात् सूक्ष्म इति स्मृतः । K.Ā. 2 260

If the definition of this *alaṁkāra* was same in the time of Bhāmaha as it was in that of Daṇḍin, the fault which Bhāmaha found with it, i.e., absence of *vakrokti,* seems unfounded. In fact, it would be injustice if one does not find any *vaicitrya* in the following example of this *alaṁkāra* presented by Daṇḍin in which the damsel, even in a crowded place, cleverly informs her lover of the meeting time, i.e., evening:

कदा नौ संगमो भावीत्याकीर्णे वक्तुमक्षमम् ।
अवेक्ष्य कान्तमबला लीलापद्मं निमीलितम् ॥[1]

— K Ā. 2.261

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1 Unable to ask amidst the crowd of people "when will our union be," the delicate lady looked at her lover and closed the petals of the lotus (which she carried in her hand) in sport.

Thus most of the *ācāryas* dealing with *alaṁkāras* right from Daṇḍin to Appayadīkṣita have discussed it as an independent figure of speech and almost in the similar footing. The example given by Mammaṭa is however most striking. By drawing the sword on the palm of the lady, her *sakhī* (female friend) gave a subtle hint of the reverse posture in the act of copulation :

वक्त्रस्यन्दि-स्वेदबिन्दु-प्रबन्धैर्दृष्ट्वा भिन्नं कुंकुमं क्वापि कण्ठे।
पुंस्त्वं तन्व्या व्यञ्जयन्ती वयस्या स्मित्वा पाणौ खड्गलेखां लिलेख॥[1]

—K.P 10.532 (verse)

3. Leśa

First of all, Daṇḍin disucssed the *leśa alaṁkāra* in the following two ways:

(a) to conceal the form or shape of a thing which is revealing itself though only a little; or to conceal a thing revealing itself by means of *leśa* (excuse).

(b) with the help of *leśa* (excuse) either to condemn a thing through eulogizing terms or to praise a thing in condemnatory words.[2]

But after him, Appayadīkṣita did not discuss at all the first form of *leśa* as defined by Daṇḍīn; though he discussed the second form, yet did not call it *leśa*. He called the first part of it as *vyājokti,* and the second as *vyājastuti*. According

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1. Some friend, having observed the saffron on [her companion's] throat, disturbed by rows of the drops of perspiration flowing from the face, drew with a smile the outline of a sword on her palm, thus suggesting the slender lady's manliness, i e., masculine action in love sport.

(A.B. Gajendragadker)

2. (a) लेशो लेशेन निर्भिन्नवस्तुरूपनिगूहनम् ।
(b) लेशमेके विदुर्निन्दां स्तुतिं वा लेशतः कृताम् ॥ K.A., 1.265, 268

to Bhojarāja and Appayadīkṣita to imagine the presence of virtue in fault and fault in virtue is also called *leśa.*[1] For example:

अखिलेषु विहंगेषु हन्त स्वच्छन्दचारिषु ।
शुक! पञ्जरबन्धस्ते मधुराणां गिरां फलम् ॥ Ku Ā., 138

[Oh parrot! if out of all free moving birds, you alone are placed in the cage, it is because of your melodious voice.]

This has been called *vyājastuti* also by Bhojarāja. But his view is not worth accepting because in *vyājastuti* the opposite sense (either of praise or condemnation) is conveyed not by expressed sense but by suggested sense, while in *leśa* the two are conveyed simultaneously. Let us have an example of *vyājastuti*:[2]

साधु दूति! पुनः साधु कर्तव्यं किमतः परम् ।
यन्मदर्थे विलूनासि दन्तैरपि नखैरपि ।।[2] Ku.Ā., 71

(Oh dūtı, how should I praise you for the honest way you have discharged your duty? You have been scratched [by my lover] both by nails and teeth.)

In this verse apparently the *dūtī* (female messenger) has been praised by the lady, her mistress, but in fact she (the latter) wanted to express her disapprobation for the faithlessness on the part of the *dūtī*. Obviously this disapprobation is arrived at through suggested sense and not through expressed sense.

× × ×

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1. दोषस्य यो गुणीभावो दोषाभावो गुणस्य यः ।
स लेशः स्यात् ततो नान्या व्याजस्तुतिरपीष्यते ।। S.K.Ā. 4.56

2. संकेतकालमनसं विटं ज्ञात्वा विदग्धया ।
ईषन्नेत्रार्पिताकूतं लीलापद्मं निमीलितम् ।।—K.P. 10., 531 (verse)

The presentation of the development of these *alaṁkāras* leads us to the following conclusions :

1. The sentence 'गतोऽस्तमर्कः' devoid of any context does not contain any poetic brilliance, but if it is used in a particular context, it can be presented as an example of *dhvani* (*vastu-dhvāni*) Therefore it is not proper to agree with Bhāmaha that it does not contain any *vakrokti* or *vaicitrya* (poetic brilliance). Possibily he has done so because of his inclination towards the views of some School.
2. Hetu, sūlkṣma and leśa, all the three, cause poetic brilliance and therefore they should be recoginzed as *alaṁkāras*. It is not proper to include them in some other *alaṁkāras*.
3. Both the forms of *hetu alaṁkāra* as discussed by Appayadīkṣita should be accepted because they present appropriate form of this *alaṁkāra*. The *hetu* accepted by Daṇḍin is nothing but the first variety of *hetu* as defined by Appayadīkṣita later on, and should therefore be recognised.
4. The form of *leśa* as defined by Appayadīkṣita is acceptable and not as defined by Daṇḍin.
5. All the prominent *ācāryas* except Bhāmaha have discussed and defined *sūkṣma alaṁkāra*. It undoubtedly deserves the place given to it in rhetorics.
6. **The view of Śri Narayandaso Banhatti is not acceptable that the line of demarcation between Kāshmīrī and non-Kāshmīrī *ācāryas* can be drawn on the basis of accepting and rejecting the *hetu*, *sūkṣma* and *leśa alaṁkāras*.**

Rasavat and other allied Alaṁkāras

Alaṁkāravādin Ācāryas

The two eminent advocates of the Alaṁkāra School are Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. These *ācāryas*, though recognizing the importance of *rasa,* have included *rasa, bhāva*, etc., in the figures of *alaṁkāras* known as *rasavat*, etc.[1] and thus lent their support to the Alaṁkāra School.

Udbhaṭa too must have been an *alaṁkāravādin ācārya*. In his work *Kāvyālaṁkāra-sāra-saṁgraha* he has presented practically all the *alaṁkāras* commended by the *alaṁkāravādin* Bhāmaha in complete adherence to the latter and thus indirectly supported the Alaṁkāra School. Besides, his famous work *Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa* (though not available in proper form) establishes him to be the follower of Bhāmaha.

Rudraṭa occupies a position different from the above three *ācāryas*. On the one hand, he is influenced by the *Alaṁkāra School* that preceded him, and on the other, he bears the impress of *Rasa-dhvani School* that flourished after him. He is inclind more to the *Rasa School,* that is why, he has not given any place to the *rasavat alaṁkāra,* etc., in his work and recognizing the importance of *rasa*, like the *ācāryas* of

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1. *Rasavat* (Impassioned), *Preyasvat* (Devoted), *Urjasvin* (Impetuous) and *Śamāhita* (allayment).

the *Rasa School*, he has discussed it in four chapters (12-15) of his work *Kāvyālaṁkāra*.

Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin have recognized the importance of *rasa* in categorical terms as follows:

—Both the *ācāryas* have declared it to be *sine-qua-non* of an epic.[1]

—According to Bhāmaha the dry and insipid pedantic talk becomes easily delectable on account of its *rasa-element* as a bitter sugar-coated pill does.[2]

—According to Daṇḍin,both the forms of the *mādhurya guṇa*[3]—*vāg-gata* and *vastu-gata* (belonging to speech and object respectively)—are dependent solely upon *rasa*. The *rasavattā*, i.e., the sweetness of *mādhurya guṇa* maddens the *sahṛdaya* (aesthete) as the honey does the black bees.[4] *Vāg-gata mādhurya* is termed *'srutyanuprāsa'*[5] and *vastu-gata* as *'agrāmyatā'*, i.e., non-vulgarity. According to Daṇḍin *agrāmyatā* alone is the most powerful *alaṁkāra (guṇa)* for the purpose of infusing *rasa* into peotry, and its both the forms—one belonging to the word and the other to the sense, particularly latter — rest solely upon *rasa*.[6]

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1. (a) युक्तं लोकस्वभावेन रसैश्च सकलैः पृथक् । K.A. (Bh.), 1.21
   (b) अलंकृतमसंक्षिप्तं रसभावनिरन्तरम् । K.Ā. 1.18
2. स्वादुकाव्यरसोन्मिश्रं शास्त्रमप्युपयुंजते ।
   प्रथमालीढमधवः पिबन्ति कटु ओषधिम् ॥ K.A. (Bh.), 5.3
3. One of the ten characterics of poetry called 'Sweetness'.
4. मधुरं रसवद् वाचि वस्तुन्यपि रसस्थितिः।
   येन माद्यन्ति धीमन्तो मधुनेव मधुव्रताः ॥ K.Ā. 1.51
5. यया कयाचित् श्रुत्या यत् समानमनुभूयते ।
   तद्रूपा हि पदासत्तिः सानुप्रासा रसावहा ॥ K.Ā. 1.52
6. अग्राम्योऽर्थो रसावहः, शब्देऽपि ग्राम्यताऽस्त्येव । K.Ā. 1.64-65

Thus the *alaṁkāravādins* Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin have paid due deference towards *rasa*. As has been already said, Rudraṭa is more inclined towards the Rasa *School*. Like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, he too has accepted *rasa* as an essential element for an epic.[1] He has for the first time pointed towords the use of *rītis* like *vaidarbhī*, etc., and *vṛttis* like *madhurā, lalitā*, etc., in accordance with particular *rasas*[2]. He has dealt with the classification of *nāyakas* and *nāyikās* under *śṛṅgāra rasa*[3], and has also clearly declared the supremacy of this *rasa*.[4] He has drawn a definite line of demarcation between *kāvya* and *śāstra* on the basis of *rasa*.[5] He has also stressed on the proper use of the *rasa*. He observes that the use of a *rasa* other than befitting the context or extreme use of even an appropriate *rasa* constitutes a flaw called *virasatā*.[6]

Though the *alaṁkāravādin ācāryas* have recognized the importance of *rasa*,[7] yet they have not treated it independently and have included it in the realm of *alaṁkāra*. All the three

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1. K.A. (Ru.), 16.1, 5.
2. *Ibid*, 14-37, 15-20.
3. *Ibid*, 12th & 13th chapters.
4. *Ibid*, 14.38.
5. तस्मात् तत्कर्तव्यं यत्नेन महीयसा रसैर्युक्तम् ।

   उद्वेजनमेतेषां शास्त्रवदेवाऽन्यथा हि स्याद् ॥ K.A. (Ru), 12.2

   (A poet should exert very hard to infuse *rasa, i.e.*, sentiment in poetry, otherwise it will become repulsive like an insipid text).
6. K.A. 11.12 & 14
7. It may be noted that the word *rasa* in Poetics always means *rasādi*, as follows.

   (1) *rasa* (sentiment),
   (2) *bhāva* (emotion),
   (3) *rasābhāsa* (semblance of sentiment),
   (4) *bhāvābhāsā* (semblance of emotion),
   (5) *bhāvodaya* (rising of emotion),
   (6) bhāvasandhi (conjunction of two emotions),
   (7) bhāvaśabalatā (conjunction of more than two emotions),
   (8) bhāvaśānti (subsidence of an emotion).

ācāryas Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa designated *rasa* as *rasavat alaṁkāra; bhāva* as *preyasvat alaṁkāra*; and *rasābhāsa* and *bhāvābhāsa* as *ūrjasvin alaṁkāra*. Udbhaṭa has termed *samāhita alaṁkāra* as a synonymn of *bhāvaśānti*. Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin too have dealt with the *samāhita alaṁkāra*, but they have established its relation with *rasa* in a far-fetched manner While dealing this subject Daṇḍin was inspired by Bhāmaha and Udbhāta by both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, yet the definitions given by Udbhaṭa of all these five *alṁkāras* present before us-the subject, as a whole, in a very clear and vivid manner.

Now let us take all these four *alaṁkāras* one by one.

Rasavat

The definition of *rasavat alaṁkāra* in the words of Daṇḍin is very simple, direct and compressed:

रसवत् रसपेशलम् । (K.Ā. 2.375)

Udbhaṭa, adopting the phraseology of Bhāmaha, has also pointed to the five constituents of *rasa*:

रसवद्-दर्शित-स्पष्ट-शृंगारादिरसादयम् ।
स्वशब्द-स्थायि-संचारि-विभावाभिनयास्पदम् ॥ K.S.S 4.3

Out of these five *sthāyin, sañcārin* and *vibhāva* are recognized by the *Rasa School; abhinaya* is synonymous with the four types of acting as accepted by Bharata.[1] The fifth factor is *'sva-śadba'*. According to the commentary of Pratihārendurāja, it means *sva-śabda-vācyatā* (the communicability by their own term) of the *sañcāribhāvas* like curiosity, *sthāyibhāvas* like love and the rasas like *śṛṅgāra*, etc.[2] Udbhaṭa himself in his illustration of *rasavat alaṁkāra*[3] has employed the words *kandarpa (rati)* indicating

1. आङ्गिको वाचिकश्चैव आहार्यः सात्त्विकस्तथा ।
चत्वारोऽभिनया ह्येते विज्ञेया नाट्यसंश्रयाः ॥ N. Sh. 6.24

2. K.S S. (Com.), p. 53 3. See page 155, 8th line.

sthāyibhāva, autsukya (curiosity), *cintā* (anxiety) and *pramoda* (hilarity) indicating *sañcāribhāva*. It appears that in the time of Udbhaṭa *sva-śabda-vācyatā* might not have been considered as an unacceptable condition in the examples of *rasa*.

Preyasvat

Bhāmaha did not put forth any definition of *preyas (preyasvat)* while Daṇḍin defined it as follows : प्रेयः प्रियतराख्यानम्, that is, felicity is felicitous expression (K.Ā.2.275). It approximates the *bhāva* of the *ras-adhvani-vādins*[1]. The definition by Udbhaṭa is more clear and suitable:

> रत्यादिकानां भावानामनुभावादिसूचनैः ।
> यत्काव्यं बध्यते सद्भिस्तत् प्रेयस्वदुदाहृतम् ॥ K.S S. 4 2
>
> (The poetic embodiment of *sthāyibhāvas*, love, etc., through *anubhāva*, etc., forms the subject-matter of *preyasvat*.)

In other words, the poetry, in which the *sthayibhāvas* are not carried to the stage of *rasa*, is called *preyasvat alaṁkāra*. No doubt the *rasadhavani-vādins* accept *'bhāva'* in a poetry of this nature, but only where it is described as *aṁgabhūta* (subordinate to other), and not as *aṁgībhūta* (a principal theme).

Ūrjasvin

From the illustrations of *ūrjasvin alaṁkāra* as presented by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, it appears that this *alaṁkāra* is related only with the impassionate speech showing vigour and pride, and not with any impropriety related to *rasa* or *bhāva*.[2] The definition by Daṇḍin 'ऊर्जस्वि रूढाहंकारम्' also does not clearly indicate the semblance of the *rasa* or *bhāva*, but Udbhaṭa has clarified this nature of *ūrjasvin* both in his definition and illustration:

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1. ....देवादिविषया रतिः ....। S.D. 3.260
2. K.A 3.7, K.Ā. 2. 283-285.

अनौचित्य-प्रवृत्तानां कामक्रोधादि-कारणात् ।
भावानां च रसानां च बन्ध ऊर्जस्वि कथ्यते । K.S.S. 4.5.

(The unfair motivation of the *rasa* and *bhāva* by lust, anger, etc., is the province of *ūrjasvin alaṁkāra*).

For instance:

तथा कामोऽस्य ववृधे यथा हिमगिरेः सुताम् ।
संग्रहीतुं प्रववृते हठेनाऽपास्य सत्पथम् ॥ K.S.S., p 54

(The tempo of Śiva's lust rose so high that he, disregarding all canons of social conduct, rushed to take hold of Pārvaṭi by force.)

The above-said definition by Udbhaṭa is similar to that presented by *rasa-dhvani-vādins*. The only difference is that Udbhaṭa regards *rasābhāsa* and *bhāvābhāsa* as *ūrjasvin alaṁkāra* when they are *aṁgībhūta*, while *rasadhvanivādins* do so when they are *aṁgabhūta*. From this it appears that in the time of Udbhaṭa the form of this *alaṁkāra* had undergone a change from the form it had in the time of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin because of the rising influence of the *rasa-dhavani-vādins*.

Samāhita

The definition of *samāhita alaṁkāra* put forth by Udbhaṭa is as follows :

रसभावतदाभासवृत्तेः प्रशमबन्धनम् ।
अन्यानुभावनिश्शून्यरूपं यत्तत् समाहितम् ॥ K.S.S., p. 4.7

(The suspension of the *rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa* and *bhāvābhāsa*—a suspension so perfect that all comprehension of the *anubhāvas* of any other *rasa, rasābhāsa,* etc. cease altogether—constitutes the *samāhita alaṁkāra*.)

The main difference here too between Udbhaṭa and the *raṣa-dhvani-vādins* is the same which has been referred to

above in the description of *ūrjasvin* and *preyasvat alaṁkāras*.

Samādhita means *samādhi*, i.e., cessation of an emotion. The difference between these two words is only in their suffixes.[1] That is why the illustration of *samāhita alaṁkāra* as put forth by *Bhāmaha* and specially by Daṇḍin, and the definition of this *alaṁkāra* by Daṇḍin represent the form of *samādhi alaṁkāra* presented by Mammaṭa, a *rasa-dhavani-vādin ācārya*.[2] The presentation of this *alaṁkāra* by *alaṁkāra-vādin ācārya* Udbhaṭa is identical with the *rasa-dhvani-vādins* and not Bhāmaha or Daṇḍin. It is perhaps due to the growing influence of the *Rasa School*.

In this context, a form of *udātta alaṁkāra* as presented by Udbhaṭa is worth considering. He as well as his commentator Pratihārendurāja have included *aṁgabhūta rasa, bhāva,* etc., into the second variety of the *udātta alaṁkāra*.[3] This observation receives further elucidation by a later *ācārya* Ruyyaka, the author of *Alaṁkārasarvasva*:

यत्र यस्मिन् दर्शने वाक्यार्थीभूता रसादयो रसवदाद्यलंकाराः तत्रांगभूत-रसादिविषये द्वितीय उदात्ताऽलंकारः।[4] A.S., p. 233

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1. (क) सम् + आङ् + √धा + क्त = समाहित,

   (ख) सम् + आङ् + √धा + क्तिन् = समाधि ।

2. K.A. 3.10; K.Ā. 2.298.299; K.P. 10.112 (sūtra), 534 (verse)

3. उदात्तमृद्धिमद् वस्तु चरितं च महात्मनाम् ।

   उपलक्षणतां प्राप्तं नेतिवृत्तत्वमागतम् ॥

   × × × यत्र च रसास्तात्पर्येणाऽवगम्यन्ते तत्र तेषां × × × रसवदलंकारो भवति । 'तेन उवाच च यतः क्रोडे' इत्याद्युदात्तालंकारोदाहरणे कुतोऽत्र रसवदलंकारगन्धोऽपि । तदुक्तम् उपलक्षणतां प्राप्तम् इति ।

   – K.S.S. 4.8 (vr)

4. Where in a peoetic piece rasa, etc., are described as *angin*, the *rasavat* and other allied *alankārās* are accepted and where rasa, etc., are described as *aṅga*, the *udātta alaṅkāra* should be accepted.

The above discussion may lead us to the following conclusions that the *alaṁkāravādin ācāryas*.

(i) designate *aṁgībhūta rasa, bhāva, resābhāsa, bhāvābhāsa* and *bhāvaśānti* as *rasavat, preyasvat, ūrjasviñ* and *samāhita alaṁkaras* respectively and

(ii) designate *aṅgabhūta rasa*, etc., as the second variety of udātta alaṁkāra.

The Repudiation of the Alaṁkāravādins by the Rasavādins

The view-point of the *alaṁkāra-vādins* is at complete variance with that of the *rasa-dhvani-vādins*. According to the former all the constituents of peotry like *guṇa, rīti, vṛtti rasa,* etc., are its decorative means and they are termed as *alaṁkāras*. Perhaps influenced by them the *rītīvādin* Vāmana, not only called *alaṁkāras* as beautifying means, but also identified beauty with it: 'सौन्दर्यमलंकारः' (K. S. Vṛ 1.1.2).

The conclusion is that the *alaṁkāravādins* regard the *alaṁkāra* as a sovereign virtue of peotry, while the *rasavādins* accept it only as a beautifying means aiding *rasa*. According to the latter, the process of enhancing beauty is as follows: The *alaṁkāras* though perceptibly decorate the body of the poetry *(śabdārtha)*, but in fact they enhance the beauty of its soul, i.e., *rasa*. But this is not obligatory; sometimes they do not do it[1]. This difference alone is responsible for relegating *rasa* to a secondary position according to the *alaṁkāravadins*, and elevating it to a principal position according to *rasa-dhvani-vādins*..

The above view also applies to the mutual relationship between the *alaṁkāras* like *rasavat, preyavat,* etc., and *rasa, bhāva,* etc. The *rasavādins* designate *rasa, bhāva, rasābhāsa,*

1. See page 202 f.n. 1.

bhāvābhāsa and *bhāvaśānti* as *rasavat, preyasvat, ūrjasvi* and *samāhita alaṁkāras* only when they occupy a subordinate position and not the principal one :

प्रधानेऽन्यत्र वाक्यार्थे यत्राङ्गन्तु रसादयः।
काव्ये तस्मिन् अलंकारो रसादिरिति मे मतिः॥ Dh.Ā.2.5

That is why nearly all the *rasavādın ācāryas* discuss them under *aparāṁga*, a variety of *guṇibhūta-vyaṇgya* and not along with *upamā, rūpaka,* etc., under *citra-kāvya.* As the *rasavādins* include the *aṁgabhūta rasa,* etc., amongst the *alaṁkāras rasavat,* etc., the concept of the second variety of *udātta alaṁkāra,* as commended by Udbhaṭa, is automatically discarded :

रसादीनामङ्गत्वे रसवदाद्यलंकारः, अंगत्वे तु द्वितीयोदात्तालंकारः, तदपि परास्तम् । —S.D. 10.97 (vṛ)

The *rasavādin ācāryas* have never agreed with the view of the *alaṁkāravādins* that the *aṁgībhūtā, rasa, bhāva* etc., be included in the *alaṁkāras*. In their view they are the *alaṁkāryas*, i.e., the objects of embellishment and not the *alaṁkāras* like *upamā,* etc., which are the means of embellishment. The function of the *alaṁkāra* is to give a briliant touch (*camatkāra*) to the object of decoraton. If *rasa,* etc., be accepted as *alaṁkāra* then whom would they embellish? Can anything be the cause of its own beauty:

यत्र च रसस्य वाक्यार्थीभावः तत्र कथमलंकारत्वम् । अलंकारो हि चारुत्वहेतुप्रसिद्धः। न तु असौ आत्मैवाऽऽत्मनश्चारुत्वहेतुः।
—Dh.Ā 2.5 (vṛ)

Therefore the thing sought to be decorated will ever be different from its beautifying means.:

रसभावतदाभासभावशान्त्यादिरक्रमः ।
भिन्नो रसाद्यलंकाराद् अलंकार्यतया स्थितः॥ K.P. 4.26

The Repudiation of the Alaṁkāra-vādins by Kuntaka

Kuntaka, the exponent of *vakrokti,* also refuting the aforesaid view of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa, has not regarded *rasa,* etc., as *alaṁkāra* like the *rasavādins* though his point of view is different from them. His main arguments in this regard are as follows:

(1) The *rasa* is to be embellished. If it is accepted as *rasavat alaṁkāra*, it will be self-contradictory. How a thing to be embellished can embellish itself? Can anyone sit on his own shoulders:

शरीरं चेदलङ्कारः किमलंकुरुते परम् ।
आत्मैव नात्मनः स्कन्धं क्वचिदप्यधिरोहति ॥[1] V.J.1.13

(2) As a matter of fact, *rasa* does not convey or illuminate any other element (*alaṁkāra*, etc.,) except its own nature. How can then it be accepted an *alaṁkāra*?

(3) The word '*rasavadalaṁkāra*' does not convey its literal meaning. This can be expounded in two ways:

(a) *Rasavat* is one which is the repository of *rasa,* the *alaṁkāra* of that *rasavat* = *rasavadalaṁkāra*.

(b) That which is the repository of *rasa* and at the same time an *alaṁkāra* = *rasavadalaṁkāra*.[2]

But both these expositions, as says kuntaka, cannot establish *rasa (alaṁkārya)* to be an *alaṁkāra*:

अलंकारो न रसवत् परस्याऽप्रतिभासनात् ।
स्वरूपाद् अतिरिक्तस्य शब्दार्थासंगतेरपि ॥ V.J. 3.11

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1. See *vṛtti* also.

2. (a) रसो विद्यते तिष्ठति यस्येति मत्प्रत्यये विहिते तस्याऽलंकार इति षष्ठीसमासः क्रियते ।

(b) रसवान् चासौ अलंकारश्च इति विशेषणसमासो वा ॥

—V. J. p.347

Kuntaka, though rejecting the view of the *alamkāravādins*, does not agree with *rasavādins* in regard to the nature of *rasavadalaṁkāra* that a subordinated *rasa* be called *rasavadalamkāra*. Going against the conventions, he has presented an absolutely original view. He has explained the word '*rasavat*' in a very simple manner : an *alaṁkāra,* which acts as a *rasa,* is *rasavadalaṁkāra*. An *alaṁkāra* achieves to this status only when it, attaining almost to the position of *rasa,* affords pleasure to the *sahṛdaya*:

रसेन वर्तते तुल्यं रसवत्त्वविधानतः ।
योऽलंकारः स रसवत् तद्विदाह्लादनिर्मितेः॥ VJ, 3 15

and because of this eminence he has commended *rasavada alaṁkāra* as the crown *(jīvita)* of all *alaṁkāras*:

यथा स रसवन्नाम सर्वालंकार-जीवितम् । V.J. 3.14

What Kuntaka implies is that if the *alaṁkāras upamā*, etc., create phantasy, they would be called *alaṁkāras*, but if they contribute to the aesthetic enjoyment of the *sahṛdaya* by presenting the matter so brilliantly that it well-nigh reaches the position of *rasa*, these *alaṁkāras* are called *rasavadalaṁkāra*:

यथा रसः काव्यस्य रसवत्तां तद्विदाह्लादं च विदधाति एवमुपमादिरप्युभयं निष्पादयन् भिन्नो रसवदलंकारः सम्पद्यते ।
—V.J. 3.16

The conclusions are:

(i) The *upamā, rūpaka,* etc., in their common use are called *alaṁkāras*.

(ii) But when they present the subject in as delactable a manner as is done in any poetic piece of *rasa,* they are designated as *rasavadalaṁkāra*.

(iii) *Rasavadalaṁkāra,* being capable of affording as much pleasure as the *rasa,* is the crown of all the *alaṁkāras*, though it is not *rasa* itself.

For instance, in a composition which technically lacks *rasa* (रसविहीन-रचना), the use of simile will

be termed as *upamālaṁkāra*, but in a composition of *rasa* (सरस-रचना), the use of above *alaṁkāra* will be termed as *rasavadalaṁkāra* in case this *alaṁkāra* becomes instrumental to the illumination of *rasa* and thus leads to the aesthetic enjoyment of the *sahṛdaya*.

(iv) It may be noted that the new concept which Kuntaka put up regarding *rasavadalaṁkāra* on the basis of the above exposition has not been presented by him in the case of other three *alaṁkāras: preyasvat, ūrjasvin* and *samāhita*. This may probably be due to the fact that the literal meaning or the exposition of the other three words *preyasvat,* etc., did not fit in with his concept as much as did the aforesaid exposition of *rasavat.* However, it is certain that in the case of the other three *alaṁkāras* too his concept must have been the same.

This view of Kuntaka, though original, does not appear convincing. If the figurative embellishments, which show some brilliance and exhilarate the *sahṛdaya,* are to be called *rasavadalaṁkāra*, it would be difficult to find the pieces of poetry illustrating *rasa* only. If *rasavadalaṁkāra* is admitted wherever there is some magnificience owing to the presence of one or the other *alaṁkāra*, this would lead us to accept that a composition of *rasa* would necessarily be without *alaṁkāra*.

As a matter of fact, the difference in the views of the *alaṁkāravādins* and the *rasavādins* is only superficial:

— The *alaṁkāravādins* do not call the *aṅgin rasa*, etc., as *rasa,* but as *rasavadal-aṁkāra*, etc., and the *aṅga rasa*, etc., according to them are nothing but the second variety of *udātta alaṁkāra*.

— On the other hand the *rasavādins* are not inclined to give the name *alaṁkāra* to the *aṁgin rasa*, etc., though they may agree to call an *aṁga rasa* as *rasavad alaṁkāra*.

Thus the view of Kuntaka, though appearing new, is not an advancement on the views already propounded by the *alaṁkāravādins*.

The Comparative Excellence of Rasavad and Other Allied Alaṁkāras

The *alaṁkāravādins* have conceded the superiority of *rasa* even though they have called *rasa*, etc., as *rasavad alaṁkāra*, etc. Therefore it is certain that *rasavat* and other allied *alaṁkāras* must have been, in their opinion too, superior to other *alaṁkāras* like *upamā*, etc.

Further, Kuntaka has in plain words declared the supremacy of *rasavad alaṁkāra* by calling it the *'jīvita'*, i.e., the life of other *alaṁkāras*.

The *rasa-dhvani-vādin ācāryas*, Mammaṭa and others have not placed *rasavad alaṁkāra*, etc. in *citra-kāvya* along with *upamā*, etc., but included them in *aparasyāṁga*, one of the variety of *guṇībhūta-vayaṁgya*-kāvya. Thus they have indirectly recognized them of higher order than *upamā*, etc.

Though Viśvanātha has put forth the illustrations of *aparāṁga-vyaṁgya* parallel to those of Mammaṭa, yet he has dealt with the *rasavad* and other allied *alaṁkāras* under *citra-kāvya* along with the *alaṁkāras* like *upamā, rūpaka*, etc. In this way, he has equated them, though indirectly, with the latter. The discussion put forth by him deserves elucidaton:

There can possibly be four alternatives in regard to the position of *rasavat*, etc., as *alaṁkāras*:

(a) *Rasavat*, etc., are not *alaṁkāras*,

(b) *Rasavat*, etc., should be recognized as *alaṁkāras* only secondarily,

(c) *Rasavat*, etc., may be recognized as *alaṁkāras* principally,

(d) *Rasavat*, etc., are *alaṁkāras* similar to *upamā*, etc.

Of these Viśvanātha attributes the first three to some unknown *ācāryas*, while he put forth the fourth as his own:

(a) *Alaṁkāras* are those which heighten the *rasa*, etc., by embelishing the form of words and senses. But *rasa*, etc., being *upakārya* (that which is helped, i.e,. embellished) by words and senses should not properly be called *alaṁkāras*. Threfore *rasa*, etc., cannot be called *alaṁkāra*.[1]

(b) *Rasavat*, etc., should be accpeted as *alaṁkāras* secondarily, because *aṁga rasa*, etc., do aid the *aṁgin rasa,* etc.[2]

(c) If the chief aim of the *alaṁkāras* is to subserve the *rasa,* then only the *rasavat*, etc., should be called *alaṁkāras*. To *designate, upamā, rūpaka*, etc., by this name would be as meaningless as to call lump of flesh attached to the goat's throat as its nipple.[3]

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1. (a) शब्दार्थयोरस्थिरा ये धर्माः शोभातिशायिनः ।
 रसादीनुपकुर्वन्तोऽलंकारास्तेऽङ्गदादिवत् ।। S.D. 10-1
 (b) इह केचिदाहुः 'वाच्य-वाचक-रूपालंकरण-मुखेन रसाद्युपकारका एवालंकाराः। रसादयस्तु वाच्य-वाचकाभ्याम् उपकार्या एवेति न तेषामलंकारता भवितुं युक्ता। —*Ibid*,10.97 (vr)
2. अन्ये तु 'रसाद्युपकारमात्रेण इहालंकृति-व्यपदेशो भाक्तश्चिरन्तनप्रसिद्ध्याऽङ्गीकार्य एव, इति । (*Ibid*)
3. अपरे च रसाद्युपकारमात्रेणालंकारत्वं मुख्यतो रूपकादौ तु वाच्याद्युपधानम् अजागलस्तनन्यायेन इति । (*Ibid*)

Viśvanātha does not exclude *rasavat* and other allied *alamkāras* from the list of *alamkāras*, nor does he recognize them as secondary *alamkāras*; nor he admits them as the *alamkāras* primarily. He equates them with other *alamkāras* like *upamā*, etc.

In this connection he argues that the value of an *alamkāra* does not depend only on its being contributory to the *rasa*., as such contribution is done even by the *vācaka*, etc., i.e., a word, a syllable, a sentence, sense, etc., but they are not called *alamkāras*.[1] As a matter of fact, the value of an *alamkāra* lies in its aiding the *rasa* through the aid given to the word and meaning. This view applies as much to the *rasavad alamkāra* as to the *upamā*, etc. The *amga rasa*, etc., strengthened by their own suggestive word and sense, supplement the *amgin rasa* by embellishing the suggestive word and sense of the *amgin rasa*.[2] They never do it without embellshing the word and sense. For instance:

अयं स रशनोत्कर्षी पीनस्तनविमर्दनः ।
नाभ्युरुजघनस्पर्शी नीवीविस्रंसनः करः ॥[3] K.P., 5.116

In this verse the subordinated *śṛṁgāra rasa* strengthens the principal *karuṇa rasa*. According to Viśvanātha the process is as follows : the subordinated *śṛṁgāra rasa* — which itself is *upakṛta* (helped) by words and senses that manifest it —

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1. यदि च रसाद्युपकारमात्रेणालंकृतिवं तदा वाचकादिष्वपि तथा प्रसज्येत । (*Ibid*)

2 अभियुक्तास्तु स्वव्यंजकवाच्यवाचकाद्युपकृतैरंगभूतैः रसादिभिः अंगिनो रसादेर्वाच्यवाचकोपस्कारद्वारेणोपकुर्वद्भिरलंकृतिव्यपदेशो लभ्यते । (*Ibid*)

3. This is the hand which [at the time of copulation] pulled the girdle, pressed the well developed breasts, touched wistfully the nave, thighs and buttocks and loosened the knot.

obtaining the denominaton of an *alaṁkāra*, enbellishes the words and senses of the *karuṇa rasa* which manifest it.[1]

In short in this context *śṛṅgāra rasa* has played the part of an *alaṁkāra* and it is termed as *rasavadalaṁkāra* Same is the case with other allied terms also· *bhāva*, is termed *preyasvad alaṁkāra, rasābhāsa* and *bhāvābhāsa* are termed *ūrjasavin alaṁkāra, bhāvaśānti* is called *samāhita alaṁkāra* and other three *bhāvodaya, bhāvasandhi* and *bhāvaśabalaā* are called the *alaṁkāras* by their own names, i.e., *bhāvodaya alaṁkāra*, etc[2]. :

भावस्य चोदये सन्धौ मिश्रत्वे च तदाख्यकाः । S D 10.97

Viśvanātha's attempt to apply the definton of *alaṁkāra* on *rasavat* and other allied *alaṁkāras* is of course laudable, but a closer study would reveal that these *alaṁkāras* are more significant than *alaṁkāras* like *upamā,* etc. In the illustrations of these *alaṁkāras*, one of the *rasa, bhava* etc., by reducing itself to the secondary position, contributes to the principal *rasa, bhāva* etc., by strengthening its 'word and sense'. On the other hand in the illustrations of *upamā,* etc., such question does not arise. **Thus the *rasavat* and other allied *alaṁkāras* are superior to the *alaṁkāras* like *upamā*, etc. It would, therefore, be more logical and cogent to accept them as a variety of *guṇībhūta-vyaṁgya-kāvya* as Mammaṭa does and not to place them under *citra-kāvya* as Viśvanātha has done.**

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1. It may be noted here that *aṁga rasa* differs from *guṇa* in the respect that while it helps the *aṅgin rasa* indirectly, i.e., through embellishing the words and senses, the *guṇa* does so directly.

2. For the examples of these alaṅkāras see S.D , 10.96 (vr):

   (a) आमीलितालस ....। (b) वनेऽखिलकलासक्ताः .... ।

   (c) अविरलकरवाल ....। (d) मधुपानप्रवृत्ता .... ।

   (e) जन्मान्तरीणरमणस्य ....। (f) पश्येत् कश्चिच्चल .... ।

Perceptlike Experience in Bhāvika Alaṁkāra

The poet, by virtue of his poetic intuition which is described in mystic language as third eye of *Trilocana* (Three-eyed), directly perceives every form of existence past, present and future[1]. Sometimes the poet delights us by the picturesque presentation of the things gone by, on occasions, he paints a vivid and striking picture of the 'shape of things to come'. No doubt, a historian also unfolds the past, and a prophet gives the glimpses of the future, but matter-of-fact as they are, none presents the past or the future as though it were present. Only a poet can do it:

कोऽन्यः कालमतिक्रान्तं नेतुं प्रत्यक्षतां क्षमः ।
कविप्रजापतींस्त्यक्त्वा रम्यनिर्माणशालिनः ॥ R.T.,1.4

This present-like representation of the past and the future, which is the tangible result of the poet's power of visualization, is called *bhāvikālaṁkāra* :

अतीतानागतयोः प्रत्यक्षायमाणत्वं भाविकम् । A.S., P. 178

Older poeticians, like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, described it as a quality pervading a literary work:

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1. सा हि चक्षुर्भगवतस्तृतीयमिति गीयते ।
येन साक्षात्करोत्येष भावांस्त्रैलोक्यवर्तिनः॥ V.V.

भाविकत्वमिति प्राहुः प्रबन्धविषयं गुणम् ।[1] K A (Bh), 3 53

Here the use of *'prāhuḥ'* suggests that even before Bhāmaha this concept of *bhāvika* was well-recognized, though probably for the sake of the classification, the learned poeticians were obliged to include it under an *alaṁkāra* :

भाविकत्वं च निजगुरलंकारं सुमेधसः। K A.(Bh), 3.4

Udbhaṭa, however, was the first *ālaṁkārika* who assigned to it the status of a definite *alaṁkāra* of a *vākya*, though, Pratihārendurāja, his commentator, struggled to retain its old concept. Like *atiśayokti* of Bhāmaha and *śleṣa* of Daṇḍin, *bhāvika*, in its early development, enjoyed a superior status than a mere *alaṁkāra*. It was probably because it is concerned with the presentation of not an aspect of a thing, as the *upamā*, etc., are, but with the presentation of the whole event, past or future. Ruyyaka in his exposition of this *alaṁkāra* explains the word *bhāvika* in two ways. They are as follows:

1. कविगतो भाव आशयः श्रोतरि प्रतिबिम्बत्वेनास्तीति ।

2. भावो भावना वा पुनः पुनश्चेतसि निवेशनं सोऽत्रास्तीति ।

The first idea patly originated in Daṇḍin, who said :

तद् भाविकमिति प्राहुः प्रबन्धविषयं गुणम् ।
भावः कवेरभिप्रायः काव्येष्वासिद्धि संस्थितः ॥[2] K.Ā., 2.364

1. The commentator on Bhāmaha would interpret the word *prabandha* as the part of poetic composition and not a literary work.

2. It is significant to note that Bhoja radically differs from all other poeticians in his description of *bhāvika*. But his definition of it as:

स्वाभिप्रायस्य कथनं यदि वाप्यन्यभावना ।
अन्यापदेशो वा यस्तु त्रिविधं भाविकं विदुः॥ S K. Bh. 4.76

clearly follows the etymological meaning of *bhāvika*. It is otherwise substantially different from its generally admitted concept as the presentation of past and future as if immediate

And this embodies the well-known theory of poetics that poetry is the representation of the poet's vision: 'कवित्वं हि कवेर्भाव:'. In dramaturgy the term *bhāva*, which Bharata classified into fortynine types, has a technical sense with which we are not paiticularly concerned at present, though it may be noted in passing that the dramaturgial *bhāvas* or mental states which suggest *rasa* into being have their origin in the poet's mind:

कवेरन्तर्गतं भावं भावयन् भाव उच्यते । N.Sh , 6th ch.

The term *bhāva* is used here in its more popular sense of a poetic idea. The reader with aesthetic susceptibility throbs with poet's ideas which are reflected in him. *Bhāvika* is thus a relflection of the poet's vision in the reader's mind:

(i) कविभावस्य श्रोतरि प्रतिबिम्बतापत्तिः ।

(ii) स्वरूपं ह्यस्य श्रोतरि कविगत-भाव-प्रतिबिम्बनम् ।

This reflective unity or the infusion of the spirit of the poet and the reader makes it possible for the latter to witness the poet's creation as his own. This accounts for visualization of the poet's idea by the reader.

The second explanation of *Bhāvika, viz.*,

भावो भावना वा पुनः पुनश्चेतसि विनिवेशनं सोऽत्रास्तीति ।

draws attention to the important role that *bhāvanā* plays in the present *alaṁkāra*. In the case of such scriptural texts as 'रात्रिमासत' and अग्नौ प्रादात्', the Mīmāṁsakas admit a trnsformation of the literal meaning; the past tense and the third person, etc., used in these sentences, are turned into present tense, etc. This change is given the name of *bhāvanā* by the followers of Kumārila (Jayaratha in his comment on *Tantrāloka*, 1, p.177). *Bhāvanā* involved in the concept of *bhāvika*, has some affinity with that of a Mīmāṁsaka in so far as it means the apprehension of the past or future as if it were present. The meaning and the function of *bhāvanā* with reference to *bhāvika* will be better understood by the perceptible analysis of the aesthetic cognition of this *alaṁkāra*.

To begin with, *bhāvika* is the conciousness of the non-present as present. It is an almost perceptual cognition of the past or future, i.e., of the mediate objects presented in imagination. An act of cognition presupposes the triple form *(tripuṭī);* the subject who knows, the object that is known and the means of congnition and the perception is distinguished by its directness or immediacy (*sākṣātva* or *aparokṣātva*). In the first explanation of the term *bhāvika*, which explained the unification of the thought and feelings of the poet and the aesthete, we were given the clue to the subject who knows. It is *sahṛdaya* or aesthete, who in his mirror-like heart (*manomukura*) receives the reflection of the poet's intention. He is the cogniser of the subject. The events or ideas described in *bhāvika* are the objects. And they are mediate since they belong either to the past or the future. What does then make them shine as if immediate? To this Ruyyaka replies that either the theme is inherently charming or even when it is not the poet's pictorial style (*varṇanā*) presents it so beautifylly that it seems to live before our eyes.

According to Bhāmaha, the contributory causes to this are the presntation of a picturesque, exalted and wonderful idea, the adaptability of the story to being presented on the stage or conveyed by gestures and a harmony of words.[1] To this list Daṇḍin seems to add:

परस्परोपकारित्वं सर्वेषां वस्तुपर्वणाम्,
विशेषणानां व्यर्थानामक्रिया, स्थानवर्णना ॥
व्यक्तिरुक्तिक्रमबलाद् गम्भीरस्यापि वस्तुनः।
भावायत्तमिदं सर्वं तद् भाविकं विदुः ॥ K.A., 2. 365-366

Now let us take the definition of bhāvika alaṁkāra according to Udbhaṭa:

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(१) चित्रोदात्ताद्भुतार्थत्वं कथायाः स्वभि(वि)नीतता ।
शब्दानाकुलता चेति तस्य हेतुं प्रचक्षते ॥ K.A. (Bh.), 3.54

प्रत्यक्षा इव यत्रार्था दृश्यन्ते भूतभाविनः ।
अत्यद्भुताः स्यात्तद् वाचामनाकुल्येन भाविकम् ॥ K S.S , 6.6

According to this statement there is bhāvika alaṁkāra where (1) the *artha*, i.e., the happening of past or future has been presented as if occured in present, and that happening should be extremely striking (*atyadbhuta*) and that (2) should be presented in a perspicuous style (*vācāmanākulyena*).

The emphasis on *'śabdānākulatā'* or perspicuity of words by Bhāmaha, on *'ukti-krama-balād vyakti'* by Daṇḍin and on *'vācāmanākulya'* by Udbhaṭa has led Ruyyaka to believe that *bhāvika* is essentially a description of such characteristics of an object which are given to it by the force of poetic style (*varṇanā*); though he has not denied that even 'real' theme which is not poet's creation or *prauḍhokti-niṣpanna* can come under *Bhāvika*.

From these observations it follows that the extremely striking ideas or events couched in beautiful words help to make the objects as if immediate. Jayaratha, a commentator on Ruyyaka, has laid a special emphasis on the charm of words and meaning: *vācya-vācaka-rāmaṇīyakam.* According to him, there will be no *bhāvika* if either word or meaning is not beautiful, *śabdārtha-sāhitya* or *śabdārtha- saubhrātra*, to borrow the terminology of Kuntaka and Parāśara Bhaṭṭa, are particularly desirable. Strikingness of the idea and the charming effect of the words are the *modus operandi* for the presentlike representation of the objects. so far we have discussed the subject who knows and the objects that are known. *Bhāvanā* is the means.

For normal perception we need the aid of an organ of sense to perceive an object which should be in immediate vicinity of the perceptive sense. In his ordinary perception the cognizer is conditioned by time and space and the law of cause and effect, an aesthete with the help of peculiar poetic

power called *bhāvanā* raises himself above all these. Like a mystic the poet and aesthete with aesthete susceptibility visualize a thing of the past or the future as actually present before him. *Bhāvanā* is the contemplative power innate in the poet and the reader. Perceptuality in *bhāvika* is thus the result of this *bhāvanā* coming in contact with mediate yet wonderful objects, beautifully presented by the poet.

Now we might discuss in what respect the poetic cognition of *bhāvika* differs from the consciousness that results from such *alaṁkāras* as *bhrāntimān, atiśaykoti, pratīyamāno-tprekṣā, kāvyaliṁga, svabhāvokti* and *rasavat.*

In both *bhrāntimān* and *bhāvika*, there is a cognition of a thing which is not there, but while in the former, where one thing is mistaken for another similar to it the cognition is erroneous and based on similarity, in latter the reader gets the vision of a thing exactly as it was or as it would be. Thus *bhrāntimān* represents a mistaken identity and consequently the cognition thereof is erroneous; *bhāvika* gives immediate vision of mediate and is not erroneous in its cognitive results.

In *atiśayokti* the *viṣayin* swallows up the *viṣaya, e.g.*, in 'चन्द्रोऽयम्'. the *upamāna* moon altogether takes in the *upameya*, the face. Hence *atiśayokti* is a consummated introsusception or *siddha adhyavasāya*. The process of *bhāvika* cognition has no *adhyavasāya*. When a thing of the past or the future is visualized, the reader is conscious of its pastness and futurity. The past and future are invariably presented here in their relevant forms. It avoids the element of *adhyavasāya* or *āhāryatva* in the process of resultant cognition of *bhāvika*.

When the poet presents to us a thing of past or future as though it were present one is likely to mistake it for *utprekṣā, gamya* of course, because the words *iva, manye, śaṁke*, etc., are absent. But there is a fundamental difference between the two. Whereas in *utprekṣā* there is intro-susception

in process of completion or *sādhya ādhyavasāya*, and *utprekṣā* is *saṁbhāvanā,* which like knowledge and the feelings of pleasure and pain, is essentially an attribute of the self. But in *bhāvika* the immediacy is not in the form of *sambhāvanā* and thus it is not the exclusive attribute of the self because it has refernece to the objects also which *bhāvanā* makes to shine distinctly before the mind's eye.

Udbhaṭa has put *kāvyaliṁga* and *bhāvika* in one group. Mammaṭa describes *kāvyaliṁga* immediately after *bhāvika*. Are they similar in any respect? The *hetu* in *kāvyaliṁga* and the ideas in *bhāvika* must be striking to be poetical. But the strikingness of ideas is not an invariable sign of the singet—the immediacy. *Bhāvika* consciouness is essentially characterized by the immediate vision of the mediate. This like a mystic's visiualization of the objects of his own creation. A striking theme and an attractive style present the picture clearly but there is no invariable relation (poetic relation can harldy be invariable like that of cause and effect) between the two. Hence the congnition of *bhāvika* and *kāvyaliṅga* are different.

The distinction of *bhāvika* congnition from that of *svabhāvokti* and *rasavat* will be of greater interest. *Svabhāvokti* is a penpicture of such actions and dispositions of an object which must be characterisitic of it. The theme must be poetically striking and should bear testimony to the poet's power of minute observation.

No doubt, *svabhāvokti* is based on 'realism', yet none but a poet can effect it. The matter depicted should be *sūkṣ ama* which Ruyyaka interprets as कविमात्रस्य गम्यः. It requires a poet's power of observation to observe it in every detail : small or big. And further, it requires the poet's power of expression to present the object with perfect vividness. Take an example of *svabhāvokti:*

चलापांगां दृष्टि स्पृशसि बहुशो वेपथुमतीं
रहस्याख्यायीव स्वनसि मृदु कर्णान्तिकचरः।
करं व्याधुन्वत्याः पिबसि रतिसर्वस्वमधरं,
वयं तत्त्वान्वेषान्मधुकर! हतास्त्वं खलु कृती ॥ A Śā., 12.4

Here the picturesque presentation of the actions of a bee seems to dance before our eyes. An aesthete who has the faculty of self-identification with the events feels that this is so natural of a bee. Ruyyaka calls it *vastu-saṁvāda*.

Now so far as perfect vividness is concerned *svabhāvokti* and *bhāvika* resemble one another. But while the former is based on 'realism', the latter has a striking theme as its starting point and thus *svabhāvokti* is the cognition of the *laukika vastu* or ordinary objects possessed of subtle characteristics; the *bhāvika* is essentially the cognition of strikingly worderful or *lokottara*. There is one more important point of difference between the two which we shall take up in the course of distinction of *bhāvika* from *rasavat*. In both *rasavat* and *bhāvika* what is described shines as if dancing before our eyes : पुरःस्फुरत्, and in both there is an element of relish : चमत्कार, Beyond these there is no point of similarity between the two. *Rasavat* has *rati*, etc., which are particular mental states, as its contents and these are evolved by appropriate *vibhāvas*, etc., *bhāvika* presents events or ideas and does not have the particular mental states as its content. This, then is the difference in respect of the content.

From *rasavat, bhāvika* differs in respect of the form of cognition too. *Rasavat* implies the presentation of that *rasa* which happens to be subordinate to another rasa. In this cognition, neither there is any reference to the temporal and spatial distinctions nor the cognized is known to be different from the cognition. This is 'साधारण्येन प्रतीतिः' in the words of Ruyyaka as distinct from 'ताटस्थ्य-प्रतीतिः' in *bhāvika*. This

universalized cognition is the result of *hṛdayasaṃvāda* or the correspondence of heart to the aesthetic object. And the form of cognition can be represented simply as 'I' or *'aham'*.

In philosophical idealism this is like the experience at the state of *paramādvaita* or supra-monism where 'this' merges into 'I'. Thus while the cognition of *rasavat* involves no distinction, that of *bhāvika* does. *Bhavika* cognition refers to the past and the future. Here the cognizer is conscious of the distinctions of the subject, object and the process of knowledge, although he regards them essentially non-different. The *bhāvika* cognition can be represented as 'I know this' ('इदमहं जानामि'). Here also 'I' is the substratum of 'this', because ultimately 'this' (*idaṁ*) is the manifestation of 'I' (*'aham'*). To be explict, *bhāvika* represents the objective apprehension of the events which are poet's own creation and therefore ultimately rest in the poet. Ruyyaka calls it 'ताटस्थ्येन प्रतीतिः' which his commentator Jayaratha explains as 'इदमहं जानामीति समानाधिकरण्येन प्रतीतिः'. This cognition resembles the experience of the subjects who belong to the *īśvara* category of *śaiva* system and who are technically called *vidyeśvaras*. It follows from this that speaking in philosophical terms of *śaiva monism, rasavat* apprehends or cognizes 'I'; *svabhāvokti* vividly represents 'this' and *bhāvika* is the cognition of 'I this' ('अहमिदम्'), perhaps evenly balanced. The following example aptly illustrates the *bhāvika*.

दर्भाङ्कुरेण चरणः क्षत इत्यकाण्डे
तन्वी स्थिता कतिचिदेव पदानि गत्वा ।
आसीद् विवृत्तवदना च विमोचयन्ती
शाखासु वल्कलमसक्तमपि द्रुमाणाम् ॥ A.Śā. 2.12

Here Duṣyanta narrates to his companion *Vidūṣaka* the love-sweet actions of his cherished one; such as the foot

being pricked by *darbha* sprouts. The event is past but Duṣyanta's emotionally ornate representation makes it live again. *Vidūṣaka's* reaction to it is quite appropriate:

किदं तुए उववणं तपोवणं त्ति पेक्खामि ।
(कृतं त्वयोपवनं तपोवनमिति पश्यामि ।)

Here the use of *pekkhāmi* (I perceive) is very signigicant. It represents the form of cognition that arises from the vivid description of the past and the future.

The Process of Poetic Creation

[1]

A proficient critic while commenting upon any poetic work goes on trying to reach the depth of the mind of the poet and wishes to make his readers acquainted with the same feelings which the poet himself might have experienced at the time of writing his piece of literary work. With this effort the critic may conclude that upto what extent the poet becomes sentimental or emotional while narrating a particular scene or aspect, or becomes rigid or provoked while dealing with another. He also comes to know as to how far is the poet competent in depicting any incident with his faculty of imagination and is capable of expressing his views and notions in a style suitable for the context. What process works in the mind of a poet while creating a piece of literary work—regarding this issue, we find ample material in the treatises of Indian Poetics.

The only and inevitable cause for poetic creation is *śakti* or *pratibhā*, i.e., an inborn intellect in a man. It is an intuitive intellectual power or poetic genius. There are two other causes also for the creation of poetry: *vyutpatti* (erudition) and *abhyāsa* (practice). But both of these, in fact, are the factors which make *śakti* (*pratibhā*) itself polished, chaste and chiseled.[1]

Regarding the function of *śakti* we may say that when a

1. See 'The Causes of Poetry', PP.15-23.

poet, through any source, becomes familiar with any object or incident —and also some time becomes emotionally involved with it—it gets imprinted in his mind. And, it, at some occasion with the aid of his imaginative faculty, bursts out spontaneously in multiforms of expression. This very expression is called a fine piece of poetic work—whether in versification or in prose. It is all through the working of the *śakti* or *pratibhā* of the poet defined as follows:

(i) मनसि सदा सुसमाधिनि विस्फरणमनेकधाऽभिधेयस्य ।
अक्लिष्टानि पदानि च विभान्ति यस्यामसौ शक्तिः ॥[1]

K.A. (Ru.) 1.15

(ii) नव-नवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रज्ञा प्रतिभा मता ।[2] (Bhaṭṭa Tauta)

The main aim[3] of the reader is to enjoy *rasa*, i.e., aesthetic pleasure (poetic delight) out of a literary work. Not only a reader or a spectator gets such delight, but the poet himself also does so from his own work, and at that time he is called a *sahṛdaya*[4] and not a poet, and is considered to be at par with other *sahṛdayas*.

Does a poet enjoy such pleasure even when he is composing his work? The aesthetitians reply in affirmative, but at that moment too he is neither an ordinary man, nor a poet, but a connoisseur. Let us suppose a poet writing about an incident which happened in his own life recently or in the past. During this period such moments must occur many-a-time when he forgets the real characters, the time connected with the incident; the place of happening and also even himself. These are the moments when he enjoys the *rasa* (poetic bliss) like other *sahṛdayas*.

It may be noted that such moments also do occur during his writing-process when there erupt obstacles of many kind creating hinderance in his work, e.g., he is unable to find out a word or expression suitable for the context; or he

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1,2. See page 17 and 18.

3,4. See page 33 and 33 (f.n.).

becomes unable to give a new turn to the incident he is writing about; or while writing about a real happening with him, he can not forget the moments of joy and union with his kith and kin especially with his beloved; or can not forget the ill events fallen upon him like when he was in a miserable condition and could not fill even his own belly; or he can not forget those days when his living chamber, or his business chamber or his barn was gutted by fire or totally destroyed due to earth-quake.

These moments, of course, are like those of an ordinary person. During this period, he becomes unable to write. He can do his job only when he is mentally away from all the worldly affairs; and is free from all sorts of obstacles. This is the high time when he is enjoying the aesthetic pleasure—both the phenomena (writing and also enjoying poetic delight) go side by side. Such moments are of his concentration of mind, what they call *'samādhi'*. Only in such moments, in fact, the creative activity can take place in a poet. In short:

— The foreceful influence of any object or event on the mind of the poet is transferred into an appropriate expression with the help of his imagination. It happens when he is in the state of *samādhi* (concentration of mind). Such expression is called poetry.

— Both, the flight of imagination and an appropriate expression, are, in reality, the offshoots of the inborn intellect (*pratibhā*) of the poet.

Thus poetry is a harmonious co-ordination of the outer and the inner world of the poet.

Here I quote a verse of Kalidāsa, as if, he had composed it in order to support the above-said view-point:

चित्ते निवेश्य परिकल्पित-सत्त्वयोगाद्,

रूपोच्चयेन मनसा विधिना कृता नु ।

स्त्रीरत्नसृष्टिरपरा प्रतिभाति सा मे,
धातुर्विभुत्वमनुचिन्त्य वपुश्च तस्याः॥ (Abhi., 2·9)

(After looking at the charming face of Śankuntalā, King Duṣyanta says to Māḍhavya, the Vidūṣaka[1]: "As I see the body of this damsel on one hand, and contemplate about the supreme power of creativity of the Creator on the other, I perceive that He, firstly, might have garnered up her form in His mind and then, with the help of assemblage of all lovely things, have moulded her into being—not with his hands, but—with his mind. She seems to me a wondrous creation of Him into a gem-like lady infused with life and breath.)

All such things happen in the case of a poet also. After seeing an attractive object of the world, he beomes overwhelmed with its wondrous charm, and it gets impressed in his mind. And sometime, in the state of his concentrated mind, the occurance turns into a spontanous overflow of appropriate words laid out in sentences. An aesthete becomes engrossed by the creation of the poet after reading it, as Duṣyanta had become by Śakuntalā after beholding her.

In this context let us have another saying of Kalidāsa:

तं वेधा विदधे नूनं महाभूतसमाधिना [2] । Raghu. 1.29

(Brahmā had made the form of Dilīpa with the collected material of all the five elements of nature, and this is as if the state of the concentration of the mind of the Creator.)

This saying indicates that a poet before starting his writing gathers in his mind all the material relevant to the theme, and this is called the state of his *samādhi* (concentration of mind).

1. The jocose companion and confidential friend of the hero.

2. समाधीयतेऽनेनेति समाधिः = कारणसामग्री । (Mallināṭha)

[2]

The poet's imagination plays an important role, as said above, in the creation of any poetic form. For example:

गाढालिंगण-रहसुज्जुअम्मि दइए लहुं समोसरइ ।
माणंसिणीण माणो पीलणभीअ व्व हिअआहिं ॥
(गाढालिंगन-रभसोद्यते दयिते लघु समपसरति ।
मनस्विन्या मानः पीडनभीत इव हृदयात् ॥) K.P.4-66

(A sulky lady, as her lover came from out of town, did not utter a single word to him, but as he advanced towards her just a little to encircle her into a tight embrace, her sulking ran away at once from her heart out of fear lest it should be crushed between the two excited bodies.)

In fact, as an emotion in the mind of a poet becomes stimulated owing to some reason, it automatically takes the shape of poetry: कवेरन्तर्गतं भावं भावयन् भाव उच्यते. That is why any episode, e.g., taken from the Ramāyaṇa of Vālmīki, has been presented in various and different forms and fashions, manners and norms by Kalidāsa, Kamban, Tulsīdasa and many other poets of different languages.

Here a question arises whether a poet, while composing his poetry, uses the *alaṁkāras* (figures of speech) deliberately or not. "No, not a good poet", answer the aesthetitians. According to them, "A genius, while composing poetry—with his mind absorbed in enjoying the poetic bliss—the figures of speech, how much obscure they may be in their usage, come one after another in his mind as if falling into his lap and saying 'use me first, I am to be preferred first of all.'[1]

[3]

Let us now discuss whether all the poets have similar type of genius. An obvious answer to this query is also in

nagative, otherwise all the poetry-pieces would have been similar to each other qualitatively. In fact, one plot of a story or a particular theme is dealt with by the individual poets in different ways and manners. It is all due to their varied genius. For example, in the following two verses the theme of shyness has been designed in two different ways:

(1) कृते वरकथालापे कुमार्यः पुलकोद्गमैः ।
सूचयन्ति स्पृहामन्तर्लज्जावनताननाः ॥ Dh.,Ā., 4.4 (Vṛ.)

(At the mention of their spouses, the damsels—with their eyes downward owing to shyness—betray their inner desire to meet them through the bristling of the hair of their bodies.)

(2) एवं वादिनि देवर्षौ पार्श्वे पितुरधोमुखी ।
लीलाकमलपत्राणि गणयामास पार्वती ॥ K.S., 6.84

(As the sage Nārada told the Mountain Himālaya that Pārvatī should be married to Lord Śiva, she, sitting beside her father, with her face downward, began to count the petals of the lotus flower.)

Very obviously, while the first verse is plain and straight-forward, the second one is fanciful, imaginative, hence delectable. It is owing to the difference in the genius of the two poets. Kuntaka, in this context, has mentioned the poets having the following three types of nature: *(i)sahaja* (natural or straight forward) or *sukumāra* (mild), *(ii)vicitra* (variegated, verbose) and *(iii)miṣrita* or *madhyama* (combination of both). According to him, the poets depict their themes and views in agreement to their nature, hence difference in their composition regarding the style and setting, usage of figures, so on and so forth.

1. अलंकारान्तराणि निरूप्यमाण-दुर्घटनान्यपि रससमाहितचेतसः प्रतिभावतः कवेरहम्पूर्विकया परापतन्ति । (Dh.Ā.,2.16 (vṛ.)

[4]

What is the relation between a poet and his reader? It occurs usually that the reader agrees with the implication desired by the poet through his work. Let us take two examples in this context:

(1) मुखमिन्दुर्यथा, पाणिः पल्लवेन समः, प्रिये ।
वाचः सुधा इवोष्ठस्ते बिम्बतुल्यो, मनोऽश्मवत् ॥

S.D. 10,18 vṛ.

(Dear me! your face is like the moon; your hands like the leaves of a tree; your speech like the nector; and your lower lip like the *bimba*-fruit,[1] but your heart is like the stone.)

Here the object of the poet is to show the brilliance of simile (the figure by the name of *upamā alaṁkāra*). The reader too agrees with the poet in this respect.

(2) पृथुकार्त्तस्वरपात्रं भूषितनिःशेषपरिजनं देव!
विलसत्करेणुगहनं सम्प्रति सममावयोः सदनम् ॥

K.P., 4.17

(In this verse a beggar compares his house with that of a king using following 3 words having pun: 'पृथुकार्तस्वर-पात्र'[2], 'भूपित-नि:शेष-परिजन'[3] and 'विलसत्करेणु-गहन'[4]. He says:

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1. A ruddy fruit.
2. (a) पृथुक a child, आर्तस्वर = cry of distress, पात्र = an abode,
   (b) पृथु big, कार्तस्वर = gold, पात्र = a container.
3. (a) भूपित (भू+पित) = lying down on the earth, निश्शेष-परिजन = all the members of the family.
   (b) भूषित = decorated with ornaments.
4. (a) बिलसत्क = who lives in a burrow, i.e., a rat, रेणु = dust, गहन = filled with.
   (b) विलसत् = swinging in a gay mood. करेणु = she-elephant. गहन = full of.

"O King! in my house there is hue and cry always of children in distress; where all the members of the family are lying down on earth, which is filled with the dust of burrows of the rats; while—

In your house there are big containers full of gold; where all the members of the family are decorated with ornaments; and which is flocked with the she-elephants swinging in gay mood.)

This verse is accepted to be an example of *śleṣa alaṁkāra* i.e., the pun, as the poet has purposely used the above-said three words having two meanings and the reader also feels poetic delight through the usage of these words and also through simile, i.e., the comparison of the two houses.

Now another example is quoted here where it is to be decided which *alaṁkāra* out of the two—*upamā* (simile) and *śleṣa* (pun)—be accepted :

सकलकलं पुरमेतज्जातं सम्प्रति सुधांशु-बिम्बमिव ।

(Now this city has become like the shadow of the moon, as the city is 'स-कलकल', i.e., full of noise and commotion, while the moon is 'सकल-कल', i.e., having all the sixteen *kalās*, i.e., digits in her form.)

According to Mammṭa and Viśvanātha, the above saying is an example of *upamā alaṁkāra* which is supported by *śleṣa alaṁkāra* (pun). But in our opinion, it should be admitted to be an example of *śleṣa alaṁkāra* as the reader gets becharmed with the brilliance of pun, and the pun, here, of course, is supported by *upamā*. It is in fact the reaction of the psyche of the *sahṛdaya* which becomes the deciding factor as to what *kāvyaṁga* (*alaṁkāra*, etc,) should be accepted prominantly in a particular piece of poetry. In

the sentence 'सकलकलं पुरमेतज्जातम्.......', therefore, the charm of pun be accepted prominantly and not that of simile which in this context serve as an auxiliary to pun.

[5]

In short, we may say that before starting his writing, a writer gathers all the material in his mind relating to his theme, and this mental state of him is called Samādhī. The result of it becomes that he—being indifferent from all sorts of worldly rules and regulations, academic doctrines, and prototypes and also historical facts—goes on expressing his throughts spontaneously in his epic, novel, short story or drama, etc., in a style befitting to his subject-matter.[1] The main cause of all the process of his creation is, of couse, his Kāryitrī Pratibhā, i.e., creative faculty.

There are other type of writers also—of inferior quality—who following the doctrines of Poetics, especially making the use of different varities of Śabdālaṁkāras and Arthālaṁkāras (figures of speech relating to sound and sense), go on writing the happenings in the various forms of metres as prescribed in Prosody. They, not taking resort to their faculty of imagination, would go on presenting the historical

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1. (a) अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरेव प्रजापतिः।
यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिवर्तते॥

(In an incrossable world of poetic creation, a poet, like the Creator, moulds this universe according to his liking and fancy.)

(b) नियतिकृत-नियमरहितां ह्लादैकमयीमनन्य-परतन्त्राम्।
नवरसरुचिरां निर्मितमादधती भारती कवेर्जयति॥ K.P., 1.1

(We hail the poetic creation of a poet which is indifferent to the rules of the destiny, is delightful only (and not painful), never depends upon any other aspect, and is quite pleasing through nine kinds of *rasa* like *śrṁgāra*, *hāsya*, etc., and not six kinds of taste like sweet, saltish, etc.).

facts as they were, or the worldly affairs as they are. Such type of writing should not be designated as Kāvya (poetic creation), but a simple narration fashioned in versification, otherwise the texts on Medicine, Law, Astronomy or Astrology, etc., written in verse form, would be entited as the pieces of literary poetry.

Acting, Actor and Spectator

Acting is the performance through which the desired theme is presented on the stage directly before the audience.[1] The actor is one who by his performance binds the spectator and the *anukārya*[2] (Rāma, etc.,) into a bond of relationship and thus helps in providing aesthetic pleasure to the spectator. This is possible only when the spectator takes the actor to be the *anukārya* himself on account of his skilful performance.

But how does it happen when neither the actor nor the spectator has never seen the *anukārya*? Therefore on the one hand, the actor cannot exactly imitate the *anukārya*, and on the other, the spectator cannot believe that the actor has exactly imitated the actions and played the role of the *anukārya*.[3]

The authors of the *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, Rāmacandra-Guṇacandra have tried to explain it by giving the following points :

1. The actor, by reading or listening to the life-sketch

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1. (a) सामाजिकानामाभिमुख्येन साक्षात्कारेण नीयते प्राप्यतेऽर्थोऽनेनेति अभिनयः। N D., P. 352

   (b) नटै रङ्गादिभी रामयुधिष्ठिरादीनामवस्थानुकरणमभिनयः। S.D.,6.2 (Vṛ.)
2. A person who is to be imitated.
3. रामादेरनुकार्यस्य नटेन प्रेक्षकैर्वा स्वयमदृष्टत्वात् । अनुकर्ता हि अनुकार्यमदृष्ट्वा नाऽनुकर्त्तुरनुकर्तृत्वमनुमन्यते । N.D., p. 352

of Rāma, etc., as depicted or delineated by the poet, begins to feel, after good deal of practice, that he has himself seen the *anukārya* and then he starts believing that he is imitatng him.[1]

2. Another question that arises in this connection is how can the poet exactly delineate the moods and actions of the *anukārya* whom he himself has never seen. In answer to this it has been said that they receive this knowledge, i.e , the past history of the *anukārya*, from the omniscient sages and then write their dramas on the basis of this very knowledge. The spectator too, having full faith in their knowledge, acquired in this manner, takes the actor to be an *anukārya*.[2]

3. As a matter of fact, the actor has no knowledge of how the *anukāryas* had laughed or wept on particular occasions. He, therefore, imitates only the general attitude of the people who laugh and weep on such occasions.[3]

4. Though the spectator is unable to take the actor for Rāma, etc., on account of the gap of time and place that exists between the two, yet when he listens to the words of *anukārya* uttered by the actor, and is also bewitched by the melodious music played in the theatre hall, he begins to take the actor for *anukārya*, who is able to hid his own identity and appears like *anukārya*, by his gestural, vocal, extraneous and internal acting. In such a situaton, the spectator identifies

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1. तदयं नटो रामादेश्चरितं कविनिबद्धमधीत्य अत्यन्ताऽभ्यास-वशतः स्वयं दृष्टमनुमन्यमानोऽनुकरोमि इत्यध्यवस्यति । N.D., page 352

2. इह तावद् इत्थमाकृतिरित्थं गतिः × × × इत्येवमशेषमपि रामादि-ललितम् ऋषीणां कालदर्शिना ज्ञानेन निश्चितं कवयो नाटके निबध्नन्ति तत्र चार्थे मुनिज्ञानविश्वासात् नटस्य साक्षाद् दर्शनमेव । *Ibid*, page 353

3. परमार्थस्तु लोकव्यवहारमेवाऽयमनुवर्तते । *Ibid*, page 352

himself with the mental state of the *anukārya* whether it be pertaining to sorrow or pleasure.[1]

5. Besides, illusion is also responsible for taking the actor for an *anukārya*. Due to this illusion a *sahṛdaya* enjoys various *rasas—śṛaṁgāra, bhayānaka, vīra,* etc., — just as a person, while, seeing a damsel, a thief or an enemy in a dream, manifests his various emotions by symptoms like stupefications, bewitchment, perspiration, etc.[2]

The conclusion of the above statements is that as long as the spectator thinks an actor to be an imitator, he is incapable of deriving pleasure from the scene enacted.[3] It is only when he takes him to be an *anukārya* then he enjoys the performance. The reason that leads him to such a belief is the actor's skill and beautiful stage-setting. According to the *Nāṭyadarpaṇa,* these two can be termed as *bhrānti,* i.e., 'illusion'. The actor's skill too depends upon his belief that he himself is the *anukārya* and it is possible only when, on the one hand, he rehearses his part of the drama again and again, and on the other, he learns to exhibit various mental states with the help of the experience he has gained through observing various attitudes of the people for this purpose.

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1. प्रेक्षकोऽपि रामादिशब्दसंकेतश्रवणाद् अतिहृद्यसंगीतकाहितवैवश्याच्च स्वरूपदेशकाल-भेदेनाऽतथाभूतेष्वपि अभिनेयचतुष्टयाऽऽच्छादनात् तथाभूतेष्विव नटेषु रामादीनध्यवस्यति । अतएव तासु तासु सुखदुःख-रूपासु रामाद्यवस्थासु तन्मयीभवति । — *Ibid*, p. 352, 353

2. उन्मिषन्ति च भ्रान्तेरपि शृंगारादयः। कामिनी-वैरि-चौरादीन् अधि-स्वप्नमभिपश्यतः पुंसः कथम् अपरथा रंसप्ररोह-रोहिणस्तत्र स्तम्भादयोऽनुभावाः प्रादुर्भवेयुरिति । *Ibid*. p. 353

3. कृत्रिममेतद् इति जानन्तो [प्रेक्षकाः] न रामादि-सुख-दुःखेपु तन्मयीभवेयुः । — *Ibid*, p. 353

As regards the question how does the poet come to know about the various mental states of the *anukārya*, the answer is that he gains this knowledge from the sages who are capable of seeing everything with their intellectuel vision.

The above analysis by Rāmachandra-Guṇachandra is acceptable to a large extent. His last statement, however, is a bit lax. In our opinion the term 'intellectual vision of the sage' used by them is nothing but 'imaginaton' in the modern terminology. It is through this imagination that the poet is led to believe that the particular events as well as mental state might have occured in the life of the *anukārya*. He, then, depicts them in his work accordingly. Even if we admit Vālmiki to be the contemporary of Rāma, he could not have been aware of all his mental states. He also might have depicted the life of Rāma through his imagination. Similarly, other dramatists like Bhāsa, Kālidāsa, etc., must have come to know of the mental states of the *anukārya* with the help of the faculty of their imagination. It is neither logical nor a practical proposition to believe that they did so through contact with the sages.

In our opinion, the foremost medium of knowing the mental state of the *anukārya* is traditional knowledge as well as the experience of general behaviour of the peoeple at different occasions. In fact, the poets have been delineating the traditional and hearsay character of Rāma, etc., on this very basis. Though from time to time they have made certain slight changes in their character on account of their own views, yet their basic, fundamental and original concept has remained unaltered: they have been presented as persons specifically belonging to their own land and age and not to those of some other. Similarly an actor learns his skill of acting mostly from the tradition and enhances it through the

1. Such as : 'to himself', 'expressedly'; 'with anger', 'with emotion,' etc.

directions given to him by the director and by the dramatist himself in the drama.[1] The difference in the wailing and lamentation of the separated Rāma, of the separated Yakṣa and of the separated Pururavas is known to him or even to the director only by tradition. The same can be said of the spectator. If the actor peforming the role of Rāma, separated from Sītā, begins to weep bitterly on the stage, instead of arousing a feeling of pathos in a spectator, fully aware of Indian tradition, it will create a ridiculous effect on him, though it may remain pathetic to a foreigner unacquanted with that tradition. On this very basis when an actor performs the role of an *anukārya*, the spectator takes him to be *anukārya* and is thus capable of deriving aesthetic pleasure from the dramatic scene.

Therefore it can be concluded that traditional knowledge or experience of general behaviour of the people is the only basis for the manifestation of *rasa*.

21

Origninality and Plagiarism

It is said that a boy (say 'X') was carried away by a wolf. The wolf took pity on him and began to bring him up in the midst of his community, the result being that the boy escaped the fury of the wild animals. Once when the hunters pursued these wolves, the wolves fled away, but this wolf-boy came to their hands. The boy growled like a wolf, took raw meat and did not care for the clothes. The only aim of his life was to satisfy his hunger, and for this he followed devices usually employed by the wolves.

It is reported that once a king put a boy (say 'Y') in a solitary cell just after his birth. He was fed and bathed and all his needs were fulfilled, but he was not talked to . As he grew, his communion with human beings was made less and less. In the end he was supplied food through an aperture. It is said that when was taken out, he was able to speak only one word used for bread, which the person who gave bread to him used inadvertantly.

Of X and Y — the symbols of the free atmosphere and the confined cell respectively — X makes various attempts to procure food, while Y could not learn even this. The methods employed by X in this connection had been learnt by him from others — should we call them as acquired from other, or absolutely original?

Let us now think of a third boy (say Z) in contrast with the two boys mentioned above, who has been brought up in

the midst of his family, teachers and other members of the society and who has thus learnt many a thing.

Again, let us think of the people, in contrast with these three boys, who in the beginning of the creation used to move about freely in forests and yet had no knowledge of worldly affairs, and were slowly accumulating the means of life.

Obviously, the attempts to these people should be taken as original, and those of the boys X and Z as acquired from others. In the case of 'Y' the cell in which he had been confined prevented him from making any sort of such attempt, with the result that he could not learn anything. On the other hand, X and Y learnt from the circumstances in which they had been brought up. The activities of X and Z cannot be called completely original. Only that act by which one gives a new colour to the whole thing deserves the name 'originality', and that too to a certain extent, the rest being acquired. Thus no one can claim to be absolutely original, because even the things which are considered by him to be original, are often those alrady heard from other people or read from the books in some form or other. Therefore, all the human efforts are considered to have come down to us from tradition, and are not original.

The same is true in the case of creative-writing. Therefore no writer can be regarded as original. The thoughts which flow down to him through ages in the form of various genera are experessed by him in his own individual style.

Now the question is why we call some as original writers, some as ordinary, and a few others as plagiarists.

Firstly, we call a writer original, if he, with his imagination, links two or more ideas handed down by tradition on the relationship of 'generating cause and effect', 'support and suppored',[1] or on the basis of affinity or contrast. Secondly,

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1. (a) कारणकार्यसम्बन्ध, (b) आश्रयाश्रयिसम्बन्ध.

we call even that writer origianl, who presents the old thoughts in a new form. By new form is meant a style which according to the subject is simple or pedantic, delectable, sensuous and impassioned. Besides, he who can present the same idea in various shades systematically is called original. But above all, there is another form of originality whose claim is the strongest :

First an idea is prsented in a synthetic form. Then it is analysed into various concepts. Later, each is defined and supported by illustraton if desireable, the affinity and contrast between these concepts are hinted at, and if necessary, these are compared and contrasted with other conecpts of another idea either singly or collectively. In the end the conclusion is drawn in the most economic and compact language. And if possible, the writer ends his script with a consumating remark which may either have compelte or partial affinity with the initial idea, or be in complete disagreement with it.

Undoubtedly, this kind of presentation, in our opinion, is in its best of the order, and their authors may be put in the category of admirable writers. Generally they possess the following three qualities which have been called *kāvya-hetavaḥ* (the causes of poetry) in Sanskrit Poetics: *śakti, vyutapatti* and *abhyāsa*. By *śakti* they mean inborn genius, which a writer gets from the *saṁskāras* (recollections) of his previous births and which he also gets as a gift from heredity.[1] *Vyutpatti* means knoweldge acquired through various channels. By *abhyāsa* we mean practice and constant pursuit. Of these, the first should be necessarily present in an origianl writer, the rest two chasten and enhance the first.

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1. (a) शक्तिर्निपुणता लोककाव्यशास्त्राद्यवेक्षणात् ।
काव्यज्ञ-शिक्षयाभ्यास इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे ॥ K.P., 1.3
(b) शक्तिः कवित्वबीजः संस्कारविशेषः । *Ibid*. 1.3 (vr)
(c) प्राक्तनाद्यतन-संस्कार-परिपाक-प्रौढा प्रतिभा काचिदेव कविशक्तिः ।
V.J., 1.23 (Vr)

We have said above about contradiction and disagreement. Even while putting forth a contradictory view the writer requires a mature mind and a sharp intellect, with which he presents it sometimes by way of suggestion and sometimes in a friendly or sympathetic way. With the result that the bitterness involved in the contradiction loses its fangs and the whole presentation of the writer becomes so sweet and delectable that not only its supporters but even the propounders of the opposed view feel like agreeing with it.

All such expressions are termed as the individual style of the writer, and it is through this that a critic with acumen attempts to penetrate the very depths of the writer's mind and views. That is why it is said, 'Style is the man'. On the very basis of it, the critic guesses about the culture of the family of the writer, his surroundings and his social conditions. It is, of course, difficult to answer how far the conclusions of the critic are correct and convincing, but it cannot be denied that they do contain some truth in them.

Those, who are deprived of this genius of high order, are considered ordinary writers. Besides these, there are certain writers who indulge in plagiarism, for which they have been condemned, because it is the root of calumny and disgrace for them. Of course, he who claims other's work as his own is a plagiarist, but he who steals away the ideas of another and presents them in his own language is more guilty and deserves more condemnation, because he is a braggart too.

Such plagiarists have been condemned in many ways, and the words of Rājaśekhara amongst the aestheticians, and those of Bāṇabhaṭṭa among the poets have often been quoted in this context. Rājaśekhara has mentioned four types of

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1. अकवित्वं परस्तावत् कलंकः पाठशालिनाम् ।
अन्यकाव्यैः कवित्वं तु कलंकस्याऽपि चूलिका ॥ N.D., I-11

poets : (i) *Utpādaka,* (ii) *Parivartaka,* (iii) *Āchādaka* and (iv) *Saṁvargaka.*[1]

The first amongst these is undoubtedly original, hence a real poet, because he is bestowed with genius and peotic skill, but the other three are plagiarists in one way or the other. The *parivartaka* changes the languge of the original work here and there, the *āchādaka* over-shadows the ideas of other writers, and the *saṁvargaka*, like a robber, unhesitatingly borrows another's work in toto, and openly declares it as his own.[2] Someone has bowed his head before such a dare-devil again and again:

कविरनुहरति च्छायां, अर्थं कुकविः, पादादिकं चौरः ।
सकलप्रबन्धहर्त्रे साहसकर्त्रे नमस्तस्मै ॥

[An (ordinary) poet takes away the shade of the original ideas of another, a poet of meaner order the sense, and the plagiarist the words and phrases. We bow our head to the dare-devil who steals away the whole work.]

Bāṇabhaṭṭa condemning the plagiarist, has, with the help of pun, called him a thief :

अन्यवर्णपरावृत्त्या बन्धचिह्ननिगूहनैः ।
अनाख्यातः सतां मध्ये कविश्चौरो विभाव्यते ॥ H.C. 1,6

(If the thief transforms himself into the *varṇa* (shape and guise) of another, the plagiarist tranforms the words and phrases of another. The thief attempts to hide the scars left on the body by the shackles, the plagiarist tries to conceal signs reminiscent of the original work.

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1. उत्पादकः कविः कश्चित् कश्चिच्च परिवर्तकः ।
आच्छादकस्तथा चान्यस्तथा संवर्गकोऽपरः ॥ K.M., XI ch.

2. *Ibid.*, XI (last portion);

> But they are easily recognized in the midst of wise people even when not specifically pointed out.)

The point to be considered in this context is, if it be accepted that originality is a rare commodity, why should a writer be condemned only because there is likeness or similarity in his ideas and views with those of some other writer? The reason of this similarity lies, in reality, in the unity of human thought. The poeple belonging to different countries and ages, who had no chance of being influenced by one another in any way, have expressed similar ideas and views. We cannot accuse such writers of plagiarism. An idea, an incident or a view, when read or heard, enters into our mind and resides unconciously in some remote corner there Then aroused by some incident or circumstances, it results in poetic composition giving rise to similarity of ideas or feelings Man has no control over such similarity because neither he can check the ideas of others making their imprint on his mind, nor he can stop them from being expressed at some inspired moment. There are many occasions when after reading or listening to the ideas of other, we like to express them in a more systematic and novel way, and thus transform them into a literary genra: an essay, a drama, a story or a novel. This process, of course, is commendable, because it gives new direction and form to the old ideas. Sometimes assisted by our imagination, they become all the more clear, lucid, impressive and aritstic. This transformation, if we like, may be called 'originality'.

There remains now only one form of plagiarism in which a writer retaining the ideas of another delibrately replaces the latter's words or sentences by his own. It is undoubtedly hateful and deserves full condemnation

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Index of Quotations

The book presented in clear and lucid expression and style is studded with authentic quotations and appropriate illustrations. The author hopes that through his modest attempt some of the readers may cultivate the desire of studying some of the original texts on Poetics written in Sanskrit itself.

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